UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE EDUCATIONAL DEBATE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO HUNGARY, POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1989-1991

A dissertation

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of the requirements for the Degree of

Master of Education

by

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DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the Degree of Master of Education in the Faculty of Education of the University of Cape Town. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university.

Signed by candidate

Henning Oosthuizen

February 1994

TO MAGDEL AND SIMONE

IN GRATITUDE

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to determine how the socio-economic and political changes, following the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe, have found reflection and led to the emergence of interest groups in the education debate. It looks at the reforms initiated by the new ruling power-elite in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. This reform process, embodying the value system of the new governments, has led, the dissertation seeks to show, directly to new and vibrant interest groups on the educational landscape.

This study identifies the seven prominent interest groups - seeking to satisfy their own interests - which engage the government in the education policy making arena. This policy making arena, which I refer to as the "arena of power", is analysed through focussing on the relationship of power between the seven interest groups and the state. The Halasz (1986 : 123) classification of interest groups in communist Hungary in 1986, forms the point of departure for my examination of post-1989 interest groups. Each chapter highlights the circumstances that influenced the development of interest groups and the extent of their participation in reforms. The dissertation concludes with a reclassification of post-1989 interest groups in Central Europe, in order to facilitate a better understanding of the dynamics of interest groups in the "arena of power".

CONTENTS

EASTERN EUROPE 1991

(Roskin 1991 : i)

LIST OF APPENDIXES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

POLAND

SLD	-	Democratic Left Alliance
EC	-	European Community
CE	-	Committee of Experts
NSZZ	-	Solidarity National Education Section
WSE	-	Warsaw School of Economics
ZNP	-	Polish Teachers Association

HUNGARY

MDF	-	Hungarian Democratic Forum
SZDSZ	-	Alliance of Free Democrats
HSP	-	Hungarian Socialist Party
HIER	-	Hungarian Institute of Educational Research
CC	-	Core Curricula
PDTU	-	Pedagogues Democratic Trade Union
PTU	-	Pedagogues Trade Union
UP	-	Union of Pedagogues

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CSFR	-	Czechoslovakia
PFD	-	Project of Further Development of the Czech and Slovak Education System
LEA	-	Local Education Authorities
TTU	-	Teachers Trade Union
TFS	-	Teachers Forum of Slovakia
TF	-	Teachers Forum
CTTU	-	Communist Teachers Trade Union
PU	-	Pedagogical Union
PORG	-	Real Gymnasium
APS	-	Association of Private Schools
IPD	-	Islands of positive deviation
CSAS	-	Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences
CF	-	Civic Forum
PAV	-	Public Against Violence

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. ORIGIN OF THE RESEARCH

In 1989 Eastern Europe experienced its "third political turn" of the century - after 1918 and 1945 - as mass pro-democracy demonstrations swept across the continent (Anweiler 1991 : 1). Within three dramatic months, six communist governments in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria were toppled, tearing down the "Iron Curtain" on four decades of West-East conflict.

Although the international media was blanketed by coverage of the so-called "springtime of societies aspiring to be civil" (Zielonka 1991:111), I found that background material in mid-1990, unfortunately, limited itself to the political terrain. There was little information reflecting the tumult and change at the educational level in Central Europe (Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia). As the picture of political transformation began to emerge, I became keenly interested in how this situation was impacting on education. By mid-1990 it was evident to me that South Africa would within the short term face similar far-reaching changes in education. In order to develop my own understanding and hopefully to contribute to the understanding of the process of change taking place in education in my own country, I decided to undertake research on the topic and embarked upon a study tour of Central Europe to gain first hand experience. The study tour proved to be both disconcerting and inspiring. Impressive as the changes in Eastern Europe proved to be, the weight of several decades of intolerance pervaded the environment. It is the tension suggested by this condition which is the theme pursued in this dissertation. While there were clear signs of democratic changes within the society, there remained everywhere evidence of the stultifying censorial style of the old regime. Of course, it is easy to overplay the weight of this past. As a corrective to this, one needs to be aware of both the depth of the roots of the so-called new democratic movement and the deep feelings to which it appealed. There

is some hint of this in the academic literature of the field.

In the post-1989 literature, for example, such as was available, it was of particular interest to note the "wave" of opposition to the political and education system which the ruling parties were facing within the region, little of which was intimated in the pre-1989 literature on education (Davies 1986; Heinrich 1986; Hoensch 1989). In Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, a review of this literature suggested that there were vibrant interest groups with vested and long standing interests making themselves heard in the changes being experienced in education (Darvas 1991:224; Kozakiewicz 1990:46). Striking as the appearance of these groups were in the post-1989 period, logic suggests that they must have been present earlier, either in embryonic or prototypical form. It is the significance of this opposition, in a rapidly changing educational environment and its involvement in defining education in the transformational stage in Central Europe which is at the heart of this work. I refer to these groups in this process as "interest groups", following the work of Halasz (1986) and Howell (1988) on the subject.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Three features of education literature on Central Europe from behind the wall are worth drawing attention to in this review. In the first instance, Soviet ideological hegemony kept an effective censorship "lid" on publications in the pre-1989 period. Secondly, with the exception of Hungary, no literature raising critical pedagogical issues could be found. Only in the latter half of 1990, following the first democratic elections did journal articles appear that reported on and reflected the conflicting viewpoints on education reform from within these countries. The third point is that there is little reference to interest groups; only research by Halasz (1986) in Hungary and Kozakiewica (1990) in Poland, directly refer to the term "interest groups" within the education context.

A central motivation for this research, as I have stated before, is the absence of work on the transition from communism to democracy, and particularly its relevance to the sphere of education. It is the role which interest groups have played in shaping the contours of this transition which is important for this

dissertation. This work, therefore is an attempt at addressing the lack of research on the emergence and participation of interest groups in this process, especially in light of the fact that the Halasz classification only reviews Hungarian interest groups within the period of communist hegemony up to 1986.

In this review, I look at the literature on a country-by-country basis. I begin with Hungary, move to Poland and conclude with Czechoslovakia. While there are other more general studies, Howell's (1988) work is a useful introduction to the Hungarian scene for the purposes of this dissertation. He documented the initial moves towards educational decentralisation in that country, which was incidentally the first in Central Europe to do so, and the participation of local communities in school councils. The article's preoccupation with the decentralisation debate in Hungary does not, however, shed specific light on the contending interest groups and leaves the reader without much insight to ground-level (e.g. at schools) tensions and perspectives on the reform process. Darvas' (1991:244-245) work which appeared one year after the democratic election, addressed this difficulty somewhat. It was the first to identify academic experts, educators and political parties as central role-players in education. Darvas, however, refrained from identifying these groups as specific interest groups and rather chose to give a historical perspective on their development. The work has value nonetheless, in that it gives an insight to how the inherited traditions of groups influence the articulation of their initiatives. Szunyogh's (1991:9) contribution, although written earlier, gives a detailed description of emerging professional teacher associations and reports on rural conflict in schools that remain dominated by headmasters resistant to change. His articles provide a wealth of insight into "real life" situations in society and at schools and were an important source of data for this research. Taking a different tack, that of the question of an appropriate future education philosophy, the sketch by Horvath (1990:207) lends valuable insights to the debate on traditional versus modern education. Although Horvath neglects to link his observations to visible interest groups, he helps one to achieve a clearer understanding of this issue which is at the heart of the pro-versus anti-reform viewpoints. In a special feature on education, the Hungarian Observer, in September 1991, provides a lively addition to the literature. In a debate on the question of religious education (specifically Roman Catholic lessons) one has access to a number of different points of view. Gyarmati (9.1991:35), writing

in the Observer, gives a report of the particularly controversial introduction of religious education and provides a balanced report of the perspectives of opposing sides.

A number of other works, which while not specifically addressing interest groups are useful too. Tamas Kozma (1990:379 & 1991:15) gives a historical overview of general education from 1945 to 1985 and in particular the political transition in higher education. Kozma, director of the Hungarian Institute for Education Research, widely regarded as pro-government, argues for the acceleration of reforms in tandem with government policy. Writing also in the domain of higher education, Istvan Bakos of the Ministry of Education (1991:9) discusses the present challenges facing institutes of higher education in great detail. Elaborate statistics are used to strengthen Bakos' outline of the government reform strategy based on modernisation. These works are useful in illustrating the context within which the main players find themselves. Equally useful from this point of view are works which deal with the themes of centralisation and decentralisation, for example, Gesa Saska (1991:3), Nagy and Szebenyi (1990:3) who write about this policy debate in the period 1980-1990, and Bathory (1991:2), Halasz (1991:1), Szebenyi (1992:19), Halasz and Lukacs (1990:4) who look at the period 1989 onwards. The former two publications lay out the progression of the policy and the common sense behind the call for core curricula. The debate of centralisation versus decentralisation, is also intrinsically linked to the discussion about whether traditional or modern values should be reflected in the core curricula. Halasz (1991), Szebenyi (1990), Bathory (1991) and Lukas (1990) provide a broad description of changes but do not reveal the particular features of opposing interest groups or the emergence of an organised lobby exerting pressure on the new government.

In Poland, Kozakiewica's work (1990:46) (Deputy of the Solidarity dominated Parliament) usefully defined the opposing interest groups in education in terms of Minimalists (satisfied with the traditional system and in favour of slight modernisation) and Maximalists (who call both the values and objectives of the existing system into question and are in favour of far-reaching changes). Kozakiewica gives a sharp critique of the former education Ministry and in the process, identifies the opposing camps in the debate about a future education system. However, he stops short of spelling out the position of the new Ministry itself. Sorenson (1991:1) and Chimielecka (7.1991:1) identify the

academic nomenklatura (reserved positions for Communist Party members) as the most resistant group to reforms who, they argue, fear loss of influence and prestige. Chimielecka, lecturer at the Warsaw School of Economics, provides first hand knowledge of how former Communists obstructed the transition process. Jerschina and Kosiarz (1990:303-304) see the Catholic Church as a major player in education as the government seeks the Catholic Church's support in return for access to schools through religious education (Davies 1986:238). Nasalska (1990:26), Wisniewski (1991:118) and Stasinska (1990:88) point to the lack of teacher motivation, loss of status and poor salaries leading to tension within the profession's ranks and indirectly tell us about the nature of this group. However, none of the authors present these issues as the concerns of organised pressure groups. The growth of the independent school movement, undoubtedly a fast rising power group, is documented by Starzynski (1990:5) and Mieszalski (1991:1). Starzynski's account, interesting as it is, is somewhat one-sided as the author himself is a leading figure in the movement.

Aside from the work of Siemak-Tylikowska (1992:1) we know little about the dynamics of the field of curricula development since 1989. This article on core curricula development focuses solely on curricula reforms and does not place these reforms within the "big picture" of transition and is therefore of limited use to this research. Recent changes to the education system as a whole, reflecting the process of political democratisation are discussed in the writings of Bugaj (1991:1), Mieszalski (1992:1) and Kozakiewica (1992:91). Again these papers only serve to update the researcher in the most general terms and fail to contribute to the data on the emerging powers within the policy-making arena.

Czechoslovakia, Central Europe's ideologically most rigid state, placed educators under severe restrictions in the pursuit of Marxist education. This stark reality is evident in the literature itself, which only begins to manifest and discuss opposing views in education after 1989. The Council of Europe's documents on Czechoslovakia (Barret 1.1990:7), provide the first glimpse of Czechoslovakia's educational history. They give the first indication to be found anywhere of the activities of pupils and parents in exerting pressure on the government in Slovakia, where parents demanded the democratic election of all headmasters in 1990. Harach (1990:14), in his paper at the International Conference on Education in Geneva (1990), drew attention to the development

of incipient divisions between the organised teaching profession, academics and parents. The debate on an appropriate future education system had only begun at this stage and interest groups were still indistinguishable. The literature on higher education and research institutes by Burjan (1991:2) emphasizes the difficulties these institutes faced in transferring from their communist pasts as the academic nomenklatura resisted changes. Work on post-revolution (1989) reforms to the public education system by Potucek (1991:1). Von Kopp (1992:101) and Cerna (1991:3) all set out the first tentative changes based on differentiated education. These researchers, however, stress that full transition is dependent on an improvement of the economy and consolidation of the democratic process. Conspicuous by its absence in this literature is contextual detail of how interest groups have interacted with the state and with each other in influencing the turn of events in the educational arena after 1989. Suggestive as some of the material is, it fails to indicate both the scope and the nature of interest groups' involvement in the events which have played themselves out. It is this lacuna in the literature which calls for further investigation.

3. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The central research problem focuses on secondary education interest groups in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the period 1989 - 1991.

This study is an examination of the social dynamics of transition in education in Central Europe. It is an attempt to define and analyse the circumstances in which interest groups seek to develop and participate in mapping out the future of education. I will pay particular attention to the difficulties emerging systems in Central Europe encounter in working with their communist heritage. The dissertation will focus on how these pasts and their inherited traditions, obstruct, facilitate or articulate with reform initiatives. It then proceeds to analyse the sociological dynamics surrounding the most prominent interest groups in the debate on secondary education reforms. These groups include the following : teachers, teacher associations, independent schools, religious groups, parents, media, public opinion, higher education and research institutes. It is the differential way in which these groups engaged in the reform debate which is of interest here.

I will focus upon two research questions by using power as an interpretive tool. These research questions are :

i) To what extent have these interest groups participated in reforms?
ii) What are the circumstances which have influenced the development of these interest groups?

This research will attempt through an analysis of these questions to generate a better understanding of the context in which interest groups work in their attempt to influence the power elite and attain their goals in the policy-making arena. [Goals of interest groups are defined by Ziegler and Peak (1972:65) as the "stated or unstated values for which groups or individuals strive".]

The data emanating from the research will be used to develop Gabor Halasz' 1986 classification of interest groups model. I will then construct an interest group classification for each country and then for Central Europe, to suggest how the location of interest groups in the dynamics of change might be understood. The point on which this research pivots is to be found in my analysis of the balance of power in the education policy-making arena, or what I term the **"arena of power"**. In this arena, interest groups vie for power to influence government education policy and in so doing, attempt to satisfy the interests or goals of their supporters.

The research problem was **constructed** from a review of the education literature. The research approach and questions were developed during the preliminary research done in Western Europe and Britain, through interviews and document collection (see Appendix 16 and Bibliography). The approach to the work was influenced by the work of political analysts, Breslow (1991:206), Tokes (1990:61) and Di Cortona (1991:326) who drew attention to the continued influence of former communists in the political processes in Central Europe.

The **significance** of the research and the reason for studying the education debate in Central Europe, is that, in the absence of a body of knowledge of how transition from communism to capitalism works, it provides preliminary data which will hopefully enhance our understanding of the transition process in Central Europe. The interviews, drawn from people directly involved in this period of societal "flux" extending across Central Europe, will hopefully add to

the resources of primary data available on the situation in education in Central Europe. The seven most prominent emerging education interest groups (in post-communist Central Europe), as encountered by myself are identified and a classification put forward which seeks to engender a better understanding of the distribution of power in the education policy-making arena. The reason for grouping these countries together is because they are seen by analysts as a geographical and historical region, traditionally referred to as Central Europe (Szebenyi 1992.a.:19). Eveling (7.1990:21) also refers to these three countries as the "northern tier" in Eastern Europe.

4. INTEREST GROUPS AND POWER

As is clear from the review, while there is some information on interest groups in the literature, specific research targeting the broad spectrum of emerging post-1989 education interest groups, has yet to be undertaken. The significance of this absence is evident in the rather underdeveloped state of the sociology of education in Central Europe. It is for this reason that **Halasz**'s (1986:123) work is important. A brief review of his classification follows. Halasz developed a theoretical model to represent the relationship between the various interest groups present in the educational landscape in Eastern Europe. In this model four interest groups are identified which have conflicting ideas on the function of education in the pre-1989 society. The value of this approach is that it provides a guide to comprehending the social forces which interact with education and the educational debate in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Using ideology as a criterion, Halasz distinguished four major "spheres of interest" or categories of interest groups in education policy making. The first interest category included those who exhibited a high degree of ideological commitment in formulating education policy. Category two gave less priority to ideology and argued for economic considerations in policy-making. A strategy of reconciliation between economic and ideological considerations characterised the third category. The last category was least committed to ideology in education policy (see Appendix 8). The arena of education policy-making in which these interest groups form coalitions or clash is structured in a vertical axis representing the economic "E" function and a horizontal axis illustrating the ideological "I" function. Both axes have a

positive and negative pole. The positive pole of the "E" axis represents the external interest groups, for example, economic management, enterprises and economic planners. The negative end of the "E" axis is constituted by 'internal interest groups' such as the teaching profession, education administrators and educationists. At the positive pole of the "I" axis we find those who propagate Marxist ideas in education while at the opposite end of this axis are located proponents of a pluralist and differentiated view of education.

Graphically this could be represented as follows :



The interest groups (see Appendix:8) that participate in this arena are :

1. Ideologically committed educational groups (Dimension 1)

2. Ideologically less committed groups of economic planners (Dimension 2)

3. Ideologically committed vocational education groups (Dimension 3)

4. Ideologically less committed education groups (Dimension 4)

The main features of conflict identified by Halasz (1986:123) and Howell (1988:125) are between groups (3+1) which see a central role for ideology in education, and groups (2+4) which view education as a pluralist/differentiated structure catering for a wide spectrum of interest groups. A characteristic of the Halasz structure is the emphasis on education issues by groups in dimensions 1 and 4 as opposed to the economic priority visualized by groups 2 and 3. Halasz's classification model explains the structure of policy making over a period of two decades of communist government. This dissertation only focuses on a three-year period and proposes a model based on events from the 1989 revolutions to my study tour in late 1991. The conclusions and predictions

drawn from my model are limited to research of the period 1989 to 1991 and are influenced by certain limitations as spelled out later in this chapter. This research will, in Chapter 5 - the Summary and Conclusion section, comment on the position of the seven "new" post-1989 interest groups, identified in this research in regard to the Halasz classification. Data emanating from this study will be used to comment on the contemporary use of the Halasz classification and propose a new post-1989 classification.

At this point I must make it clear that the hermeneutic or interpretive tool which I will use to analyse interest groups, centres upon the concept of "power". This approach necessitates a brief definition of the key terms "interest group" and "power".

In general "**interest group**" is defined by Sinclair (1992:608) as an organisation or group of people who want certain things to happen or to be done because they will benefit from them. The Oxford Dictionary (Sykes 1984:523) describes "interest" as : "a principle in which a party is concerned; with a party having a common interest". Research in the West on interest groups theories in political science can be traced back to the first major study by Arthur Bentley, entitled, The Process of Government, in 1908 (Ziegler & Peak 1972:5). Skilling and Griffith (1971:23) state that the group approach in political science has become "an effective tool of research on many political systems" since the mid 1950's. In research on interest groups in American society, Ziegler and Peak (1972:3) define an "interest group" as "an organised social aggregate which seeks political goods that it is incapable of providing for itself". In the publication, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State and Democracy, Alford and Friedland (1985:92) elaborate on the role and function of interest groups in society: "Interest groups mediate between individuals and the state, screening and aggregating demands so that they can be responded to by the state without demand overload. Interest groups arise, become strong and disappear as a result of the changing values and preferences of individuals". The conflict theorist, Gustav Ratzenhafer, sees the social process as "the result of interaction between persons with conflicting interests" (Ziegler & Peak 1972:9). These conflicts of interests form the basis for my research on emerging Central European interest groups in education. In the literature, the term "interest groups" is used interchangeably with "lobbies", "pressure groups", "power groups" and "organised interest". The level at which this research examines

interest groups is that of education.

Interest groups in Central Europe, by no means new, are important to recognise and to understand, both from political and educational points of view. They help us understand the complexity of decision-making and policy formation processes. They draw attention to the way in which power operates in the policy-making arena. Interest groups, therefore, form the central sociological phenomenon I examine in this dissertation. It is important, however, to make clear that I see them in terms of the following sociological approach: the use of power by interest groups to control, influence or change government education policy (see Appendix 24).

Under study here is the relationship between a social category, educational interest groups in this instance, and their behaviour, which is the pursuit of **power** (influence) in the education reform process. The term "power" has been debated at length over centuries. The human tendency to seek power has been recognised by most classic political theorists, including Aristotle, Thomas Hobbs and James Madison (Willhoite 1988:23). The English philosopher, Bertrand Russell suggested that: "Power may be defined as the production of intended effects" (Willhoite 1988:5). Robert Dahl, the prominent political scientist, preferred the definition of power as "Influence of this kind, when compliance is attained by creating the project of severe sanctions for non-compliance" (Willhoite 1988:5).

In 1979, the political sociologist, Dennis Wrong (1979:2), wrote : "Power is the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others". Perhaps the broader definition by Wrong (1979:253) is most appropriate for this discussion. "Power is inherent in all social interaction, which consists of actors reciprocally producing effects on one another". In analysing the relationship between Central European education interest groups and their governments, I will use the definition by Wrong and the notion of "influence" which Dahl uses to describe this feature of social existence. The term power or influence will thus be used as an organising concept to develop an understanding of the complex educational process in Central Europe during the period of transition.

In studying the relationship of power between individuals or groups, the basic

question to pose is why power is sought (Alford & Friedland 1985:92). There is no single correct answer, but power seeking seems to be a characteristic of human communities as they compete for a scarcity of resources or differ about policies. This disagreement in political terms is called a 'conflict of interests' and forms the rational for the struggle for power and its rewards (Ziegler & Peak 1972:9). Opposing groups within a society and their relationship with a government, centre upon two components of power. James Madison (Willhoite 1988:16) describes the inevitability of 'self-centered power seeking' on the one hand while Willhoite (1988:14) refers to the 'self-defensive power seeking' group, as those who do not desire to seek power but do so to prevent political opponents from steamrolling them. The main strategies for attaining power are co-operation, tolerance, domination and elimination (Willhoite 1988:14). Reviewing these strategies we see that 'co-operation' can be defined as alliances of people working together for a common objective, for example the first post-1989 coalition governments in Czechslovakia and Hungary. The issue of 'desertion' by one or more of the coalition parties or inter-party groups remains a problem of this power strategy as will be pointed out in both Czechoslovakia and Poland (Potucek 1991; Korosenyi 1991). 'Tolerance' is a strategy whereby political opponents are accepted within, for example, a democracy where certain rules and peaceful competition are acknowledged. The third power strategy of 'domination' refers to securing control and superior power through coercion. An example is the pre-1989 Soviet foreign policy that kept the Central European satellites within the Warsaw Pact orbit by coercive means in suppressing the 1956 and 1968 revolts in Hungary and Czechoslovakia (Davies 1986; Hoensch 1989). 'Elimination' as the last power strategy can be described as removing one's opponents through means of assassination or as a result of losing elections (Heinrich 1986).

The re-establishment of civil society in Central Europe gave individuals and groups the opportunity to pursue their interests and goals within education. In this paper, seven interest groups have been identified whose primary interest is that of lobbying for their values and ideas to be represented in education. These interest groups, with the exception of the Media and Public Opinion category, stem partly from occupational categories, but essentially represent organised aggregates of people with common interests. These groups rely on a range of tactics to induce or persuade political parties and in particular the government and education minister to incorporate their goals into government legislation. The efforts of these interest groups primarily focus upon the loci of real

decision making power in the respective countries - the power elite - namely the ruling Solidarity, Hungarian Democratic Forum, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence parties (Chmielecka 21-11-91, Halasz 25-10-91, Musil 8-11-91). The governments of Central Europe, however, in turn are caught in a power balancing act in their attempts to reform education in ways which reflect democratic principles and thereby gaining legitimacy by conceding to some demands of interest groups. Their record in this regard has, however, shown that they are prepared to concede only limited control of power, and are willing to do so only in so far as it does not affect their own political strategies and undermine the support they command from their constituencies. The tactics and strategies used by interest groups thus far have shown signs of great imagination in some cases, but reflect, in other, mounting despondency.

This study will furthermore point out that the political power of legal authority which the ruling parties sought through victories in the first post-1945 democratic elections has come under threat through voter apathy and confusion stemming from a proliferation of political parties. This has seriously undermined the power base of the ruling elites and the successful outcome of the transition to democratic government in Central Europe. The balance of power and use of various power strategies by interest groups within the education policy making arena will form the focus in the section on the seven emerging interest groups.

In this study I will look at the relationship of power between the new "power elite" that is Solidarity (Poland), Civic Forum and Public Against Violence parties (Czechoslovakia), the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Hungary) and the "new" lobby of education interest groups. I will proceed to analyse the sociological phenomenon of education interest groups as the latter attempt to attain their goals in the "arena of power".

It is within this arena that interest groups have emerged to challenge the new power elites' education policy and representation of the "truth", albeit religious, traditional or reform communist values. Foucault (Ball 1990:202) reminds us that within education "knowledge is central to power relations" and a crucial role of opposition groups is to question the "universal truths" and to "detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony within social, economic and cultural spheres". This study will attempt to identify how interest groups have formed in response to the power elites implementation of education reforms

based on their vision of "universal truths".

I approach this study with the assumption that the policy of communism as it was practised has failed politically, ideologically and economically in Central Europe. My view is founded upon data emanating from extensive personal interviews, nationwide anti-communist sentiment in each country which saw up to 300 000 protestors take to the streets in Prague, Bratislava, Warsaw and Budapest. I also draw on political analysts such as Brown, Gati, Griffith (in Bresslow 1991:206) and Garton Ash (1990:2) who put the root cause of the communist crisis down to political illegitimacy and economic deterioration (Szelenyi in Powel 1993:33). Based on the information from my research I take the position that the forms of political and economic governance emerging in Central Europe offer these countries the opportunity to reconstruct civil society (Bernhard 1993:326), to legitimate and re-define political democracy.

I see a central role for education in this process. Clearly, however, the process is not a simple morality play. There are no clear villains and heroes in these situations. Communism and its followers do not automatically fall on the side of evil and tyranny. Capitalists may as easily be found there. The real problem is how societies develop open democracies where people are empowered to participate in the making and unmaking of their worlds (Roskin 1991:146). It is this position I adopt in approaching this study.

5. METHODOLOGY

How one researches transitional processes is not easy. The method I chose to employ in this dissertation was that of interviewing key pro-reform people (see Appendix 16 and Bibliography). This approach was essential :

i) because a large proportion of the documents gathered in late 1991 was not available outside of Central Europe; Literature on education reform therefore had to be obtained from people at the forefront of the reform movement.

ii) in view of the contemporary nature of political events and the scarcity of education literature reflecting political changes;

iii) because I felt that it offered an opportunity to guage people's feelings.

iv) due to the limitation of access to non-English sources.

The interviewees were originally identified through their prominence in publishing articles on education reforms and through references by academics in Western Europe. Professor F.K. Kieviet (see p.2, Bibliography) was instrumental in arranging these contracts. All the interviews of ± 60 minutes were tape-recorded and transcribed to ensure accuracy of the data gathered. The interviews were structured around a synopsis of the research problems. The interview schedule was circulated more or less, two months ahead of my visit to Central Europe, to give the interviewees time to familiarise themselves with the questions I had in mind (see Appendix 17). During the interviews, I found that the interviewees preferred to discuss the research problem "in their own words". Many of the interviews were, as a result, informal. I found myself, as a result, frequently asking for clarification of certain statements or directing the discussion to the research problem through interjecting appropriate questions. I decided to follow this method rather than a formal interview, as the interviewees clearly felt at ease, less threatened and a rapport could more easily be established. In the politically sensitive period this interview method was found to be appropriate. The majority of the interviewees spoke English and their comprehension was generally excellent. I used translators on five occasions. (Translators indicated in Appendix 16 and Bibliography). All the interviews were individual interviews except in Warsaw where a group interview of the Solidarity National Education Section took place.

I was based at the University of Leiden (Netherlands, September - December 1991) and carried out preliminary research in Western Europe to familiarise myself with socio-economic, political and education trends in the "New Europe" (Mitter & Weiss 1991:3). My initial research enabled me to gain a better understanding of the impact of the European Community (EC), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Maastrict EC unification talks on Central Europe. This phase of my research consisted of document collection and interviews in the Netherlands (10 interviews), Britain (London: 1; Exeter: 2) and Austria (Vienna: 3).

A limitation on the sample of people accessible to the researcher was the ongoing process of institutional restructuring and staff dismissals in all three countries.

The **research in Central Europe** consisted of literature and data collection, through interviews in Czechoslovakia (Bratislava : 10 ; Prague : 10), Hungary (Budapest : 7) and Poland (Warsaw : 10). It must be clearly stated that the majority of interviews reflect the perceptions of reform minded people and therefore the sample represents, by and large, a biased community. The Bibliography gives full particulars of the interviewees to facilitate a better comprehension of the sample. The sample of people selected in Central Europe included:

- educators and academics who had published literature relevant to the research

- newly appointed and/or pro-reform minded persons from Ministerial level, to research institutes, universities, trade unions, newspapers and schools

6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study is limited to a study of the events in the period from the first pro-democracy demonstrations (October 1989) and first free elections in early 1990 to my research in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, during September to December 1991. Although this study focuses on secondary education interest groups, the complexity and extent of socio-economic and political changes that impact on education during the transition period required that I review the relevant pre-1989 education and economic policies of the particular countries and examine, briefly, the characteristics of the political transformations in each. The limitations of this research are three-fold:

- only literature available in English is reflected in the discussion. A limited number of articles were also translated.

- the transitional nature of education, with continuous changes as textbooks

are re-written, preparation of education legislation and staff replacement from Ministerial level to individual schools take place, contributes to a study of this nature representing what Mitter and Weiss (1991:6) labelled, "snapshots, recording momentary states" in Central Europe on education.

- there were people I was unable to see simply because I could not obtain their addresses. Many people who had been dismissed for supporting the former system, suspicion, and a lack of co-operation from some of my contacts, made it extremely difficult to obtain a variety of perspectives. While my status as a South African appeared not to play a role amongst those who agreed to meet with me, it was not clear whether this was a material factor in the attitude of those who wished not to speak with me.

Doing research of this nature, is as a consequence, risky. Trends may be reversed. The situation in Poland where Solidarity lost in 1993 to the reform communist which they had ousted in 1989, illustrates this well. [Reform communists or liberal communists propose to "reform, liberalize or seriously modify a communist system" (Roskin 1991:138)]

7. ORGANISATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE DISSERTATION

Data analysis and interpretation of the research problem have been conducted through a "intra-systemic" (member states of former Easter Block; Mitter 1991:23) inquiry, using the comparative framework of George Z.F. Bereday as an organisational tool (Vos & Brits 1990:18-23).

The discussion of each of the countries in the study is structured into the three stages proposed by Bereday, with stage four representing the conclusion, as follows :

- Stage 1 "Description" : Education Policy (3) in each chapter relates to pedagogical data only.

- Stage 2 "Interpretation" : Political Transformation (1.) and Economic Transformation (2.) present explanation of pedagogical data through the use of disciplines such as politics, sociology and economics.

- Stage 3 "Juxtaposition" : Education Interest Groups (4. 1-7) are placed in juxtaposition by analysis of the two research questions and classification diagram constructed for post 1989 groups, in all three countries. The common criteria of "interest groups" has been established and used in comparison to examine the transition in education.

- Stage 4 "Comparison" : Conclusion (Chapter 5). Simultaneous comparison to analyse interest groups as a phenomenon and classification of Central European interest groups in "arena of power".

Chapters 2-4 examine the three countries in question. Each starts with a general introduction as an outline to the issues under discussion. The political and economic background is briefly outlined before an analysis of the education policy is undertaken. Each chapter concludes with an analysis of the research questions and a classification of interest groups that contest the policy making "arena of power". Finally, in Chapter 5: Conclusion, the data emanating from this paper will be analysed in a comparative manner, to comment on the phenomena common to the participation of interest groups in Central European education. This data will be used to construct a general classification of interest groups in this region. The study ends with Appendices and Bibliography.

CHAPTER TWO

POLAND

INTRODUCTION

Is geography destiny? In the case of Poland, the answer would probably be positive. Wedged between powerful neighbours, Poland has been appropriated, partitioned and trampled over repeatedly by Russian, Prussian and Austrian empires for over two hundred years, starting in 1772. Polish patriots' attempts to establish an independent country failed in 1794, 1830, 1863 and in 1905. It was only through Polish military force that Poland re-appeared on the map of Europe between 1917 and 1941. This period was, however, shortlived. The Germans occupied the country in 1941 and then in January 1947, communists seized power and invited the Warsaw Pact forces to enter and "defend" Poland.

The crisis which beset Poland in the mid-eighties was correctly predicted by many analysts but few foresaw in this process the rise of the Polish working class and their unknown leaders who were to initiate the domino effect (first referred to by President Eisenhower of the USA) which led to the toppling of communist governments in Central Europe (Davies 1986:720; Roskin 1991:136). This chapter is structured according to the Bereday (Vos & Brits 1990:18) comparative framework. Using this framework, the growth of opposition to the communist government in Poland, in particular the emergence of a constellation of new political forces, is discussed by means of tracking the development of Solidarity and the triumph of its leader in the first post-1989 elections (section 1). The discussion will suggest that the success of reform implementation in education depends largely upon economic recovery. This reality mandates a brief description of economic transformation in Poland (section 2).

The relevance of this for education is shown by means of a brief review of pre-1989 education policy (section 3). The significance of this review is that it foregrounds the first signs of the presence of new and vibrant interest groups in Poland and the breaching of what one might call ideological monism in the education debate. The political result is that we see three areas in education

targeted for reform by government (post 1989). Legislation is introduced in management and administration; curricula; and teacher training. This legislation gives concretisation to the government's education reform policy and is a stimulus for the involvement and legitimisation of interest groups.

The chapter examines the seven most prominent education interest groups to illustrate how they face these challenges (sections 4.1-7). The section on interest groups starts with a summary which reviews the data relevant to the research questions : interest groups participation in reforms and the circumstances influencing the development of interest groups (Section 4). This "arena of power" and the balance of power between the interest groups are then presented in the form of a classification diagram in the concluding section (5).

Before I proceed, it is important to comment on the mood I encountered during my visit to Poland. The momentous events of 1989 which saw the establishment of an independent Poland after nearly two centuries and the deep patriotic fervor were still evident in 1991 during my visit to Warsaw. There was an almost tangible atmosphere of hope and optimism for the future. At this point I must state that while the physical scars left by the Nazi demolition of Warsaw in 1945 had disappeared by 1991, the people, and particularly those I had interviewed, were still manifesting the psyches of people who had been forced to endure decades of totalitarianism. Signs of their oppression were evident everywhere. Many Poles were still working through the process, psychologically and socially, of adjusting to the hegemony of the communist period. As a result, many, especially the dissidents in the "liberated" and somewhat giddy moments of the early nineties, continued to be wary of the presence of former communists and nomenklatura. This brief sketch of the prevailing "societal mood" in a period of radical transition is essential to be able to comprehend the political and educational landscape.

1. POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

The first sign of weakening in the control of the Communist Party came to light as long ago as August 1980 as Solidarity (Solidarnosc in Polish), the first self-governing and independent trade union in the Warsaw Pact, won its

demands during strikes at the Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk and the mines at Silesia (Heyns & Bialecki 1991:52) (see Appendix 21). The basis of this crisis, such as it became, was to be found in both economic stress and political opposition; in terms of the former there had been worker strikes (1970, 1976), and sporadic food shortages, which reflected in essence, a growing failure of the Communist Party's economic strategy; and in the latter, there was an increasing gulf developing between a fervent - despite state policy - Roman Catholic population and the atheist government (Davies 1986: 616, 626).

After the strike of 1980, events in Poland moved rapidly. During the negotiations with the state over the rights of registration for Solidarity in 1980, a unique partnership between workers and intellectuals was forged under the leadership of Lech Walesa. Solidarity evolved into an umbrella organisation for anti-government opposition as worker committees joined together. Martial law was imposed in 1980 - 1981 as the Communist Party realised that the seven million strong Solidarity posed a real threat to its monopoly on power (Roskin 1991:122). Lech Walesa and other Solidarity activists were arrested, forcing Solidarity underground. In December 1981, as corruption in the Gierek government became evident and an undoubted liability for the Warsaw Pact, the Polish military under General Wojciech Jaruzelski took over power, and in the process avoided the threat of Soviet intervention (Davies 1986:616). Ironically, several years later, Jaruzelski was to use this putsch as his great "liberating act". He claimed that by averting a Soviet invasion, he had initiated the peaceful erosion of the Iron Curtain in Poland : "I really doubt whether Europe would be the Europe being shaped today had Poland been witness then to the kind of conflict that would have ensued if martial law had not been introduced" (Prentice 1991:10).

But his actions were, in reality, sufficient only to postpone facing the country's crisis. Strikes and demonstrations continued apace. By early 1988, arising from the persistence of crisis, Jaruzelski instructed the Interior Minister, Kiszczak, to invite Solidarity to round table talks to "save" Poland (Roskin 1991:135). The government delegation led by Prime Minister Rakowski and Kiszczak met Solidarity, led by Walesa, as equals and in desperation pleaded with them for their co-operation to save their country. This development had momentous outcomes. Solidarity activists were released from jail in February

1989 thus paving the way for negotiations which in their turn were to set the terms for a general election. Unlike the situation in the 1950's to the 1980's, it became clear that in terms of Mikhail Gorbachev's new "glasnost" (openness) and "perestroika" (reconstruction of Soviet society) (Evling 7.7.1989:2) policies, the Soviet Union would not intervene. Gorbachev had repudiated the Brezhnev Doctrine - in his Strasbourg speech (6.7.1989) to the Council of Europe, saying : "Any interference in internal affairs, any attempts to limit the sovereignty of states - both friends and allies or anybody else - is inadmissible" (Evling 7.7.1989:2). The negotiations thus took on the characteristics of a government retreat.

A major breakthrough of the talks was the unconditional legalization of Solidarity and the recognition of its status as an equal participant with government in the political process. Popular discontent and economic crisis had thus forced the government to accept power-sharing through the establishment of an "anti-crisis pact" (Walicki 1991:95).

The role of the Roman Catholic church and the influence of Pope John Paul II needs to be emphasised in these developments,especially in the emergence and success of Solidarity (Michel 1990:2). The church, especially after the Pope's visit in June 1979, had become not only a religious, but also a political symbol of the spirit of resistance in Poland and played no small part in welding together what became a social movement (Swajkowski 1-10-91). Polish society, infused with a new religious and patriotic spirit as a result, and enflamed by the apparent rottenness of the communist government, underwent a process of "recatholisation" (Schopflin 1991:245) in the 1980's. The church, moreover, as it turned out, was also to provide crucial organisational support for Solidarity in the upcoming elections.

In June 1989, partially free elections were held in a complicated system of election run-offs. Solidarity, which had developed into a broad based political party, faced an election campaign dominated by a government in control of and using the popular media. This notwithstanding, it scored an impressive triumph and won 99 of the 100-seat Senate and all 161 parliamentary seats it contested (Roskin 1991:150). The government still ruled, however, as Solidarity was only allowed to compete for 35% of the 460 seat Parliament, the remainder of which were reserved for the Communist Party. When Parliament reconvened in

July 1989, the Communist Party continued to hold power, but Solidarity had undoubtedly gained the psychological advantage as the so-called "puppet-parties" (Roskin 1991:150) who had previously ensured communist parliamentary dominance, deserted the government to swing the majority to Solidarity. General Jaruzelski, as President, was forced, in these circumstances, to name Solidarity's Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Prime Minister. And thus was Solidarity catapulted from an oppositionary social movement into power as a fully fledged political organisation (Breslow 1991:206).

After Soviet leader Gorbachev had convinced the Polish Communist Party leader, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, not to oppose the Solidarity nomination, Mazowiecki was inaugurated in office by unanimous parliamentary vote (Roskin 1991:150). Thus had Solidarity, in a sense, reached the pinnacle of its power. This speedy ascent, however, was followed by an equally speedy decline, for the movement, as a coalition of forces, could not withstand the disintegrating impulses of the revolution. The assumption of power had, in a sense, come too quickly for the social movement (Bauman 1991:130). Its identity as a political party with a clear political programme was as yet underdeveloped and even undefined. In 1990, Solidarity split into the populist Walesa Supporting Center Alliance Party, and the Democratic Alliance led by intellectuals such as Mazowiecki. The organisation was, in some ways, hiving off into its natural constituencies. In late 1990, Jaruzelski resigned as president and Walesa won the presidency against his erstwhile comrade, Mazowiecki (Roskin 1991:150). (The distribution of the seats in the Parliament in November 1991 appears in Appendix 2.)

Almost inevitably, it must be said, the rending apart of Solidarity into the Centre Alliance and the Democratic Alliance (later Democratic Left Alliance - SLD) was a consequence of serious policy differences about economic strategy and the role to be played by former communists in positions of influence. While the former Mazowiecki government had introduced economic "shock therapy", into Poland, it appeared, however, to Walesa's Centre Alliance Party to be slow in privatising factories and dismissing communists in government and industry. The image Mazowiecki's Democratic Left Alliance revealed was that of a moderate left, free-market party consisting of intellectuals with social democratic ideals (Korosenyi 1991:104). The Centre Alliance image was strongly Catholic but worker based with fervent nationalist and conservative

religious ideals. Walesa moreover, deeply charismatic, provided a form of leadership which won much popularity for its strong anti-nomenklatura stance. Walesa also won a great deal of support from the working class, who continued to see the electrician turned trade union leader as a champion of the rights of the workers (Rose 1993:156).

With the Centre Alliance asserting a strong presence within the working class the Polish Communist Party, was thus effectively by 1989 cut off from its proletarian roots. Jaruzelski, the party's last leader, admitted : "From the very beginning, Solidarity was seen as the fruit of a working-class protest." However, as time marched on, political slogans appeared in its programme which showed that it had moved towards a counter-revolutionary anti-socialist form" (Prentice 1991:10) (see Appendix 21).

2. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

Towards the end of 1989 (see Appendix 5) the new Solidarity government was faced with a ruined economy with inflation running over forty percent per month (Evling 13.7.1990:27; Morawski 1991:286). Without the benefit of a precedent of how to transform itself from a planned to a free market economy, the government and finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz decided upon the rapid "shock therapy" economic policy. In cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, the "shock therapy" policy went into effect on 1 January 1990 (see Appendix 21). In terms of this, the polish zloty currency was devalued and made fully convertible to international currencies, prices were freed to market-dictated levels, government subsidies were eliminated, movement of private capital was allowed and limits were put on wage increases and credit (Roskin 1991:183). The policy, furthermore, included a cut in the national budget deficit and implementation of Western taxation and banking systems.

Five months after the implementation, the government had succeeded in reducing inflation to below five percent a month, the zloty had stabilised against the dollar, the budget had been balanced and consumer goods had become once more available. However, as the government embarked upon an economic

restructuring program the consequences of the economic policy began to be felt:

- Unemployment spiralled rapidly increasing from zero to more than two million in two years, forcing many more people below subsistence level (Boyes 1991:23; Balasz 1991:10).

- Parliament delayed the privatisation of unprofitable state enterprises. These enterprises cut back production and contributed to a deepening recession. Only five of the 7000 state enterprises were sold in 1991 (Zielonka 1991:116).

- In June 1990 Polish salaries had been devalued by forty percent while food prices were fifteen times higher than they had been in June 1989 (Roskin 1991:183).

By the end of 1991 the economy started to recover slowly. The Parliament passed a law on privatization that gave all citizens vouchers to acquire shares in former state enterprises. However, the economic outlook continued to be unfavourable with a huge budget deficit, a cautious investors' climate and Poland having to compete with Czechoslovakia and Hungary for scarce regional investments. The completion of economic restructuring and thereby possible membership of the European Community (EC) would, it appeared, take some time, with the earliest predictions by the Polish Foreign Minister, Skubiszewski, indicating some sucess by the year 2000 (Holm 1991:15).

How these developments on the political landscape impacted upon education, will be discussed in the next section.

3. EDUCATION POLICY

In this section a brief review of the period 1960 to 1989 is offered in order to grasp the education environment in which interest groups articulate their needs and the conditions which influence their development and participation in the reform process. This section begins by outlining the crisis which had developed in education and proceeds to highlight the communist government's attempt to address this crisis particularly through (i) its appointment of what it called the

Committee of Experts (CE) and (ii) the subsequent involvement of the Roman Catholic Church and Solidarity. The round-table talks between Solidarity and the government which flowed out of this attempt signalled the start of talks on education reform, a process concretised by legislation after the first free elections in July 1989.

The education system in Poland - a product of communist ideological and political reasoning in 1949 - appeared, by the late 1960's, unable either to promote national development or meet the country's cultural and economic needs. By 1970 general conditions in Poland had so deteriorated that the Gierek government was forced to re-evaluate its strategy in many areas, but particularly with respect to education. It appointed an expert committee, led by Jan Szczepanski, to investigate the situation and to recommend how the education system could be reformed to meet the needs of the changing society. The committee delivered its report entitled, The State of the School System in Poland, in May 1973 to both the government, and, unexpectedly, to the public, a novelty within the communist state (Mieszalski 1992:3) and indeed, it may be added, in any communist country. The 1973 report proposed a comprehensive reform of the education system. The recommendations centered upon a new ten grade compulsory common school system intended to provide students with options for pursuing both technical and academic tertiary education. The lack of public enthusiasm for the recommendations and the deepening economic crisis, however, prevented implementation of the report (Januszkiewicz 1985:3952). This left the education system essentially intact in the period 1973 - 1987.

The present situation in Polish education can be traced to **January 1987** when Prime Minister Messner established a new **Committee of Experts** whose task was to evaluate the entire system and to suggest alternative education options for Poland. "Where do we stand?" and "What should be done" were two questions he required the CE to address. Messner's approach to the enquiry was influenced by concern that public attention was preoccupied with economic issues and not on the deteriorating education conditions, and that educators were caught up in debating the prevailing conditions at the expense of planning for the future (Mitter & Weiss 1991:71). In the end, Messner's insight was undermined. Opposition parties, sensing that the enquiry opened up political space, argued that the committee should engage the whole society in the

discussion. As a consequence, it took a year to establish the new committee, led by Czeslaw Kupisiewicz. (The composition of the CE is not given in literature.)

Three approaches were considered (Gesicki 1991:1) by the new committee. These are considered briefly.

The first option, "The Society Without Schools", and the replacement of the school with alternative training and education, an extremely radical proposal in anybody's terms, was rejected by the CE for fear that it would pose a threat to the development of Polish civilization and culture. A second proposal, "The Substantially Innovated School" in which the schools would undergo innovations (structure - organizational; programme - methodical) in a series of "jumps" (Gesicki 1991:2), was found by the CE to be suspect; its opinion was that this reform strategy would constantly be rendered obsolete, due to its retro-active nature and as a result of the expected rapid rate of social changes. A third approach "The Permanently Innovating School", found favour with the CE, and emerged as its proposal. Educational reform, in accordance with this approach, consisted of a double-stage strategy in which, in a first-stage, the present structure and organisation was to be maintained, but legal reforms would be prepared in order for the system to perform the "jump" to the new innovated education system. The important second stage is then to maintain a permanent state of innovation as a process of evolution in accordance with the needs of the changing society.

Given the prevailing conditions in Poland, the CE in the end, however, recommended that the implementation of the reforms in the whole educational system should be put aside as they were of an experimental nature and time was needed to counter mistakes. A process should instead be pursued which would allow mistakes in reforms (e.g. structure; curricula) to become apparent following a certain time lapse after implementation. The committee thus opted for a "mosaic strategy" (Gesicki, 1991:3) in which selected sections of the whole education system would, in a step by step manner, be subject to reforms. It was felt, moreover, that this approach would give the Ministry the time to adapt their reforms from updated information where evaluations had been conducted. The CE concluded by citing a number of difficulties which were likely to be encountered. These included the inappropriateness of the education system in relation to the needs of the new market economy and the lack of

public support and absence of pressure from social groups for radical education changes.

It was to Prime Minister, Mazowiecki, that the Committee of Experts delivered its findings in two reports in October 1989. Entitled **Education under Impeded Conditions** and **Education as a National Priority**, both reports drew attention to the reforms needed in education and found in the new Solidarity government a receptive audience. So palatable to the government were these reports that the government used them as the basis for legislation which it initiated (Mieszalski 1991:4).

The new government thus found itself in a peculiar position. Having had to take responsibility for the affairs of state more quickly than it had anticipated, stern challenges lay ahead of it. In the CE's reports, however, fortuitously almost, were elements of an approach which it found acceptable and which it thus appropriated. This appropriation was the so-called "mosaic strategy" which the CE had recommended in its reports.

On 6 June 1990 the new government passed the System of Public Education Act, containing the essential recommendations of the Committee of Experts' reports (see Appendix 18). Reflecting the social climate, the government sought to embody in the Act the values of what it perceived to be the new democracy. Principles emphasized in the Act included:

- liberty, justice, tolerance and openness to universal values (mostly West European), including basic human rights; a neutral ideology for education (that pupils have the right to receive tuition consistent with their own convictions within the parameters of the education system's principles);

- parental right to educate their children according to their own philosophical and religious beliefs (Szebenyi 1992:21).

Growing out of a groundswell of reform, this legislation gave impetus to the process of renewal which had started after the Polish round table talks. Its impact was significant in that it initiated change in the key areas (Barret 1.1991:21) of management and administrative policy, curricula, structure and

teacher training.

With respect to management and administration, the changes were far reaching A new **management** and **administration** policy was installed which led to the abolition of the old centralised 3 x 3 model of administration in which each of the three levels of administration (national, regional and local) contained a political organ, administration organ and Communist Party organ. A new two-level structure consisting of municipalities and the Parliament - with the courts as the means to appeal against state decisions - was brought into being (Szebenyi 1992:28). With the new structure the local education authorities were placed under direct jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education.

The idea behind the elections of local government and education authorities is described by Swidlicka (Evling 13.7.1990:30) as a means of "speeding up" the democratic reform process. Swidlicka reports that: "He (Prime Minister Mazowiecki) had hoped that the local elections on 27 May 1990 would sweep away the old nomenklatura and bring in thousands of local activists who would make use of the opportunity to implement innovative solutions to local problems and build completely new democratic structures from the ground up. It is too early to say to what extent the recent (May 1990) local self-government elections achieved this aim " (Evling 13.7.1990:30).

With the disappearance of the regional authority level, schools became responsible to the local municipalities and local educational authorities represented by school inspectors. It is essential to understand the position of schools in this transitional period of the two-level model and therefore a discussion on municipalities and schools follows (Barret 1990:31).

The 1990 Municipal Act in Poland, a companion to the System of Public Education Act, supported the formation of school districts around towns, which were to be supervised by one to two qualified experts on behalf of the municipality. The formation of school districts, based upon the English Local Education Authorities, was one of the options proposed in the Polish educational debate (Szebenyi 1992:28). The new system of administration opened the way for the autonomous development of villages, each taking responsibility for its schools. Provision was made by the Parliament in the Municipal Act which would enable the government to intervene. In order to avert initial administrative difficulties in the change from the three level model

(to a two level model without the formal regional level), Poland retained forty-nine regional "voivodeship" (or provinces) administrative units.

The decentralisation drive also received further momentum from the new emphasis placed on the role of the local community and municipalities. The displacement through the 1990 Municipal Act of the centralised imperatives made possible "bottom-up" initiatives by municipalities. In 1990 the local municipalities began by taking over the responsibility of kindergartens (children aged 3 - 6) and by 1994, all primary and community schools of the region were to fall under such local jurisdiction (Szebenyi 1992:28).

Autonomy at municipal level meant a transfer not only of the schools and their assets, but also the financial burden to the local community. Central government in Poland was to meet primary school budgets only until 1995 ((Szebenyi 1992:28).

The implications at school level of this change have been equally significant. School autonomy has been advanced with the bulk of decision-making being delegated to school councils. The school councils are composed of parents, teachers and representatives of the pupils and local community. The position of these councils has furthermore been strengthened particularly with regard to local education policy, as a direct result of the new education legislation which gives these bodies wide latitude in so far as it contains only the basic guidelines for local policy formation on staff selection, financial policy and curricula background (Barret 1.1991:21).

This process has helped to "liberate" (Wisniewski 1991:111) the schools from the central authority and bring them within the sphere of control of the local community. The transfer of financial responsibility to local education authorities is a key part of the decentralisation process. This transfer of responsibility will further give local authorities the power to appoint principals and to influence the pedagogical direction of school programmes.

The second major area in which the reform made itself felt was that of subject curricula. The need arose to address what was perceived as propaganda in textbooks, to curtail overloaded curricula, to bring more flexibility to the syllabi and to consolidate the fragmented nature of certain subjects. The gist of the new

reforms was the common core school curriculum of minimum requirements. Outlined in the February 1990 publication of the Council of Europe Newsletter (Barret 1.1990:31), these reforms were:

i) The teacher would spend 70% of his/her time tutoring to the common core syllabus, leaving him/her the remaining 30% of his/her time to utilize in a flexible manner according to own initiative. This was largely in an attempt to address those long-standing grievances and cries of dissatisfaction from teachers about the absence of alternatives available to the individual teacher (Barret 1990:31).

ii) The privileged and compulsory status of Russian was dropped in favour of a statement giving equal status to all foreign languages. The context of this reform was that an acute shortage of foreign language teachers plagued the education system with Barret (1.1990:31) putting the demand for foreign language teachers in Poland at 20 000 in 1990.

iii) The abolition of ideological monism. The path of ideological pluralism which had been started upon in Poland before 1989, was concretised under the Solidarity government with the elimination of the ideologically loaded "Social Studies" subject in schools which dated from the communist era (Szebenyi 1992:21).

A new teacher training system and improvement of in-service training constituted the third focus of the education reforms. A diagram explaining the structure of the Polish education system appears in Appendix 3. At present the standard of education is adversely affected by the presence of 40 000 unqualified rural teachers in the system, 70 000 teachers who are not deemed adequate for a modern school and by the fact that 20% of the teachers corps do not tutor in the subjects in which they majored (Mieszalski 1992:6).

Fifty new teacher training colleges were scheduled to open in October 1990 in terms of the 6 June 1990 System of Public Education Act. Offering a three year course included in which were many novel dimensions, such as foreign languages, for example, it was hoped that they would act as a model for the future development of the system and thus facilitate the introduction of innovative teaching methods. The ascendancy to power of Solidarity in 1990 produced an interesting twist to these reforms. Since forming the

government, it has been reluctant to promote these structural changes further (Szebenyi 1992:25). This has been a direct consequence of the opposition to such changes by parents and teachers. This signalled the earliest presence and impact of interest groups in the education arena and a phenomenon that the government has to contend with since 1989. The structure of the Polish education system (see Appendix 3) therefore remained relatively unchanged following the events of 1989 (Januszkiewicz 1985:3953).

4. EDUCATION INTEREST GROUPS

The re-establishment of civil society in Poland after 1989 provided evidence of the normalisation of the activities of organisations, associations and groups from across the political, cultural and education sphere. Within education, I identified seven interest groups or social categories, each containing various disparate and often opposing groups, that were involved in the various education reform debates and ground-level participation in changes. These interest groups are teachers, teacher associations, independent schools, religious groups, parents, the media and public opinion (groups representing public opinion) and institutes of higher education. This section proposes to ask the research question: what were the circumstances that influenced the development of interest groups and their participation in reforms. The seven interest groups will then be dealt with in greater detail, with the analysis of each interest group ending in a description of its position in the proposed "arena of power" classification.

4.1 Teachers

Following the first democratic elections in 1989 and the embodiment of democratic principles in the education legislation passed in 1990, one would expect the reform of the Polish education system to have been a foregone conclusion. However, my research in Warsaw towards the end of 1991, found pro-reform educators, politicians and academics locked in a "battle" with communists, former communists and nomenklatura over the implementation of legislative reforms (see Appendix 24). This "battle" ranged from Ministerial, municipal and university right down to school level.

Although the Solidarity government had made enormous headway through its dismissal of many ideologists from the previous government, there remained communists entrenched at all levels. The dire situation which teachers faced, especially those pro-reform minded, is best exemplified by the comment of the president of the NSZZ, Stefan Kubowicz (22-11-91) (see Appendix 16 and Bibliography) : "Many teachers are still afraid of old communist headmasters and can't teach normally, the power of headmasters is a problem in reforms. There are many (with vested) interests, not just political, for example, associations of teachers, groups of old directors (headmasters) who want to maintain their influence and prestige". (The title "headmaster" is used in Central European education literature to refer to the head of a school and is therefore used in this study, as opposed to a more neutral and less sexist word such as "principal".) The persistence of pre-1989 conditions in certain schools creates the potential for conflict between pro-reform teachers, parents, pupils and local community on the one hand and **those favouring the status quo** or minimal changes. A research report entitled, New Ideas of Education in Poland, published by the University of Warsaw, outlined a number of problems which continue to plague reform implementation at schools (Bugaj 1991:15). One of the central problems was found to be a shortage of teachers who are creatively involved in implementing Ministerial reforms. Schools in small villages and towns are especially prone to this phenomenon.

Polish teachers have to come to terms for the first time in roughly four decades with the prospect and actual day-to-day task of **dealing with parents** as equals. The teachers' relationship with newly empowered parents (especially on school councils) therefore warrants discussion as their attitude will affect their participation in the process of a democratically functioning community-based institution. Teachers, however, are a complex community, as shown by a number of studies. One by Professor Wisniewski (1991:113), who heads the education department at the University of Warsaw, found that a number of teachers in Warsaw were satisfied with the working of state schools and hence were resistant to reforms. Such teachers saw changes as negatively affecting their immunity to parental influence. Zahorska's (1991:113) work, coming from a sociological analysis, argues that elementary school teachers, whom he had interviewed, view parental influence as already being sufficient and in some cases too strong. Teachers have become used to complying with the principal and Ministry's directives and have never had to co-operate with parents. The teachers' present apprehensions therefore are deeply related to the prospect

where they will no longer receive top-down instructions but will have to co-operate with newly empowered parents (Wisniewski 1991:111). Nasalska's (1990:31) project on teacher conceptions of their professional roles confirms this distance between the local community and teachers. Polish teachers participating in this project, in reference to the elements most highly appreciated in their roles, put contact with the local community at the bottom of their list of responsibilities. (See Appendix 1).

What these studies reveal is that although the isolated position of the school within the community is to an extent the result of the former communist centralised education system, the present reforms necessitate a change in teacher attitudes to fully normalize teacher-community relations. The willingness of teachers to accept the new participation of parents within their former exclusive domain in schools, will determine the nature of teacher-parent relations.

The poor **economic position** of teachers has in many instances dominated education debates and pushed to the margin, questions of reforms and teacher implementation thereof. The salary issue is seen by 65% of teachers as the most urgent issue within the education debate. Teacher demands call for the Ministry to address the financial position of the teachers as a priority, instead of "idle" attempts to reform the education system (Stasinska 1990:88). The increase in the quality of teachers' work is seen by 74% of teachers as a direct link to an increase in pay (Stasinska 1990:88). The teacher demands centre around a pay increase equivalent to their work and qualifications. These demands are supported by 64% of teachers who see their financial position as inferior to corresponding white-collar groups.

Teachers' replies in research data clearly underline the poor self-concept prevalent among teachers. Research reveals that 33% of teachers believe that they have no influence on reforms of the value-system (Stasinska 1990:92). This attitude, and the extent therefore, to which teachers criticise or are reluctant to criticise the education system, can be traced to a number of factors. The teacher is traditionally seen to be submissive to institutional, parental and community recommendations. Open criticism of the education authorities is also traditionally seen to have little effect and only lands one in trouble.

The negative social status and prestige of teachers shape to a significant extent,

their approach and involvement in school affairs and orientation to reforms. In order to ensure teacher implementation of reforms and reverse the former top-down administration style, the new Ministry is faced with a paradoxical situation. The Ministry needs to take the lead in making certain national reforms whilst simultaneously being seen to enlist the input of local schools and communities. As many as a quarter of teachers, by the end of 1990, held the pessimistic view that the national debate on education reforms, was too late to stop the current wave of "ruining developments" - a reference to poorly equipped and understaffed schools (Kubowicz 22-11-91). Following the democratic elections, pro-reform teachers were in a disadvantaged position in relation to the reform process. This could be ascribed largely to the absence in the pre-1989 era of a legal and non-communist lobby and the existence of relatively few teachers as community representatives in public issues. Teachers, therefore, were separated from public life and lacked a tradition of participating in decisions affecting their work. They had ceded all initiative to the Ministry whom they regarded as having the only real ability to change the conditions surrounding their work.

In the climate of uncertainty pro-reform teachers and those which cling to the former system, remain bogged down unable to make the transition to implementation of ground level reforms.

Within the classification of interest groups that contest the education policy-making "arena of power", I would describe pro-reform teachers (dimension 4 - see page 67) as being in a position of weakness in view of the dominance of the Education Ministry in this process. In the short-term, the groups in dimension 1, e.g. reform communists, will continue to impact negatively upon pre-reform teachers, especially in light of the recent ascent to power by the reform communists. The power of pro-reform teachers in policy-making will only be enhanced given economic recovery, increased influence by the pro-EC economic lobby and backing by parents who share their reform sentiments. The possibility of teacher demonstrations and even strikes are not excluded in the near future, as the data reveals the lack of "access channels" (e.g. failure of the NSZZ reform proposals to the 1991 Education Commission and lack of media coverage) by teachers to gain an input into policy-making.

4.2 Teachers' Associations

Teachers Associations are by definition established and organised to further the professional interests of a particular group of teachers (see Appendix 21). The discussion in this section looks at the two main antagonists in the Polish context, the Teachers Solidarity (NSZZ is the umbrella body of this association) and the Polish Teachers Association (ZNP). The position of both associations in regard to participation in education reforms is examined from the 1989 political transformation. Special attention is given in this section to the NSZZ pro-reform efforts in the parliamentary Education Commission (1991), election of headmasters in state schools, and the involvement of parents at school level (see Appendix 24).

Education, in contrast to sectors such as transport and industry, where Solidarity was extremely effective, lacks the unity and the presence of a change agent. For example, only a third of the corps of 500 000 teachers in Poland belonged to Teachers Solidarity, formed in the late 1980's at a time when its activities were severely restricted by the communist government. The rest are members of the controversial **Polish Teachers Association**, one of the most powerful and influential interest groups in education. The ZNP trade union is controversial because it is politically left-wing, non-communist, with 60% of the teachers according to Kozakiewicz (1992:99) non-aligned. A third of the ZNP teachers were members of the old Communist Party and constituted the bulk of the group to which supervisors (inspectors) and headmasters also belonged under the former government. The non-communist label given to it by Kozakiewicz (1992:99) contrasts with that of Solidarity NSZZ's characterisation which views it as communist dominated (Kubowicz 22-11-91). During my group interview with the Solidarity NSZZ presidium, they ascribed the continued power of the ZNP to two factors: "The ZNP are rich because they have assets of pre-1989 (presidium members present : Kubowisc, Zielinski, Zurawski, Kropiwnicki, Kurylo, Baron - see Appendix 16, p. 184). The money power of the ZNP attracts members; for example, they can pay for language courses, hotels. They are popular because the directors are of the trade union and in the local villages they are all powerful. This ZNP trade union is of the old communists" (Kurylo 22-11-91).

The **National Education Section (NSZZ)** led the pro-reform lobby in education.

The NSZZ leadership consists of a presidium with a president, vice-president and five presidium members, each democratically elected and representative of their regions (see Interviews in Warsaw). A review of the education reform campaign of the NSZZ, shows that their proposals centered around enabling the society and parents to influence schools and to have a choice of schools. Their anxiety, confirmed by Parliament turning down their proposals, is essentially that headmasters wield inordinate power. The NSZZ members of the parliamentary education commission put forward proposals which sought to increase the flexibility of schools so that they could respond to the increasing need of private firms and commerce (in the change to a market economy) for specific job skills. In spite of a few communist members coming out in support of the NSZZ proposals, the parliamentary education commission voted nine to eight to turn them down. According to Kurylo (22-11-91), the old communists now in Parliament, in the Education Ministry, at various levels in the education system and as a number of headmasters, remain a major stumbling block in the reform process.

Much of the conflict, particularly between the ZNP and the NSZZ in the teachers associations can be traced to opposing views on teacher appointments, the old system of headmasters and participation of parents. Following the political transformation in 1989, education underwent a period of "housecleaning". The long debated need for free and open competition for posts was realised. However, a series of reports have indicated that the new criteria for appointments discriminate against former Communist Party members, disregarding individual ability in spite of a declared policy of so-called fair competition (Kozakiewicz 1992:100).

The old network of headmasters is identified by Kubowicz (22-11-91) as a specific interest group within the education system: "Under the communist regime, all directors (headmasters) had to be confirmed by the party. This position we (NSZZ) want to change so that society and parents have influence in schools. This is the main thrust of Solidarity's demands". The power of this group of directors is viewed by many Solidarity teachers as a major obstacle to reforms at school level (Boron 22-11-91). The maintenance of their institutional dominance, their influence and prestige are seen as the main motivation for the anti-reform stance of the old communist school directors' group. In addressing this issue, interestingly the NSZZ was successful in its negotiations with the

Ministry of Education. All directors appointed from 1992 were to be elected following a ballot of parents, teachers and the local authorities.

Parent participation and involvement in school councils has however been mostly at those lyceums which have pro-reform directors. NSZZ members have also become involved in helping parents and pupils to adapt to the changing education system. The infusion of the spirit of democracy and parent empowerment at school level has also been met by resistance from pro-status quo teachers. The influence of teachers' associations as interest groups, depends to a large extent upon the fortunes of the political party which they draw most of their supporters from. This is especially the case in a country such as Poland which has since 1991 been characterised by fragmentation of political parties and thereby a reduction of the lobbying power of teacher associations (Klosowski 1991:2).

In spite of the political power of the ruling Solidarity government, their education section, the Teachers Solidarity continues to be overshadowed by the former Communist Polish Teachers' Association. The data indicates that dominant power within education remains in dimension 1 (see page 67), as both the ZNP and reform communists in local government form a formidable obstacle to the passage of any reform policy initiative by the NSZZ and pro-reform educators. Protest activity by the pro-reform organised teaching profession, in dimension 4, seems likely, given the successful blockage of reform proposals to the parliamentary education commission by reform communists. This is predicted as the commission is an important 'channel of access' to organised education interest groups.

4.3 Independent Schools

The breaching of the state's monopoly in education gave rise to what Andrej Witwicki (Starzynski 1990:13), in an article, called an avalanche. Referring to the momentum gained by the independent school movement, as we saw earlier, within months new independent schools had come into being. By themselves independent schools have indeed emerged as one of the major interest groups on the educational terrain. The right to establish independent schools is viewed by the NSZZ as one of their first triumphs. "This right is the success of Solidarnosc," stated the association's vice-president Albin Zielinski (22-11-91).

Analysis of this, the fastest growing interest groups amongst educators, will start with a discussion of the conditions which contribute to the founding of such schools, particularly the prominence of economic restraints on state schools and the intransigence of certain state teachers. Finally, the attitude of the Ministry to independent schools will be reviewed as well as the positive influence of these schools on mainstream public education.

Late in 1989 the Ministry responded to growing parental demand and publicly removed the bureaucratic barriers which impeded the establishment of independent schools. This followed a successful high court appeal by Anna Jeziona, a teacher from Krakow, who sought legal sanction to start a private school. Public reaction to the court's findings was extremely enthusiastic, prompting Mieszalski (1992:14) to comment: "The response was overwhelming. Between April and July 1990, two or three non-state schools appeared every day in various parts of the country."

Katarzyna Skorzynska, a former Solidarity activist, and present spokesman for the new Ministry of National Education, explained this new spirit in Polish education as a liberation from the oppression of state control: "democracy in education .. means primarily the possibility to choose" (Mieszalski 1992:4). She describes this newly found freedom as the ability of parents and pupils to choose their schools and their teachers, and to influence the education provided for students. Parents and teachers have been given the right and empowered "to found or choose schools in accordance with their own educational and political expectations". The independent school movement, which can be traced to 1987 had clearly gained the support of parents and numbered two hundred and seven by the end of 1990 (Starzynski 1990:15).

The chairman of the Civic Education Association, Wojciech Starzynski (1990:5) describes the grass roots impulse which by 1990, gave character to the association that sponsored 105 of the 207 independent schools :

> "On July 15, 1987 at my house Marek Zielinski ... my wife and myself began to discuss how good it would be at least to break the monopoly of the Communists in education. Marek said, "Well, do it!" And that is how I started ... One of the first people I talked to about it was Andrzej Witwicki. Then, among my friends, another dozen or so

people were willing to join in. ... Then we talked to many research workers and activists. "

Groups of parents and teachers swept up by a mood of optimism quickly became the driving force behind the founding of the Civic Education Association, the organisation largely responsible for the establishment of schools. In terms of the court ruling, teachers and parents were required to shoulder the major share of the responsibility for maintaining their independent schools (see Appendix 24). The only responsibility carried by the the Ministry of Education was to approve their syllabi. Since February 1990, however, schools became eligible for state subsidies up to 50% of their costs (Szebenyi 1992:24). The outcome of this situation is that although private schools have to be funded by pupil tuition fees and although these are high in some cases with initial problems being experienced with equipment and facilities, it is generally accepted that these schools are better than their state counterparts (Wisniewski 1991:112).

Kozakiewicz (1992:95) ascribes the trend towards independent schools to parental and teacher dissatisfaction with the breakdown of relationships among staff, pupils and parents and the deteriorating education quality of state lyceums (schools). Teresa Bochwic (in Starzynski 1990:21) talking about pro-reform parents claims they were unhappy about the slow rate of changes at state schools, and as a result came to favour the "establishment and support of independent schools; rather than fighting with the bureaucracy to make an impact upon state schools". Parents were also attracted, according to Joanna Kurylo (22-11-91) of Teachers Solidarity, to the idea of independent schools as a solution to the continued presence of communists in the public education system : "The communists and those who cooperated with the old regime are still around and causing problems for those who want to reform education. These groups do not want to privatize factories and schools".

The competitive element brought to the education system by independent schools is also seen, by educators interviewed, as a positive development for increased excellence in education. The points of optimism expressed in the Ministry's Report on Private Schools in Poland, published in Warsaw (Starzynski 1990:2) has, however, been met by some criticism. Independent schools are accused of luring away the best teachers and not contributing to the

educational needs of the lower income sectors of the population. In spite of the criticism, it is evident that independent schools have become an important catalyst for change in Polish education. Pomianowski, a secondary school teacher argues that "The transformation of the state education system would be slower and less efficacious if this system did not have to compete with the newly emerging system of non-state education" (Miesalski 1992:15). A strong case can thus be made that the creation of alternative schools, which the Civic Education Association describes as "a real educational mass movement " of parents' and teachers', has contributed to regenerating the civic society and breaking the long siege of the Party and State (Starzynski 1990:1).

This much is evident in the new governments' attitude to independent schools. The education Ministry looks increasingly to private schools as a "social testing ground" especially in furthering foreign language training and implementing new management , financial and didactic reforms (Skorzynska in Starzynski 1990:4). By the end of 1991 the Ministry had initiated active support for the independent school movement and formed a new section, headed by Katarzyna Skorzynska, to oversee co-operation between itself and such schools. The development of a non-rival relationship between the Ministry and independent schools is encapsulated in an admission of the Ministry through an official statement that: "Today, one can point out concrete examples which prove that well-functioning non-state schools have a positive influence upon nearby state schools, with state schools introducing innovations" (Mieszalski 1992:15).

Independent schools have also acquired a new importance after the wilting of Solidarity's influence. Following the events of 1989 and especially in light of the "comeback" of communist political power in 1991, independent schools were seen to be engaging in "self-defensive power seeking". Founders of independent schools do not seek this form of power to engage opponents in a direct struggle in the education policymaking arena, but as a means to ensure the survival of schools which embody the principles of democracy, pluralism and differentiated education. It may be argued further, that independent schools do not seek to influence education policy making directly. These schools rather act as a catalyst for a change at local inter-school level and as a "social laboratory" for the Ministry of Education. The present relationship of power between independent schools (dimension 4 - see page 67) and the government (dimension1) is one of 'co-operation'. However, the yet unknown policy of the

incumbent reform communist government, could see the relationship change to the status of 'tolerance'.

4.4 Religious interest groups

Poland's history and that of the Roman Catholic Church are intrinsically intertwined. Allegiance to the Catholic Church is an emotionally charged issue in a society that professes to have a membership of ninety percent of the population. This seemingly "unanimist" part of the Polish character is best exemplified by the statement of Senator Kaczynski, prior to the passing by the Senate of the controversial abortion law in September 1990: "All good Poles are against abortion. Those who oppose legislation aimed at prohibiting it and sanctioning offenders, thereby constitute the bad part of the nation" (Michel 1990:2). At the outset of this discussion it must be clearly stated that the Polish Catholic Church places accent on Nation over Society and thereby favours national exclusiveness, is resistant to pluralist ideology and is vehemently opposed to the states' "slide into Western materialism, consumerism and secularism" (Longley 1991:12). This background is essential to understand the immense influence the Catholic Church has on any new government, as will be demonstrated in the historical overview below. The first "flare-up" in post-1989 education in Poland, will be dealt with as the opposing interest groups dispute the merits of introducing catechism in the school system. The key role players in the religious debate are identified by Szajkowski (1-10-91) in order to sketch the looming conflict between the Catholic Church and its opposition to pro-western factions in the government who wish to secure access and economic aid from the European Community.

The context in which the church (reference to "the church" refers to the Roman Catholic Church in this paper) comes to play a role in the education debate needs to be spelled out. Although significant democratic changes have occurred in Poland, the slow process of democratising the political infrastructure and the political institutions, has led directly to **conflict and a split in the governing group** which had overthrown the Communists. The split, as we saw in the introduction, has led to the formation of Prime Minister Mazowiecki's civic movement of new administrators and intellectuals who lean towards pro-centralism and, as a result, in the view of Jerschina (1990:302), have a questionable "democratic"stance.

Walesa's group is mobilised around the ideology of populism and solidarity amongst the working class and in support of the Catholic Church. This split has considerably weakened the capacity of the new government to push through its reforms. Laws are created but then implementation is left in the hands of the old administrators and clerks. In the face of this crisis the weakened new elites have turned to the Catholic Church for support. The Church, for its part, supports the government for political, ideological and historic reasons as the leading symbol during the overthrow of the communists. The support of the church has, however, been extremely ambigious and for the new government somewhat of a mixed blessing. Since 1989, the Church has attempted to apply pressure against the reform movement despite a continuance of changes and in fact has argued, as Jerschina and Kosiarz (1990:303) have shown, the view that the old administrators are more reliable if they pledge loyalty, than the democratic opposition and the radical liberals.

The upshot is that unreliable as it is, political groups have been forced to work with the church. For Minister Mazowiecki's government, this has meant making some form of agreement with the Catholic Church. Almost as a reward for this, the church portrays the government as a symbol of "social-solidarity" and views criticism against the government as being criticism against the whole society. Building upon its following from the anti-communist campaign, and influence on government, the church, therefore, continues to play a major role not only in societal debates but within education.

The power of the **Roman Catholic Church** within education becomes particularly evident when one recognises that one of the main reasons for the failure of the socialist reform school system was the deep-rooted nationwide influence of the Church (see Appendix 24). Research by Kozakiewicz (1992:92) confirms that about 90% of children and 60-70% of secondary school pupils are strongly influenced by the Catholic Church. The immense popularity enjoyed by the Catholic Church at the time of the Solidarity victory, gave the church the powerbase to influence the Ministry of Education. Szajkowski (1-10-91) tells that: "The church appealed to the largely uneducated masses for re-introduction of religious education." The outcome was the re-introduction of religious education in 95% of schools by December 1990 (Kozakiewicz 1992:93).

This development, though not unexpected, brought shock reactions from the

seven non-Catholic Churches' Ecumenical Council, particularly for the way it came about . The first reaction came in the wake of a statement published by the Joint Commission (of government and Catholic Church representations) that school religious education would be taught in accordance with the general values and ethic of the Catholic Church. This reaction quickly turned into resistance which gained momentum when religious education was introduced within weeks of the announcement of the Joint Commission recommendation, by way of a Ministerial decree and without debate in Parliament. Ministry of Education officials admitted publicly that they had been subjected to pressure from Church authorities. Van Schaik (1991:28) confirms this in his report: "Betrokken ambtenaren zouden later toegeven dat de beslissing placetsvond onderdruk van de kerkelijke autoriteiten".

Although the **law on religious education** which was decreed in September 1990, guaranteed that non-Catholic pupils' would receive religious instruction in their own faith, the controversy centred around the practical implementation. Directly after the law was implemented, it became evident that the shortage of teachers resulted in many non-Catholic pupils going to different schools for religious education. Dutch analysts predicted that the classroom implementation of religion would result in high levels of discrimination (Van Schaik 1991:28). This anxiety was fuelled by the Polish periodical, "Polak-Katolik", which labelled those pupils who did not attend religious education classes, as "slechte Polen" (bad poles; Van Schaik 1991:29). The voluntary aspect of classroom religion was also brought into question when it became apparent that there was considerable pressure placed on the individual to conform. Prevailing popular attitudes of, for example, "So how can you be outside that? (Catholic Church), then you are against us, against the whole movement" (Szajkowski 1-10-91) were clearly in evidence.

Despite protests in Krakow and Gdansk, the Joint Commission decided, in June 1991, to continue religious education for one school year in order for the completion of the new education legislation. Szajkowski (1-10-91) argues that the introduction of religion in schools will have substantial repercussions on the education system and will inevitably result in opposing interest groups coming into sharper conflict. In this debate around religious instruction, there are four interest groups identified by Szajkowski, aside from the pro-Catholic teachers, parents and priests:

i) Trained teachers, produced during the communist era, who have a secular worldview and who still remain in schools.

ii) A second group of teachers who are the pro-reform teachers and recent graduates of democratized universities and who will undoubtedly come into conflict with the traditional, conservative and clerical priests who teach school religion.

iii) Reform minded pro-Western European headmasters who have and continued to be confronted by priests who have been mostly isolated from West European trends and promulgate traditional values and have a higher social standing than headmasters. Talking of this situation Szajkowski remarked that : "...intellectually they (headmasters) have made very little impact...the quality of priests is particularly bad...these are the guys who are going to the schools to teach a traditional type religion".

iv) The fourth interest group is found within denominations such as the Polish National Church which collaborated closely with the former communist state. Parents of the non-Catholic denominations will strive to maintain their religious identity within schools.

Although a decline in church attendance has been reported by Szajkowski (1-10-91), partly due to the demise of the common "communist enemy" and because of a preoccupation with bread and butter issues, the Catholic Church remains with a larger than life presence in Polish society, in political circles and in education. The re-emergence of the Catholic Church in Poland and Central Europe after 1989 as a force to be recognised within a changing society, has led Patrick Michel (1990:6) to observe that "religion is constantly being called upon, to channel energies in search of a new identity .... religion appears as a formidable vector of re-ideologization."

The Roman Catholic Church is a good example of Weber's 'traditional' type of power and is an integral part of Polish history (Willhoite 1988:14). The 'authority' of the Roman Catholic Church can be ascribed to its broad power

base, which, unlike the multitude of post-1989 parties, is entrenched in the society. This analysis has clearly shown the immense power of the Catholic Church, as witnessed in the debate on religious education. The 'persuasive' type of power that the Catholic Church employs (calling on traditional and national values) and given its powerbase, will see the Church impact on education policy-making in the long-term. This impact will not only be felt by interest groups within dimensions 2, 3 and 4, but groups within dimension 1 will be affected, as the Church's power remains 'stable' while successive political groupings attempt to consolidate their fractured power (see page 67).

4.5 Parents

The period 1989 to 1990 can rightly be described as a landmark in the process of the normalisation of parent-school relations. In the post-war era, parents had effectively been kept from having a meaningful say in their childrens' education. With the ascendancy of Solidarity this barricade was overcome: "for parents and teachers, it means the right to found or choose schools in accordance with their own educational and political expectations and to participate in school governance" (Skorzynska in Mieszalski 1992:4). The "awakening of civic culture" to its role in the reform of the education system, which sociologist Melosik (Mieszalski 1992:11) reported as having been a chief casualty of forty years of communist rule", had indeed begun.

The discussion opens with a recounting of the legislative empowerment of parents and their access to school councils. The communist legacy that parents had to contend with is given as background, leading into an analysis of parent participation in reforms by highlighting the attitude to reform initiatives. The economic pressures on parents are interwoven in the text.

The 1990 System of Public Education Act paved the way for the establishment of school councils which in turn, prepared the way for the joint control of schools by parents, teachers and the local community (Barret 2.1991:21). The school councils act as mediators between all interest groups, including institutions which lend financial support to schools. These councils also havethe ability to influence the general didactic activities of the school in accordance

with the needs of the various interest groups (see Appendix 24).

Parental input in education before 1989 was described by Wisniewski (1991:111) as a farce. This was firstly due to the total inability of parents to influence the education of their children in the communist era. Secondly, "parents were looked upon as intruders who should not stick their noses into school affairs or, much less, supervise the teachers" (Anna Paciorelc in Starzynski 1990:11).

Parents, therefore, are relative newcomers to schools and are only at the initial stage of large scale participation. The effects of four decades of non-participation by parents in education was evident in a paper delivered at the first Polish-American Education Conference in November 1990. Discussing parental attitudes towards reforms, Zahorska (1990:110) concludes that parents see all change as originating exclusively from the Ministry and local authorities. Zahorska's research suggested that only 50% of parents who participated in the research saw a role for themselves in general school affairs and only 30% wished to have a say in electing a principal. Furthermore, only 10% of parents, polled in the research, answered in the affirmative as to whether they would become actively involved in the reform movement (Wisniewski 1991:114). Ewa Chmielecka (vice president of Solidarity National Science Section and lecturer at the Warsaw School of Economics 21-11-91) and a parent at the Lyceum Im Lelewala in Warsaw, commented that "Parent involvement was not very good. Parent attendance at teacher-parent evenings might be well attended, but to really participate is a problem".

In contrast, however, to the low parental involvement in the reform movement suggested by Zahorska (1991:110) and Wisniewski (1991:114), my attendance of a parent-teachers evening at the Lyceum Im Lelewala (state school) in Warsaw, brought a different perspective of the initiatives of parents at school level (Chmielecka 21-11-1991). On parental initiative, a class was formed, consisting of pupils whose parents saw the need for extra classes to enrich the given curricula and engage in a number of projects.

The parents led by Ewa Chmielecka; (21-11-91), received special permission

from the Minister of Education to start the extra classes and an enrichment programme. The project consisted of a number of extra subjects, e.g. History of Fine Arts, History of Religion, and New Polish Cinema which were taught in school-time. Parents paid the teachers for tutoring these additional subjects. The parents were fortunate to acquire a Canadian teacher to give six hours of English a week as they were eager for their children to learn English.

The parents of this project were also of mixed income which put a limit on their activities in the present economic conditions: "Finances of parents is a problem. Lack of teachers of English is a problem, pay is low. Textbooks (Polish) are very expensive and private tutors of English make three times more than what schools can pay per hour" (Chmielecka 21-11-91). The headmistress, herself, was actively involved in the project as one of the class tutors. The "enriched class" was busy in November 1991, planning an exchange programme with a school in Britain. The project entitled "Concept of Democracy" and supported by the Council of Europe was for a two week exchange of pupils to familiarise both groups with the others' society. The financial difficulties faced by this particular school management were highlighted during my visit in November with the state announcement that the December education budget was on the point of exhaustion.

In order to realise the programme, the parents of the "enriched" class project had approached the mayor to channel some of the municipal tax from the community which the school served to launch the project. In personal communication at the school, two further obstacles (except finance) to changing education, were emphasised . These were:

i) the continuance of a very centralised and specific curricula which left very little room for teacher creativity or supplementary subject matter;

ii) the overly authoritarian approach practised by some teachers, which at times affronted the pupils' dignity and placed pressure on the pupil in class. Chmielecka (22-11-91) expressed the opinion that the "Basic problem in the system are teachers who do not know how to relate to

pupils correctly".

Reflecting upon the visit to the Lyceum Im Lelewala, the author was left with the lasting impression of the critical role of parent initiatives in the transition period in education. Clearly the parents were not of the privileged class, nevertheless they pooled their resources to ensure that their children experienced the benefits of the new openness and changes in education.

Although the position of parents (for or against pluralist education) cannot be indicated on my classifications "Ideology" axis, due to insufficient research data, this interest group is set to have the greatest impact upon the "arena of power" (see p67). After four decades of 'elimination' from access to policy-making by the government's 'self-centered powerseeking' for ideological purposes, parents have now been empowered through participation in school councils. Personal communication and parent initiatives give a strong indication that, regardless of domination by the ruling power elite (dimension 1) in national policy-making by means of 'inducements' (for example: financial support) and 'legal' power and perhaps even old apathies, parents are beginning to wield increasing power at local level. Parents draw their power from the local community and local issues, and not from the debate related to a choice of traditional, socialist or West European education, and base their concerns on the need for the best education to equip children for a job in the rapidly changing society. Parent participation in school boards is set to increase as they pressure the "ruling-elite" to address their concerns on education policy-making.

4.6 The Media and Public Opinion

In Central Europe the communist states held an information stranglehold for over four decades. In this period the official Polish party mouthpiece, the "Trybuna Ludu", in reality only served to keep the nation informed of the achievements of the government. Information about events in the rest of the world came from "Radio Free Europe" and the "BBC" (Evling 13.7.1990:1), who with underground resistance newspapers and the free media which sprung up in many cases literally overnight, contributed to the overthrow of the communist governments in 1989.

The achievement of a free press in 1989, however, also brought with it the difficulties of democracy when it soon became clear that the press and broadcast media would be involved in the struggle for political power (see Appendix 24). Most of the media were privately owned and as Ellen Eggenhuizen (16-9-91)) of the Utrecht School of Journalism remarked upon her return from Central Europe: "Most new political parties have their own newspapers, these can also be seen as pressure groups and official mouthpieces of parties". A result of this new media freedom was that political and economic issues dominated the headlines at the expense of education.

Personal communication by interviewees related the dominance of political issues prior to and following the political transformation. The economic crisis flowing from the "shock therapy" shift to a market economy, also effectively kept education from national prominence. The small number of education articles in the press in 1990-1991 bears witness to the low priority of education within the consciousness of the new democratic society. This trend has been documented by Wisniewski (1991:11) and indicates that personal goals of teachers related to education had shifted from a priority ranking in 1977 to fourth position by 1986 (see Appendix 4).

The fragmentation of the governing coalition parties and numerous new parties which numbered twenty nine in the Polish Parliament in November 1991 (Klosowski 10.11.1991:3 - see Appendix 2) not only contributed to confusing the voters but led to the weakening of cohesive and effective public opinion within the education debate. Slawomir Majman (Klosawski 10.11.1991:8) in the "Warsaw Voice" daily editorial, commenting on the economy and public opinion, said: "The Poles, who for years were in the forefront of the struggle for democracy, are proving today that they can also be in the forefront of lost illusions. Again, the political struggle is over power and not about how to solve the major socio-economic problems".

In fact, the lack of public media interest in the education system in the pre-1989 period, when public concern was limited to the issue of teachers' status, this issue had been the topic of debate in teacher circles since the 1960's. But even this debate was poorly aired. The campaigns of the Polish Teachers

Association, for example, the only legal representative of teachers interests prior to 1989, received very little media coverage whilst its own press did not cover its lobbying adequately either. It is only since the political transformation that teachers have had an opportunity to raise openly the question of their status. This achievement has itself been a compromised one. Journalists who have attempted to put the case of teachers have come under fire from some school administrators (Wisniewski 1991:84).

The result is that both the media and public opinion do not appear on the "Ideology" axis of my classification. However, I am of the opinion that the involvement of the media and public opinion in the "arena of power" will, irrespective of its positioning, have a powerful impact upon all four dimensions. This is said, given the fact that the media form one of the main channels of access for interest groups to propagate their views and to pressure the "ruling elite". The only threat to my prediction would be the ascent to power of a party in dimension 1, which will endanger the consolidation of democracy and thereby revert back to the pre-1989 "media clampdown".

4.7 Higher Education and Research Institutes

The impression that I gained whilst interviewing and talking to some of the Solidarity education and scientific community was that institutions remained in a state of flux as successive political coalitions from the original (1989) Solidarity struggled to implement an economic policy that would appease the majority of people. Mikolai Kozakiewicz (1990:48; vice-chairman of the Parliament's Commission for Education and Youth) concluded in his article - Education research and Polish Perestroika: "Only a full knowledge of impending disaster, of a catastrophic state of affairs in a specific area, will galvanise people into action". This research will demonstrate that in spite of public scrutiny and government strategy to pressure institutions to reform, a number of obstacles need to be overcome. This discussion will show how the legacy of state control of the pre-1989 intellectual "nest of the opposition in Poland" (Chmielecka 7.1991:1) brought about the present debate on how to recuperate universities and research institutes, caught in a crisis of academic quality.

Evidence will show that the education Ministry and academic pro-reform groups have to contend with a "catch twenty-two situation." On the one hand, legislation has granted institutions autonomy which has aided the entrenchment of the nomenklatura. On the other hand, to reverse this situation, the government finds itself in the ironic position that the same central state intervention policy that it opposed in the communist era might be the only tool to dislodge the nomenklatura from their positions of influence. This dilemma aside, other challenges confront those working in higher education.

The democratic revolution was closely followed by a search for a new administration, reflecting the political changes, in the various state departments. The period 1990-1991 was characterised by the rapid change of staff not only at government level, but within the domain of higher education and research institutes. A number of old communist institutes were either closed down or renamed and restaffed. In this period interest groups grew sharply as Communists and their former collaborators, at all levels of management, resisted the democratic reforms and the newly appointed pro-reformists (see Appendix 24). This compelled the state to initiate policies to ensure compliance with its policy directives.

Education research institutes which have a direct influence on the development of education at school level and should take the lead in providing schools with alternative models, can be divided into opposing interest groups, termed Maximalists versus Minimalists by Kozakiewicz (1990:46):

i) The Minimalists view the existing society and education as acceptable and do not question the basic values or objectives of either. They favour some measure of modernisation and democratisation to achieve a cautious revolutionary path towards the new society.

ii) The Maximalists propagate a number of forward leaps in a radical revolutionary change of structures. Proponents of this view see the education system as intrinsically corrupt and support the notion of critical research which calls into question both the objectives and basic values of education.

The remaining vestiges of nomenklatura and conservative academic staff which

form strong local lobbies have compelled the state to initiate policies to ensure compliance with reform directives(Chmielecka 21-11-91).Institutions which have been granted autonomy have contributed to the process of entrenching the old anti-reform staff and structures. This forced the government to legislate additional regulations in order to gain limited control and exert pressure on structures reluctant to transform. Two of the main state strategies have been:

i) the granting of financial reserves (universities have a 16% budget shortfall - 1991) to those universities making the best progress with reforms (Chmielecka 7.1991:2),

ii) the financing of the education research sector on a competitive basis. The new democratically elected state Committee for Scientific Research, annually evaluates all research units. Karczewski (1991:2) and Frackowiak (1991:1) report on the sharp criticism and resistance of "well placed and established" groups in the science sector which are unwilling to adjust to a survival of the fittest policy. State funds would thus be awarded to researchers on the basis of excellence achieved and not on the proximity, politically, of institutions to government.

Institutions of higher education, such as teacher colleges and universities which prepare future teachers, constitute a vital link in transformation of the education system. The September 1990 Academic Education Act, ensured the autonomy of universities and prepared the way for reforms. The problems facing universities in their progress to reforms are:

i) fears of the continuance of the former system as, "people do not have the psychological mechanism to perform the task of cutting jobs" (Sorensen 1991:9);

ii) anxieties with respect to staffing, especially with conservative lecturers being unable to adapt to the greater choice of courses offered to students. The newly renamed Warsaw School of Economics (WSE), for example, has opted for a process of staff selection through the student body. The school will offer various specialities by the third term in 1991. The WSE will then give students the opportunity "to choose among different lecturers of the same course and in the process serve as an indicator of lecturers competence and teaching quality" (Chmielecka 21-11-91).

Universities in the period of transition are characterised by conflict between interest groups on the issues of rate of reforms, academic power and dependence on the state. Additional controversies are the positions of the scientific nomenklatura, professors appointed as a result of negative selection (according to political criteria under the communist government) and the contradictory interests of scientific and research groups in a time of changing state financing of research. Chielecka (21-11-91), Jerschina and Kosiarz (1990:304) and Frackowiak (1991:2) depict university administrators, professors, students and the "academic middle-class" as the other most prominent interest groups in higher education. The silent conflict is between the older traditional professors and the younger generation of doctors who were active in the Solidarity underground and political movement and who favour acceleration of reforms and closer ties to European academics.

Although the Minister of Education (1990) was popular among the "academic middle class" (young doctors), he is strongly opposed by the professors and Parliamentary Senate. The result was that the professors and tradition prevailed and with this declined the probability of significant changes occurring in the university structure (Jerschina & Kosiarz 1990:302). In spite of the professors' opposition to government central control of the universities, the professors are clearly not recognising the same principle with their dominance over the students and doctors. However, the professors in calling on the support of the government and Church, have exhibited growing dependence on these structures. In this process their new found autonomy might become a gift to the new power elite. The emigration of young pro-reform scientists as a result of the former state policy of weakening the intelligentsia through low salaries, has contributed to diminishing the chances for rapid reforms in science and education. In the period 1985 - 1990 alone, 220 000 university graduates left the state controlled economy for the private sector or to emigrate (Wisniewski 1991:74).

In 1991 I came away from the Warsaw seminar, Higher Education: Law and Practise, with the impression that in spite of the economic brake on reforms and vestiges of nomenklatura at higher education and research institutes, that pro-reform academics had crossed the "rubicon of academic freedom". Although university and research institutes' servility to state ideology had been dealt a fatal blow by new legislation and Ministerial strategies, Meek et al (in

Sorenson 1991:11) reminds us that the transition remains incomplete: "While there can be little doubt that nearly everywhere higher education is being asked to fulfil new roles and to serve more diverse community needs, demands and expectations, little is known about the inter-relationship between policy outcome and the structure and character of specific higher education system" in Central Europe.

The research indicates a three-way power struggle within higher education and research institutes. The main role players in this conflict of interests are the traditionalist professors, academic nomenklatura and "academic middle-class". Both the professors and nomenklatura are in dimension 1 (see p67) and favour respectively traditionalist and status quo education. In direct opposition, on the negative pole of the "Ideology" axis, in dimension 4, are the pro-reform "academic middle-class" that lobby for pluralistic values and academic decentralisation from a dominant state influence. The influence of the professors and nomenklatura (dimension 1) on the arena of policy-making will be strengthened by any centralist government, for example, the Democratic Left Alliance (former communist) which gained the largest vote in the 1993 parliamentary elections. The only scenario which will reverse the present domination of groups in dimension 1, will be the bolstering of groups in dimension 2, as the economic recovery, European integration and academic co-operation begin to become a reality. This development could swing the balance within the "arena of power" from the anti-reform Minimalists (Kozakiewicz 1990:46) in dimension 1, to the pro-reform Maximalists in dimension 4.

Participation of interest groups in reforms; circumstances influencing development of interest groups

In this section, I briefly consider each of the interest group categories. I begin with **teachers**. It is evident from the discussion that in spite of the political playing field being levelled, teachers found themselves in a disadvantaged position in their relationships with the community and parents and were thus relatively powerless to influence education reforms. The research demonstrates that teachers had come face to face with their traditional inability to influence Ministerial policy, as had been the case under the former government, and were thus slow in changing their attitudes and participating in the transition process.

In talking to educators in Poland I gained first-hand experience of this phenomenon which confirmed references in the literature that a number of schools and individual teachers, especially in small towns and villages, continued to support the status quo and were inclined to retard the pace of Ministerial reforms. Participation in the reform movement was left to individual teachers and schools with pro-reform headmasters, who, it must be said, struggled against the dead-weight of their reluctant colleagues. Their effectiveness was thus severely constrained.

Wih respect to the **organised teaching profession**, Solidarity played a smaller role as change agent for education than had been the case in the other sectors of society. The dominance of the former communist and for a long time only legal organisation, the Polish Teachers Association (ZNP), continued after 1989 and thwarted reform initiatives by the Solidarity aligned National Education Section (NSZZ), not only on the parliamentary education commissions, but in the implementation of reforms down to school level.

Independent schools constitute the third category. The dissatisfaction of certain teachers and parents with the slow pace of reforms at state schools and the anti-reform sentiment of some teachers led directly led to the establishment of independent schools. These schools are viewed by both founders and the education Ministry as a "social testing ground" (Starzynski 1990:4) for future reforms of the state system and in a number of documented cases have led to state schools in the vicinity of independent schools, adopting and implementing innovative practices.

The **Roman Catholic Church**, itself the fourth category, had become a rallying point for those supporting reform of the communist system, and found itself amidst the first controversy, as the new Ministry moved to implement religious education. This development was viewed by some people as an attempt to extend Roman Catholic power in education and was opposed as an undemocratic example of unilateral state action. The potential for future conflict seems probable, given the determination of the traditional conservative priests, and the opposition of those who tutor religion and those headmasters who favour instead West European type education reforms which are more secular in emphasis.

Parents constitute the fifth category. The most profound effect of the former education system is seen in the abstention of parents from the education process. Parents see change as directed from outside and exhibit a reluctance to becoming involved. Parental participation in reforms is therefore largely represented by individual initiative (e.g. Lyceum Im Lelewala - Warsaw Secondary School). This trend is substantiated in research which indicates that only 10% of parents polled in October 1990, actively supported the reform movement (Wisniewski 1991:114).

Public opinion makes up the last category. The minimal effect of public opinion and media investigation in education before 1989 had kept the community in that period from publicly debating education issues. It is only since the political transformation that public opinion began to impact upon the direction of education policy development.

In spite of the leading role played by universities such as Warsaw, Krakow and the Warsaw School of Economics, the data indicates that certain **institutes of higher education** have used their autonomy (granted in 1990) to ward off policy and staff reforms, thereby attempting to cling to their all powerful pre-1989 position. The extension of reforms to all institutions will depend upon the state's success to bring pressure to bear through a strategy of awarding research grants and allocating subsidies, dependent on the pace of reforms.

Teachers are a key element to the success of any state's education policy reforms. In Poland, however, teachers face a daunting task to re-establish themselves as an interest group, given their isolation from the community under communist rule. Teachers need to re-address the prevailing negative social attitude to their profession and public suspicion of forty years of ideologically selective admission of candidates to education training institutions. An even greater challenge that awaits the post-1989 teacher core is the urgency of reversing the culture of submission and non-criticism with respect to central top-down policy directives. The extent of teacher participation in school councils and community issues could be the decisive issue in the strategy to diminish central control and power. This situation moreover, hinges on the rebuilding of morale amongst teachers. Interviewees were unanimous in talking to me that the single biggest constraint to

transformation from the communist past was the economic crisis that had gripped the country by the end of 1991. Severe constraints on the education budget resulted in mere "modest school reforms" (Mieszalski 1992:18) as lack of funds left teachers with poor salaries, deteriorating work conditions as school maintenance came under pressure and meaningful reforms were left to await economic recovery.

The establishment of **teacher associations** as an influential interest group is closely linked to political affiliation and their stance on reforms, particularly those of the two main organisations' (see Appendix 21). In the contest for influence, the pro-reform NSZZ had the initial political edge, but lack of members and financial assets enabled the former communist Polish Teachers Association to retain its dominance and so stall NSZZ initiatives. Breaking with the former system's practices at school level has placed individual pro-reform NSZZ teachers in a vulnerable position, as headmasters continue their grip on power. Powerbrokers appointed under the former government also continue to be influential at municipal level, a reality which prompted Szebenyi (1992:30) to comment that teachers remain at the "mercy of incompetent municipalities".

The **independent school** movement, which can be traced back to 1987, gained eminent support from parents and was catapulted to the forefront to become one of the leading interest groups, as alternatives to state schools were demanded by impatient parents. Independent school founders, which included prominent reformers, wasted no time in transforming and creating a new sector in the education system. Independent schools which numbered two hundred and seven by 1990 (Starzynski 1990:15) are set to increase as conditions persist which led to their creation. These include dissatisfaction with the rate of state school reforms, breakdown of the teacher-parent-pupil relations and demand for school-leavers able to slot into the new market-orientated economy.

The stature of the Roman Catholic Church as an education interest group, active as a rallying point since the communist era, cannot be doubted. The Catholic Church was the first interest party to make headway into education after the political transformation. Seemingly regardless of opposition, the Catholic Church succeeded in securing religious education (albeit voluntary) in schools during 1991 - making a renewed showdown on the matter seem probable in the future. At school level a power struggle ensued as pro-reform headmasters and secular

teachers trained under the former system were confronted by conservative priests on their staff. The position of the Catholic Church has been vindicated by public support for the church, particularly as expressed in the popularity amongst young men for joining the priesthood (Szajkowski : 1-10-91) and by the passionate support for the Polish John Paul II.

The lack of **parental** input in the pre-1989 education context, described by Wisniewski (1991:111) as a farce, had conditioned parents to such an extent, that they were, and remain hesitant to become involved as an organised body in state schools. Schools are therefore not only faced with eliciting parents' participation in newly created school councils, but changing the negative prestige of schools and the low status of teachers.

The lack of proper **media** coverage of education has continued after 1989, as the economic crisis followed the "shock therapy" shift to a market economy, and effectively kept education from national prominence. Fragmentation of political parties and voter confusion and subsequent voter apathy in later elections, weakened the formation of a **public opinion** forum to pressure the government to maintain the pace of education transition.

An overview of the remaining scientific nomenklatura and the success of conservative professors to consolidate their positions (given the autonomy granted to **higher education institutions** in 1990) has led to the exodus of young pro-reform academics and the decline in probability of significant changes in the majority of universities' structures similar to the democratic transition in secondary education.

5. CONCLUSION : ARENA OF POWER

Classification of Interest Groups in the Education Policy-making arena or "Arena of Power"

"E" ECONOMIC AXIS (positive pole; external groups)

i.	Pro-EC membership sector of business		i.	Managers of former state enterprises resistant to free market
"I" AXIS (negative pole)		2	3	"I" IDEOLOGY (positive pole)
		4	1	
i.	Pro-reform educators		i.	Solidarity government
ii.	Independent schools		ii.	Reform communists in local government
iii.	NSZZ Solidarity		iii.	Roman Catholic Church
iv.	Pro-reform "academic middle class at institutes of higher education e.g. Warsaw School of Economics		iv.	Polish Teachers Association
			v.	Academic nomenklatura
v.	Maximalists at research institutes		vi.	Former communist teachers opposing reforms
			vii.	Minimalists at research institutes

"E" AXIS (negative pole; internal groups)

Groups in dimension 1 and 3 see education's function as a monistic affair catering for a single value system be it traditional education (Education Ministry), Roman Catholic values or socialist (reform communists) education policy. These interest groups include both internal education based members and external interest groups, for example, the business sector. In dimensions 2 and 4 both internal and external groups are found that see education's function as the provision of differentiated and pluralist education. Broadly speaking both dimensions represent people that favour pro-western European modern values and education philosophy. Although the research shows that parents are only on the threshold of using their influence in their participation in school boards, the power exercised by this interest group, albeit in dimension 4 or 1, can have a great future impact on the shift of power between the negative and positive poles of the

"I" axis. The lack of conclusive data on Parents and Public Opinion/Media made the positioning of this interest group on the "I" axis, impossible.

The influence and power of groups in dimension 2 will probably show a substantial increase with economic recovery and the involvement of the business sector seeking qualified manpower and joint ventures with education. However, the successful transition of the "shock therapy" period in the economy will be a deciding factor on the future influence of pressure groups in dimension 2. By the end of 1991 the interest groups in dimension 1, remained the custodians of power in the policy-making arena.

Following the political "change of guard", the Roman Catholic Church is the only pre-1989 interest group that has exhibited a constant growth in its influence, both within education and wider society. By contrast, the initial dominance of Solidarity and its various offshoots originating from Solidarity has shown a steady decline. Complicating this equation has been the revival of the old guard. The decline of Solidarity has been mirrored by the growth of the former Communist Party, culminating in the Democratic Left Alliance parliamentary victory in September 1993. The efforts of the majority of parties from across the political spectrum, including the SLD to form an alliance with the Catholic Church, confirm the indication that support from the Catholic Church is seen as a prerequisite for gaining political power. In conclusion, it appears that the lack of political "clout" of pro-reform groups in dimension 4, has left the Roman Catholic Church as the deciding force in the Polish education's "arena of power".

Given the "fallout" of interest groups in the four quadrants I use, the situation in education is likely to develop in complexity. What is of consequence for us in a work of this nature is to assess the alliances which have been made and/or are being considered in this situation. Clearly none of the interest groups operate as isolated organisations. Both as groups and as individuals, they find themselves in a multitude of contexts - daily - where they would be negotiating and discussing and reflecting on their specific interests. In situations such as these, it is evident that positions people occupy are liable to change as individuals and groups' attitudes become either more or less flexible. Axes of influence and alliance, as suggested in the diagram, are likely to emerge from the groups in dimension 1. Such groups would seek political power to influence education national

policy-making (e.g. remnants of the Solidarity government with reform communists and the Catholic Church). Within dimension 4 a pro-reform block can become a reality as the independent schools, NSZZ Solidarity and "academic middle class" are pressured to greater unity to defend the reform movement against a renewed onslaught from reform communists gaining political power (e.g. SLD).

CHAPTER THREE

HUNGARY

INTRODUCTION

The political transformation which Hungary recently experienced has roots which can be traced back to the 1956 revolution, an event that proved to be a political watershed and contributed to Hungary's peculiar brand of socialism. The events of 1956 enabled Hungary, as the "jolliest barrack in the (socialist) camp" as Bathory (1991:1) put it, to establish cultural and scientific relations with the West, virtually as it pleased. Structured according to the Bereday framework, this chapter starts with a political introduction (section 1) which will show how the liberal communist government acted as a catalyst for the breaching of the infamous Berlin Wall through its open border policy, thereby detaching East Germany and Poland from the East Block. It will also try to show, on the other hand, that although thousands of pro-democracy marchers took to the streets in Budapest in 1989, the revolution was mainly a "top down" affair as the Communist Party continued to manage much of the transition, including the process leading up to the multi-party elections of April 1990. This situation and the adverse effect of the "fiscal crisis" (Hausner in Campbell 1993:89) that Hungary (similar to its two northern neighbours) has had to contend with, fundamentally, it is argued, defined the character of the parameters within which Hungary worked in its attempts to reform its educational system (section 2).

Unlike most of its Comecon partners, Hungary provided its citizenry with much greater individual freedoms. The greater political and social manoeuvrability enjoyed in communist Hungary, facilitated the relatively high degree of decentralisation of education which came as a result of the 1985 Education Act. This decentralisation and the school autonomy which came with it, enabled interest groups to emerge, thus raising the level of debate in education considerably. As we shall see, however, the debate around centralisation as opposed to decentralisation came to be an issue of torment in education. This issue was to surface repeatedly between 1989 and 1991. Another issue at stake in this debate was the question of an appropriate education philosophy for a future system. While the 1985 Act, central in the country's education history,

had positive features, it was also negative in certain features which were a continuity from the communist period (section 3). This section examines the reforms that were introduced through the Act, inter alia the management and administration policy, curricula and teacher training and uses this as a basis and the background to comprehending the role of interest groups in the period 1989 to 1991 (section 3).

The section on emerging interest groups starts with a summary of the circumstances that influence the development of such groups and the degree of interest group participation in reforms. How interest parties have been moulded by their participation in the education reform process and their attempts to gain an input in policy-making and access the "arena of power", is sketched in this section (sections 4.1-7). The discussion of each of the seven interest groups ends with remarks on the relationship of the particular group to the remaining groups within the policy-making arena.

This "arena of power" and the balance of power between the interest groups are then presented in the form of a classification diagram in the concluding section (section 5).

1. POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

The Hungarian revolution of 1956, a landmark event in Central European history, marked the first sign of rupture within the monolith of its Communist Party. Workers had become disillusioned with Stalinist industrialisation and party intellectuals began to speak out in favour of liberal communist alternatives to the Soviet model (Roskin 1991:100). Taking their courage literally in their hands, people began to mobilise. Dissatisfied with the Stalinist Rakosi government, thousands of protesters under the banner of the Petofi intellectual movement, gathered on 23 October 1956 in the streets of Budapest, calling for free elections, an end to Soviet occupation and the return of the liberal communist, Imre Nagy. Their courage was met, however, by brute force. The security police, in their wisdom, shot a number of demonstrators, thus precipitating a country-wide revolt which led to reform communists taking over local government. Imre Nagy was allowed to return, and on 30 October, he formed a multi-party coalition government, promising to comply with the

demonstrators' demands. The Nagy government made its intentions clear. It wished to follow the Yugoslav model of socialism, independent of Soviet influence.

This was not to be. The dream of an independent Hungary was quickly shattered as Soviet tanks rolled into the country on 4 November 1956, leaving behind them 32 000 Hungarians dead and summarily removing the liberal Nagy government. To make their point, the Soviets executed Nagy and his chief associates, thus obliterating the effervescence of 1956 (Hoensch 1989:292). A non-Stalinist communist, Jonas Kadar, was installed by the USSR to govern the country.

In some senses, however, the Soviet government had overplayed its own hand. The international outcry following the 1956 revolution conditioned circumstances and shaped for Kadar the kind of leadership he would exercise. These enabled the Kadar government to develop a degree of independence hitherto unknown within the Soviet orbit. In particular, a secondary economy, centered upon conditions similar to a market economy and functioning on a small business basis, came into being, thus stabilising, somewhat, the vulnerable economy (Schopflin 1991:246). For more than thirty years, as a result, communism operated in a political milieu which was decidedly ambiguous about its gravitation - was it a part of the East or the West, or could it survive, Januslike, as a composite of both. Formally, Hungary appeared to be a client state of the Soviet Union, but, embedded in its political psyche was an ambivalence which rendered the political hegemony of the USSR very problematic. Elements of this ambiguity are clearly in existence as we move into the uprisings of the late eighties.

In mid-1989, the liberal Hungarian communist government played a key role in the fall of the Berlin Wall, essentially because of its non-compliance with the Warsaw Pact agreement to keep visitors within its borders (see Appendix 21). It allowed thousands of East German "tourists" to flee across its borders to Austria and then West-Germany. This forced the East German government to change its hardline policy and open the Berlin Wall. This situation had arisen as a result of a succession of events. Briefly, the tough Karoly Grosz, who had replaced Kadar, had come under immense pressure during 1989 in a constant swirl of public anger expressed through marches and rallies. People were also angry at Grosz for allowing police to violently break-up freedom rallies. The

theme during most of these rallies was the demand for freedom of expression and the right of other parties to exist. In the wake of this, levels of popular protest were rising to an unprecedented pitch. Nightly, and for weeks, over 75 000 people could be found in the streets. The upshot of these developments was that parliament was forced to bow to popular demands and legalise all political parties (Di Cortona 1991:318).

Large pro-democracy rallies took place in March 1989, and in June of that year the government was forced to support the symbolic state reburial of the 1956 revolution leader, Imre Nagy. This was a crucial psychological and indeed even political breakthrough. A further, more significant development was that the government, led in September 1989 by the liberal communist, Reszo Nyers, met with opposition parties and the first free election was set for April 1990.

The 1990 elections saw the establishment of a relatively stable modern **political party system**, characterised by the participation of a number of parties. These elections were won by the moderate anti-communist opposition presented by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), which polled 42.75% of the vote (165 seats of the 386 seat Parliament) (Korosenyi 1991:56). The MDF, under Jozsef Antall, chose to form a coalition government with the Smallholders (43 seats) and Christian Democratic (21 seats) parties (Di Cortona 1991:320) (see Appendix 13). The Hungarian Democratic Forum, a moderate Catholic party (similar to a Christian Democratic party), occupied a position to the right of centre.

The MDF were opposed by the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), a secular liberal party which, with 92 seats, attracted the second largest number of votes in the first free elections (Szelenyi & Szelenyi 1991:122). The SZDSZ, under the leadership of Janos Ris, together with the Young Democrats, a youth party with 21 seats, were inclined to a position left of centre. The Socialist Party (ex-communist with 33 seats in Parliament) was not expected to show growth, thus leaving the political spectrum without a centre left, a characteristic of a well-functioning democracy (Roskin 1991:174).

The fortunes of the MDF government, as the situation during the election revealed, depended upon the ability of its president, Antall, to form a united front with its coalition partners whilst turning the political focus from the

Catholic nationalist (MDF) versus secular liberal (SZDSZ) debate to the welfare of the society (e.g. unemployment) during the process of marketisation (Roskin 1991:174; Pataki in Evling 7.1990:21). However, the range of political parties represented in Parliament and the issues which remained at the centre of political debate, appeared likely to pose a threat to the stability and functioning of the democracy.

2. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

The new Budapest government, having to decide an economic path for Hungary and distressed by the initial "economic chaos" following the application of "shock therapy" to the Polish economy, decided to opt for a gradual transition to a "free market" (Gati 1991:141). The country had, in fact, started the process of marketisation during the 1980's, even though private enterprise had been limited to small family businesses as part of the so-called "secondary economy" (Szelenyi & Szelenyi 1991:125). The context in which decisions were having to be made is important to describe. The economy was still attempting to recover from the collapse of the Comecon network. This led to a fall in factory sales as the business sector found itself struggling to adjust in the new and highly competitive international market. This crisis was paralysing Poland and presented Hungary with a severe challenge. The government therefore took the cautious way, in the process of opening up markets, privatising factories and removing price controls. By the end of 1991, only 8.3% of former state enterprises had been transferred to the private sector (Kocsis 1992:114). Towards mid-1992, an estimated one hundred of the major state-owned enterprises were to have been privatised in terms of the government's intended policy aim of attaining 50% private ownership of the business sector (Roskin 1991:185). The **"gradualist" economic approach** of Czechoslovakia and Hungary has led Szelenyi (1989:8) to characterise their economies as socialist mixed economies, wherein the state continues to be dominant, but the private sector plays an increasing stronger role (see Appendix 21). However, by the end of 1992, the method by which this process was to take place remained an issue for debate, particularly in Parliament where the process of privatising the remaining state enterprises brought parliamentarians into fierce argument (Kocsis 1992:115).

In early 1992, the Hungarian government embarked upon a strategy to become an European Community (EC) member. It applied for EC associate membership and sought to join the Pentagonal Initiative (Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria and Yugoslavia) to gain experience in regional co-operation (Gati 1991:145; Royen 1991:85). The promise of economic growth through EC (European Community) membership has a strong attraction for Hungary. Stringent EC membership requirements, such as operating a functioning market economy, having in place a democratic political system and maintaining particular environmental standards, remain challenges for the government to meet.

In spite of opinion polls which indicate pessimism amongst Hungarians on economic issues, analysts such as Adalbert Rittmuller, German government economist in Budapest (Harden 1991:1), see the Hungarian economy as leading the Central European countries to economic recovery, as Hungary is largely unafflicted by high unemployment, strikes, collapse of social services and has a mere 26% (Mizsei 1990:78) inflation rate (Boyes 1991:23 gives the rate of inflation as 28.2% - see Appendix 5). The overall economic picture, though this relative comfort notwithstanding, is still poor and in some sectors critical. The EC and United Nations Economic Commissions report indicated that Hungary was expected to reach the bottom of its downward economic swing by mid-1992 before it could begin its recovery (Ipsen 1991:11).

3. EDUCATION POLICY

In order to comprehend the undercurrents in the present debate on education reforms, one needs to trace the political tug-of-war that began with the 1956 revolution and persisted through a succession of reforms which came in 1961, 1978 and finally in 1985 with the previously referred to Education Act, and which is discussed fully below. In this tug-of-war there was on the one hand, the Hungarian communist government who sought legitimacy in education, albeit in a top-down style by granting its populace limited school-level autonomy. Through the 1985 Act, however, it continued to control the field. On the other hand with the opening up of limited space, the return of civil society was evident - prompting Mitter and Weiss (1991:27) to call this period the period of "cool socialism". As Eva Kuti (in Katus & Toth 1990:125) showed in

substantiating Mitters' assessment that there were in existence some 6 600 voluntary associations and foundations by 1986. This activist trend had, significantly, moreover, spilled over into education during the debate of the 1985 Act, highlighting in one sense, but also confirming earlier signs of the presence of clearly identifiable interest groups in the field. The economic crisis, however, was to overshadow these developments as financial constraints and Ministerial resistance to implementation of the 1985 Act led to a crisis by 1989.

In trying to understand educational and social policy in Hungary prior to 1989, one needs to be aware of the profound effect of the 1956 revolution on the country. The revolution marked a break in the ideological hegemony of the Communist Party, and not unexpectedly, precipitated a shift in relations between Hungary and the other "socialist" countries in the region. The Kadar government, haunted by the 1956 popular uprising, sought to prevent, through a number of concessions to popular pressure (e.g. limited private enterprise), a re-occurence of that event. It, furthermore, despite working with the ideological constraints of its Comecon membership, led Hungary towards developing good relations with the West in socio-economic and scientific fields. The country which emerged out of this was undoubtedly unique and came to acquire the image of a hybridised oddity - a "Hungarian Goulash" some called it, or "refrige socialism" (Mitter & Weiss 1991:27). Tokes (1990:48) describes this period of Hungarian Socialism (1957 - 1988) as an attempt by the Kadar government to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the nation. One effect of this period was that a number of structures were to come into being and important legislation was to be passed, for example, the 1985 Education Act, which were to continue to have an impact under the post-1989 government.

One of the central inheritances of the 1956 revolution was the Kadar government's modernisation policy. The government sought through the **Education Reform Law of 1961** to modernise Hungary and ensure political stability (Tokes 1990:48) (see Appendix 19). A three track secondary education system (academic; vocational-commercial; vocational - agricultural) was established. This comprehensive or general school system formed the basis for state education and made possible, entry to either academic or technical higher education. The period 1956-1979 was characterized by a concerted state effort - albeit from the top - to promote and advance pupils from blue-collar

backgrounds through to secondary and higher education (see Appendix 9). No doubt, some of the intention behind this was to avert the growing political crisis. But a tiger had been unleashed, however. In promoting freedoms, the government was itself feeding the crisis.

A hint of a potential crisis was suggested in a public opinion poll conducted in 1976 on what voter support would be in a hypothetical free election. This showed alarmingly that the Socialist Workers Party, the party in power, would gain a mere 5% of the national vote (Hoensch 1991: 265). Clearly, further concessions were called for. By the mid-1980's the government, under pressure from its reformist wing, educators and young white-collar intellectuals, passed the **1985 Education Act**. The 1985 Act was prompted by the clear disintegration of the centralised school system and fears that "people would be taking to the streets" to press their demands for school automony (Halasz 1990:387). The 1985 Act, undoubtedly an important moment in the reform process, one that was to resonate in the post-1989 debate, justifies brief elaboration.

In summary, the legislation gave recognition to **school level autonomy** and resulted in attempts at the deregulation and depoliticisation of school administration. Schools were given the freedom, within the parameters of national strategy provisions and central government's educational policy and plans, to identify their own educational tasks. School issues which did not fall under statutory authority were left to the schools to decide upon. Furthermore, schools could work out supplementary curricula and develop their own local educational system. The school staff was described as the key decision-making and consultative body in matters relating to educational questions. It could veto, through a secret vote, the appointment of a new school director (principal). School councils consisting of parents and community organisation members were, however, set up as a balance to the influence of teachers (Halasz 1991:3).

The 1985 Act in reality initated the process of separation of legal administration and pedagogical control. The centralised pedagogical control which the earlier system had perpetuated was in fact abolished by this law. Pedagogical matters were now the sole domain of schools and even the local and regional educational departments had lost their right to interfere. The most visible, and

indeed, the most positive result was that within a three year period, school innovations had increased sharply with one quarter of schools having utilised an educational innovation fund set up by the government (Halasz 1991:3).

The general public response to the 1985 Act was that of enthusiasm, particularly after the failure of the government's attempts to reform its school curricula and programmes in 1978 (Halasz 1991:3; Howell 24-9-91). Under fire from the critical theoretical writings of Hungarian educators, (prompted by exposure to Western influence), and in reaction to the rapidly changing political scene in the mid-eighties, the reformist Ministerial policy-makers saw the 1985 Act as their opportunity to secure stability within the education system (Norman 1-10-91). However, the motives of the state were not entirely persuasive - it was widely suspected of attempting to gain the support of educators and the public through this manoeuvre (Nagy & Szebenyi 1990:9). The major problem was that uniformity of provision, determined by the centre, continued to be very much the preferred approach of government. This stance did nothing to convince educators and the public that fundamental change had occurred. In the meanwhile, what is more, the economic crisis (as described above) had reached such proportions by 1988 that it became clear that not only was the financing of school reforms in jeopardy, but it became apparent that the state was experiencing difficulty with the daily maintenance of schools (Gyarmati 9.1991:2). And further, to compound this, in 1989 the decade long crisis around the Ministry of Education's leadership came to a head with the resignation of Bela Kopeczi and his deputy, Ferenc Gazso, who had been appointed to implement the 1985 Act. Gazso, frustrated by a stubborn civil service, acknowledged in an interview that Ministry staff were reluctant to implement reforms which would effectively decrease their power. He went on to remark that "reform of schools fell apart" as the Ministry "failed to react to the requests and suggestions of educators" and continued to impose central directives contrary to the spirit of the 1985 Act (Darvas 1991:243).

At the end of 1989 the education terrain found itself overrun by new role-players as political reforms brought levelling of the playing fields. This section will relate how, in this new environment, the various political parties, each supported by members of different education interest groups, went about establishing their positions on this new levelled ground and mapping out their vision of educations role for a future society. The result was that the monist

concept of education advocated during four decades of communist rule was about to change radically as education was pulled into the orbit of the party political struggle for power.

The latter part of the discussion focuses on how the new Hungarian Democratic Forum-led government found itself amidst a public debate on central versus local control of education, thus interestingly, participating in the resurrection of the very dispute which emerged out of the 1985 Act. While this government constitutionally entrenched the principles of democracy in education, it was unsure how to proceed with devolving power away from the centre. As an attempt to resolve this problem, it commissioned two expert committees to hammer out the question of whether, and how, to centralise or decentralise education. While waiting for these two committees to report their findings, the government went ahead with reforms in three key areas. These three areas were : management and administration policy; curricula and teacher training. It is in this period, of what one can call political flux, that various interest groups became very much more visible in attempts to influence and lobby the government, in an effort to further their particular goals. This section will also follow the education Ministry's response to the pressure of these special interest parties. Before looking at these groups, it is important to lay out how the political terrain was configured with respect to education.

The discussion begins with the positions of the major political groupings on the eve of the first free elections, as political posturing on the new education law began in earnest. As schools were reduced to a political football, parties were increasingly seen to reflect the pre-1945 dictum of Cardinal Mindszenty that "Whoever holds the school in his hands, holds the youth" (Mihaly & Horvath 1991:5). In October 1989, the Parliament paved the way for a multi-party system. The political parties which had been caught up in the process of democratisation began to formulate their education-manifestos to canvas electoral support.

The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), drawn from supporters of a traditional-nationalist value system, was the first major opposition party formed before 1989 to put forward a well-defined education program. Its strategy, however, was void of concrete reform proposals and reflected mainly value positions. These values included freedom, democracy, autonomy and the

understanding of education as a "strategic branch" in its budgetary allocations (Darvas 1991:246). As the biggest member in the new coalition government described above, the MDF education program has the most support.

The former main democratic underground opposition formed themselves into the **Alliance of Free Democrats** (SZDSZ). Their position is that the entire social system would have to be radically reformed. Their 1989 education policy positions, for example, confirm their stance against state monopoly in education, opting instead for consolidation of local control. A faction amongst them, according to Horvath (30-10-91), even advocate total and unconditional freedom within education and the total absence of state control. Parents and students are regarded, within this view, as responsible citizens, capable of and therefore deserving of the right to decide upon the nature, level and educational institutions of their choice. The most outspoken anti-communist and radical party among the political organisations, the SZDSZ's education program is the clearest indication of the extent of the change in pedagogical thinking in Hungary today. International values and understandings as opposed to specific, Hungarian ones, appear in several references in their documents. They support full school autonomy in regard to structure, content and finances and concede only to national final examinations for the purposes of standardisation of academic performance..

The other important organisation in this fray is the **Hungarian Socialist Party** (HSP). This party evolved from the former Communist Party and had a brief section on education in its 1989 policy manifesto. The HSP had as goals, the curtailing of central control with more autonomy for schools and the freedom of learning as a guarantee.

Political conflict between these parties, particularly in education, reached a climax after the April 1990 elections. Especially contentious was the issue of religion. The MDF-led government immediately became embroiled in a public crisis with its proposals to re-introduce 'religious education'. The furore which followed, forced the state to adopt a consensus approach rather than attempting a one-sided radical return to traditional values. The government faced with parliamentary agreement on desired school and teacher autonomy, but division on the function of the state (e.g. state control versus local "client" control), appointed a new committee of experts to deal with the matter.

This committee was appointed in June 1990, consisting of experts linked to the 1985 Act committee, led by the deputy educational minister from the former Kadar government. This committee's draft, made public in February 1991, triggered a "particularly intensive and fierce discussion" in political and educational establishments (Horvath & Mihaly 1991:5). The draft proposed a liberal solution to the educational problems and was favourably received by the public, but opposed by the government. Government criticism focused on the need for increased state control in regard to curriculum issues and administration whilst religious and national values should be re-affirmed by the new legislation. What this highlighted was the paradoxical situation in which the 1985 Education Act (which had begun the process of decentralisation) now stood, and, which was in fact, in direct contrast to the new government's move towards tighter state control. This paradox had become evident in the government's drive to reincorporate, ironically from the top again, conservative and traditionalist values in education.

The positive public response to the draft had far-reaching implications for the reform process (Halasz 25-10-91). For one, there were many positive responses and secondly, it spoke of feelings held deeply about the crisis in education. By its sheer volume thus, public voice was inserted and continued as a key factor within the process of education policy-making. The intensity with which it made itself felt and the scope it covered, forced educators and politicians to treat public opinion more sensitively. The "large public acceptance" of this first draft of the committee's report, compelled the government to accept a number of points (e.g local school autonomy and community participation in decision-making process) from the first draft and use these as a starting point for the second group of experts asked to continue the draft (Halasz 25-10-91).

And yet, this vocal popular support notwithstanding, government remained opposed to the committee's recommendations, and, in the end, the weight of its opposition was decisive. This led to the appointment of a **second expert committee** selected from the Hungarian Institute of Educational Research (HIER). In October 1991, after sitting for a few months, the group submitted its proposals which, not unexpectedly, went in the opposite direction of the first expert committee's proposal. They emphasized the necessity for central control and made much of the limitations of school autonomy. The deviation of the

second draft from the first saw the parliamentary parties locked in debate as the second draft (supported by the government) retained as a point of departure the supposition that (as in the 1985 Act) the main function of the state was to regulate the relationships between the community, individual, school and state. This view departed from the oppositions' beliefs that the operation of schools and institutional policies should not be the product of a predefined state pedagogy.

As the majority party, the MDF had sufficient support to push through their proposals, and so on 5 November 1991, the draft act was passed by Parliament, ostensibly aimed at correcting the perceived imbalances of the first draft act. A general criticism of the first draft had been that it had excluded state schools in contrast to church and independent schools, from collecting additional funds from pupils. State school managements would in future be able to rely on additional state grants to deal with school budget deficits.

Despite the progress which took place during these two years, from pre-1989 "humanist inspired socialist education" to the post-1989 "humanist inspired democratic education" (Szebenyi 1992:21), comprehensive education legislation embodying the ideas voiced in the debate which came in the wake of the second committee's proposals in 1991, was only expected in 1992 (Bathory 1991:4). In the meanwhile, following the parliamentary and local elections, a number of developments, as a result of the changing political scene, were being set in motion and manifested themselves in three spheres : management and administration policy, curricula and teacher training. This discussion will review these changes in these spheres in order to show how the opposing groups within the society crystallised into seven interest groups which are examined in the second half of this chapter.

In terms of the November 1991 Act, with respect to administration, the old 3 x 3 model of governance was abolished. This left Hungary with a two-level structure in which municipalities were made subordinate only to Parliament, but left in control of local schools. The government implemented through the 1991 law a system whereby the country's eight regions each had a commissioner to supervise the legal activities of the various municipalities or communities. Each municipality had the same supervisory role over the schools within its jurisdiction. Schools were limited to being able to implement curricula and

conduct evaluations of the curricula. This has meant that some schools had to "defend" themselves to get back the autonomy they gained from the 1985 Act in those municipalities which chose to intervene in the schools' pedagogical activities. Schools, without the option to call on regional authorities, now found themselves in the middle of the balance of power between the Ministry of Education and the local municipality.

This system of management served to open up the debate on centralisation versus decentralisation. Severe criticisms have been voiced by people opposed to decentralisation who are against the concentration of power and supervision in municipalities (Horvath 30-10-91). The incompetent involvement of some municipalities in the pedagogical process in schools and the questionable authority of some school boards have served to strengthen the call by those favouring recentralisation and a return to the former system of controlled supervision (Szebenyi 1992:28). This issue was made even more complicated by the Ministry of Education's assertion that it had professional responsibilities to schools. The legality and practical implications of this interest - particularly the state's establishment of eight Regional Education Centres - only served to confuse the situation. The present debate on decentralisation (school autonomy) or centralisation is a direct result of the "ambiguous government policy in regard to the 1985 Education Act" (Halasz 25-10-92). The state is undecided and ambiguous to the autonomy granted to schools by the 1985 Act or whether to create a new central control mechanism. This debate has gained momentum with the staunch defence of school autonomy by teacher associations which grew in professional self-confidence under the autonomy granted by the 1985 Act. The opposing interest groups in this debate are, firstly, the educators and experts, who support the division or decentralisation of power and seek to ensure school autonomy. Secondly, the Christian-National movement and ruling MDF-led coalition, who want to ensure central control over the schools. The result of government centralisation policy might best be summed by Horvath (30-10-91) : "Democratic changes in the political system may result in authoritarian action in education. The legitimation for centralisation is seen not only for an increase in professional control over schools, but for more political power".

Before 1989, the municipalities occupied a politically subordinate position in the centralised education system. Abolition of the 3 x 3 model after

1989, transferred the Ministry's reform program to the municipalities. What this implied was that the autonomy afforded to schools by the 1985 Act was extended under the new government, but schools now found themselves in a precarious balancing act between the Ministry and local municipalities. Geza Saska (Chairman of the Education Commission of the Metropolitan General Assembly) remarked, for example, that the great act of power balancing had only begun :

> "The struggle between three elements of the system has not yet been brought to an issue. At present, nobody knows the kinds of balancing techniques that will develop among them as well as their respective spheres of authority. However, it has already become obvious that schools also are as afraid of the municipalities as of anything new. Another reason is that the initial steps (involvement with schools) of the municipalities have not always been fortunate." (Szunyogh 1991:8)

The most frequent fears expressed by teachers and parents on school autonomy were put to Ferenc Gazso, Chairman of the Draft Committee, preparing the Concept of the New Education Act, by Szunyogh (1991:6), editor of the Hungarian Educational Weekly. Gazso, in response, confirmed that schools would continue to be able to exercise a professional autonomy, but not in an absolute manner. They would have to depend on the "recognition and institutionalised representation" of parents and local community. Community participation in the new school boards was seen as a prerequisite in balancing the rights of the school, its clients and other interest groups. Halasz (25-10-91) sees the threat to school autonomy as well founded in light of the parliamentary balance of power weighed in favour of the pro-centralisation coalition government. This trend is in contrast to a 1990 public poll which confirmed that 48.4% of people surveyed preferred a local approach to education problems (see Appendix 7; Question 17). The new law of self-administration which placed responsibility for the schools in the domain of the local self-governing bodies has been eagerly awaited by the majority of schools and education experts (Horvath & Milhaly, O 1991:3) as it is a vital step in the process of decentralisation and should spell the end for bureaucratic controls and the old, Prussian school system. However, local municipalities are still viewed with some suspicion as some teachers regard local education bodies as "tentacles" of

state control. As a result of this law the schools virtually became "a captive of the disputes between the parties" (Horvath & Mihaly, O 1991:3). This situation developed as it seemed the ruling coalition was losing its central power over the schools, after suffering heavy defeats in local elections and some cities (liberal victories). Teachers have thus become wary of local education structures which could be seen as another form of central control.

The ambiguity and displacement of authority aside, the administration, management and reform of the public education system remained handicapped by the lack of funds, impatience of the population and the continued opposition of interest groups from the former system. The obstacles that the Ministry has had to contend with were revealed by Education Minister, Andrasfalvy during his speech at the start of the 1991 school year (Szunyogh 1991:3). Andrasfalvy, spoke of the continued functioning of "bad institutions" (unspecified schools) and the difficulty of changing peoples' conditioned response after forty years under the former system's influence. The limited budget and relatively recent formation of the new Ministry of Education, were cited by the Minister as reasons for his inability to announce a new Education Act at the start of 1991. The Minister, however, did point to the newly-gained freedom of teachers to exercise their professional autonomy (in reference to new freedom in teaching curricula) as the single biggest achievement of the political transformation. As former oppositionalists, the new Ministry officials are now coming to terms with the Minister's approach of administering the Ministry not as a central organ of prescription, but as a serving body to parents and pupils.

With respect to curricula, a few developments are worth noting. The imminence of political change by the end of 1989, coincided with the national discussion on the principle of a Core Curricula (CC) for education. In May 1990, about two thousand people answered the call for "all those [who] could take part" (Szebenyi 1992:289 (b)) to attend a national conference. A concerted effort was made to avoid the former government's approach of "segregated opinion gathering" in deciding upon curricula reforms. This principle was met by initial opposition from some teachers and Ministry officials (Gyarmati 1991:5), but ultimately proved to be fairly popular (Szebeny 1992:22; Halasz 1991:9). Teachers were the most enthusiastic supporters of the CC as it gave them ample freedom to "fill out" the CC according to their pupils' needs and leaving them room for innovative teaching. The final CC draft completed by

the Ministry of Education in November 1991 specified : only the minimum number of school days per year, the knowledge to be attained at primary, pre-primary and secondary levels and delimited the cultural domains instead of mandatory subjects. It also committed itself to raising secondary school standards with the view to giving pupils access to international tertiary education and instilling democratic and general European values at school level (Gyarmati 1991:5). However, by the spring of 1992, Szebenyi (1992:291,2 (b)) reported that the CC draft was "put on ice" as the whole debate flared up again. Szebenyi identified the main interest groups as intellectuals and a sector of the mass media (opposed to any curricula in education); teachers from elite schools and some members in the Education Ministry (pro-output control only) and "old and new conservative interest groups" in the Education Ministry that attack the CC from an "orthodox conservative angle".

Popular affection for the pre-1945 school **structure** within the general public prompted the government to revive the 4-grade elementary (primary) school and 8 grade academic secondary (grammar school or gymnasium) school system through amendments to the 1985 Education Act in the form of the 1990 Education Act. However, draft laws proposed in June 1991 and November 1991 were opposed by the parliamentary opposition parties and were under discussion by the end of 1991. Debate particularly centred upon the question of early selection and future career constraints that the new proposals sought to enact. The 1990 structure of the education system that dates from the 1961 act appears in Appendix 6.

The **teacher training** system is facing an immense challenge in meeting the demand for qualified teachers who have been adequately prepared for an innovative and reformed education system. K. Mihaly (1991:119) argue. that universities and colleges were generally unaffected by education changes and lacked appropriate reform strategies. Two decades of conservative management in teacher training colleges, however, had effectively ensured that they would become bastions of the old system. The new foreign language policy alone necessitated the retraining of about ten-thousand Russian teachers (Radnai 1991:2) and the re-structuring of higher education and training colleges to accommodate the overwhelming need for foreign language teachers. How this was to happen was not clear.

K. Mihaly (1991:119) expressed doubt about the ability of teacher training institutions, mainly those found in small cities, to bring about the desired changes. The result of the lack of response to the new environment, particularly from some teacher training institutions, led to an increase in the demand by pupils, students and western-orientated professionals, for English and German language career skills, which in turn had led to a surge in private language schools. In November 1991, these schools already numbered eighty-six (Kasriel 1991:7).

This particular issue - that of foreign language training - has precipitated a deep but also complex schism in the fabric of Hungarian society. The ruling political elite in Hungary generally favour a return to national traditions. The ruling coalition has as its point of reference the pre-1939 period which was characterised by strong conservative traditionalism with Christian democratic values (Evling 7.1990:20). This group sees integration with Europe only as a distant secondary objective (Horvath 30-10-91). The liberal opposition parties, on the other hand, do not question the significance of national traditions, but are concerned at the conservative inclination to re-centralise state education. Openness to West-European values, education trends and modernisation encapsulates the approach of the liberal parliamentary opposition. Horvath's (1990:208) assessment of this situation, one which is echoed by some progressive educators, is that the present government, as the result of weak tradition, is paradoxically unable to lead the society and the individual towards making a bold step towards reform, but is still too powerful to allow others to initiate such reforms. Interestingly, however, and undoubtedly significant for the balance of forces in this debate, the struggle between modern and traditional education policy values is not only present in opposing political parties, but within the ruling coalition itself.

4. EDUCATION INTEREST GROUPS

There are several interest groups on the educational landscape of Hungary which can be distinguished by their specific orientations to : level of participation in the education reform process; local autonomy versus central decision-making and traditional versus modern education values.

This section examines the development of seven interest groups identified by the writer as key role players in the education transitional phrase. Although the events of 1989, activated these "new" interest groups, "Ideologically less committed education groups" have been around since the mid-1970's (Halasz 1986:131 - see Appendix 8; Howell 1988:125). The groups to which this study gives particular attention to, are teachers, teacher associations, independent schools, parents and pupils, religious groups, media and public opinion, and higher education and research institutes. This section will conclude with an analysis of the research questions.

4.1 Teachers

In spite of Hungarian education's advance following the 1985 Act, the large scale absence of teachers in the civil opposition movement to the communist government, resulted in political leaders and not educators deciding upon the direction of education development.

Frustration and a degree of apathy amongst teachers originates from many circumstances. Their main problems relate to: their low professional status, economic improvishment and complexly, their internal vulnerability on the one hand to emerging interest groups of modern, mostly young, pro-reform teachers, and on the other to headmasters who favour traditional values and continuance with the pre-1945 education period.

The rapid transformation of the teaching profession in the eighties highlighted the need for a new education policy which clearly defined the role of teachers. The professionalisation of teaching, linked with school autonomy, resulted in an increasing number of teachers who saw themselves as professionals, and who espoused the ideas and innovations of their profession.

Although this trend to professionalisation is only in its early stages of development, it has given momentum to the question of teacher autonomy within the national educational reform debate. The "socialist" education system, however, was directly opposed to any form of alternatives and autonomy on organisational and individual level and as a result largely produced teachers who were "dependants". It would thus be "naive", argues Otto Mihaly (1991:3) "to expect that the autonomy of teachers will develop on pure

incantation, or even through teacher training". Professionalism is thus faced with a heritage of subordination of the status of teachers. This view was shared by Professor Varga (29-10-91) of the Technical University of Budapest and Professor Eva Szechy (29-10-91) of the Eotvos Lorand University, (Budapest), during interviews.

There is a need therefore, to raise teachers' self-perceptions through upgrading the position of teachers. By April 1990, the political system had pushed them into virtually defenceless positions while the former government's education policy had kept teachers from political participation and withheld teachers from empowerment in market relations by dictating the terms whereby they could sell their labour power (Szechy 29-10-1991). The ambiguity of the reforms and the contradictory tendencies contesting the sphere which they inhabited, similarly blunted their capacity for involvement in the reform process, both at macro and micro levels.

Teachers' inhibited positions have been further exacerbated by the contradictory demands placed on them (see Appendix 24). Certain politicians are pressurising educators to implement moral or religious education in schools, even though trained teachers, text-books and programs are lacking, while other politicians view the teaching profession with mistrust, accusing them of collaboration with the previous government and "mis-educating" past generations (Halasz 31-10-91). The campaign by teachers to improve their conditions and clarify expectations of them, has been undoubtedly strengthened by the establishment of professional associations and societies by education interest groups. The weight of the past, however, hangs heavily over such campaigns, so much so that in 1992, it continued to be political leaders and not educators who were determining the direction for education (Szebenyi 1992:26). Szebenyi ascribes this to the absence of teachers (and the society in general) in active opposition to the political system prior to 1989, in contrast to Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The kind of challenges that teachers face are best exemplified by two events that occurred within the first year of the new democratic government gaining office: the appointment of headmasters and the role of headmasters in the reform process.

In October 1990, a "witch hunt" was started, following a misunderstood statement

by Education Minister Andrasfaluy, urging teachers to identify headmasters appointed under the previous government in accordance to political, rather than professional criteria. The entry of political parties in this debate brought to an end the short era of less politicised education of the eighties (Halasz 1991:2). During this "witch hunt" many capable headmasters were forced to succumb to political intervention (Gyarmati 9.1991:2).

Also in 1990 a conflict evolved from the pre-1989 practice of appointing headmasters by means of consensus between the school staff and the local education authority. The staff had a veto right whilst the local authority had the power of appointing the principal and had to agree also on staff proposals for the post. This system, unique within the international context, appeared to work well according to Horvath (30-10-91), until the new government intervened. It then, however, led to increasing controversy between the school staff and the local authority, as both groups felt their interests jeopardised. When the matter was referred to judicial arbitration, in the latter half of 1991, a constitutional court ruled against school staff and awarded the responsibility of appointments of headmasters to local authorities. In its ruling, the court pointed to the absence of staff veto in Western democracies as a motivation for the decision. The irony, as a number of interviewees emphasised, was that the supposedly new democracy was scrapping a democratic feature dating from the communist period (Halasz 25-10-91; Horvath 30-10-91).

A further and re-occurring subject bedevilling the struggle for teacher autonomy is the crucial role of headmasters (directors) in the future education system. The disposition of headmasters to the reform process continues to be the deciding factor in the implementation of innovative school programs. The inertia of headmasters has forced some research institutes to involve teachers through direct mail, setting out courses or programs available (Horvath 30-10-91). The traditional role of headmasters is thus another aspect which needs to be enhanced within a new system of school autonomy. Since May 1990, the headmasters' corps has been targetted by international exchange and co-operation programs to improve their management capacities. The eight week management course for fifteen Hungarian headmasters by the University of Amsterdam's School for Education Management is an example of the prominence of Dutch universities in this process (Reparaz 1991:6).

Pro-reform and innovation minded teachers face the arduous task of breaking through the ceiling of the traditionally orientated value system.Miksa, a reporter of the Hungarian Education Weekly, describing the conflict at a school in rural Koveskal, is an appropriate example. She remarked in an interview (Szunyogh 1991:10) upon the defeat of pro-reform young teachers in their efforts to establish a school board. She felt bitter about what had happened. Eva Kovacs, spokesperson for the pro-reform group confirmed this, saying : "Mrs Gerencser (headmistress) has prevented the election of the school board.....I've lodged a complaint because of the anti-democratic suffocation of the school board. I've submitted a protest on legal grounds which has been answered by the municipality of Koveskal explicitly threatening me in a letter indulging in personalities" (Szunyogh 1991:10).

Teachers in dimension 4 (see page 110) who support democratic transformation of education through a process of decentralisation and modernisation, find themselves after two years of democratic government, more or less in the same powerless position as they were in the communist era. Channels of access to government education policy-making have certainly been opened but the research indicates the dominance of the "arena of power" by interest groups from dimension 1 who favour a single value system. At national policy-making level, the pro-traditionalist MDF-led government dominates the process while at local municipal level, former communists and traditional orientated headmasters and parents continue to obstruct initiatives by pro-modernisation teachers. The future power of teachers in dimension 4 will only be strengthened by the support of other groups (e.g. universities and research institutes) from within the same dimension and as a result of the increased influence of groups within dimension 2, as the economy recovers.

4.2 Teacher Associations

The period 1985 to 1989 was characterised by the proliferation of unions, political parties and teacher associations who had become distinct interest groups, as the transformation in the political arena gained momentum. These organisations began to lobby for influence in the educational policy making arena as teachers, parents and community groups became members (see Appendix 24).

There are two dominant professional teacher associations. For a long time the Union of Pedagogues (UP) was the only union which enjoyed official recognition in pre-1989 Hungary (see Appendix 21). It was well known for being on the one hand the mouth organ for central government, whilst on the other neglecting to act as a spokesbody for teachers in policy making.

In March 1990, because of the UP's ties with the pre-1989 communist government, the 170 000 member **Pedagogues Trade Union** (PTU) came into being as a breakaway from the UP. The PTU, which is now the largest teachers' union (it actually dates from 1945), is campaigning as an organisation, fully autonomous from political parties and government. The most prominent issue which the PTU is lobbying against, is related to state financing and the Ministry's intention to withdraw itself, to a large extent, from financial support for schools.

The **Pedagogues Democratic Trade Union** (PDTU), founded in November 1988 and numbering 1100 members, came into existence as a direct result of opposition to the PTU and the former regime. The PDTU is seen as more militant and active than the PTU and as representing the professional interest of pro-reform minded teachers. The PDTU was, for example, responsible for the first post-1945 teachers' demonstration, on December 19, 1988. Its secretary, Gabor Horn, ranked teachers' salaries, as the single most important campaign issue for 1991 and beyond. The association has moved away from its traditional trade unionist role to taking up issues within the teaching profession relating to macro policy. It is for instance, keen to promote the input of educators in national policy formation, and even more broadly, to reform the whole education system. Darvas (1991:245) comments on the PDTU's program of action : "The Program of the PDTU, challenges the whole system of public education". It has made a point, however of presenting itself as an "apolitical and non-governmental" policy organisation.

As the national education reform debate has gathered momentum, teachers are looking to their professional organisations, not only to safeguard their autonomy in light of the government's mood of centralisation, but to lead the way in demanding a living wage for economically impoverished teachers (Szechy 20-10-91). The culmination of teacher frustration over low salaries and lack of significant funding for schools, led to a number of protest marches and

strikes (Gyarmati 9.1991:2). The largest protest action was organised by the PTU and PDTU teachers' associations, which led to national rallies and a massive protest before Parliament in 1991. The scrapping of the proposed 30% raise in teachers' salaries and the use thereof for daily maintenance, were the main reason for the protests. The origin of the crisis can be traced to the bankruptcy of local municipalities which had, by the 1991 Local Government and Budget Act, been made responsible for the financial maintenance of primary schools.

The interesting feature of the organised teaching profession is that although the Pedagogues Democratic Trade Union and Pedagogues Trade Union are in opposing dimensions (4 and 1, see page 110), their domination by the MDF government has led to their co-operation. This was evident in their joining forces for the 1991 teachers' protests. Their actions can be labelled "self-defensive power-seeking" as they attempted to use demonstrations as a channel of access to influencing government funding policy. It is clear that the ability of the pro-modernisation teachers corps to influence government policy would be greatly enhanced if the Pedagogues Trade Union were to successfully shed its "former communist image" and join in the pro-reform lobby in dimension 4.

4.3 Independent Schools

I found six interviewees who agreed with a number of articles which stated that alternative schools were one of the major positive developments in education after April 1990. Parents were now given the choice to choose their child's school according to their needs and teachers were free to pursue innovative teaching methods. In an article entitled, Sorting out Priorities, Eva Gyarmati (9.1991:3) sketches a lucid picture of the new spirit of pluralism in education provision : "Meanwhile new developments in education have made it clear that what used to be an intellectual wasteland is a ferment today and heading towards unstrung diversity. The state has lost its monopoly in setting up and running schools...". She continued to remark upon growing parent support "...with expectations of changes in organizational and teaching methods running high, alternatives and novel educational institutions are bound to provoke interest". The discussion on independent schools will show how dissatisfaction with public schools has encouraged this movement towards providing for the

societies' divergent interests.

The amendment in 1990 to the 1985 Education Act abolished state monopoly and made possible the establishment and maintenance of non-state schools by individuals, organisations and churches (the Act was titled the 1990 Education Act). The rapid expansion of independent schools, which rose to thirty within the first year of legal status arose from parents' and educators' impatience with the rate of reforms with the education system's efficiency in comparison to their view of international standards (Mihaly, K 1991:3; Barret 1.91:21). The independent school movement includes private schools, commercial schools (e.g. Hungar Hotels School; Miller Food Chain School - Varga: 29-10-91), humanist co-operative schools, Jewish schools, Waldorf schools, vocational training and church schools, representing a variety of pedagogical paradigms.

The question of state responsibility for subsidising independent schools has led to conflict between the government and the various interest groups managing alternative schools (see Appendix 24). Opposition groups view state subsidy as a civil right which should be guaranteed regardless of the type of school. Leftist critics see the government subsidy policy of independent schools as infringing on equal opportunities for all pupils and giving an unfair advantage to wealthy pupils who can attend the best schools. The granting of state subsidy - rightwing groups argue - is the main form of state supervision over education quality. Some members of the professional establishment subscribe to this opinion in their attempt to guard and substantiate their controlling function or power over schools (Horvath & Mihaly, 1991:4).

The establishment of independent schools (dimension 4 - see page 110) can be seen as a form of "self-defensive power-seeking" as parents and educators attempt to ensure that their vision of pluralistic and differentiated education is concretised. The MDF coalition government (dimension 1) does have an impact upon independent schools, albeit limited to the Ministry's core curriculum which is a prerequisite for state subsidies. Independent schools in turn do not have a direct stake in national education policy-making other than their relationship with the government along the lines of 'tolerance' and 'co-operation'. The influence that independent schools do have on the "arena of power" is directly linked to the question of standards and excellence which will become the deciding factor for school-leavers seeking employment in business

sectors that are pushing for EC integration (dimension 2). The government may therefore end up, contrary to its traditionalist education, having to follow independent schools in introducing innovative programs.

4.4 Religious Interest Groups

In Central Europe "real socialism" has been likened "to a huge refrigerator in which everything is frozen and now (1989) when this refrigerator begins to thaw, all problems reappear in the form they were put into it" (Czalczynska 1991:1).

The collapse of communism in 1989 saw the re-emergence of nationalist, ethnic-separatists and religious animosity from the "socialist refrigerator" (Gati: 1991:130). In Hungary (similar to Poland and Czechoslovakia) the debates on education reforms were soon overtaken by the controversy of religious education as the Roman Catholic Church attempted to exert its influence in schools (see Appendix 24). During this controversy, religious interests took form as the public, parents, the various denominations and political parties became involved. I contend in this section that the issue of implementing religious education in schools and the Ministry's support thereof, forms an integral part of the MDF-led government's pro-traditional education stance. This policy can be seen as a direct effort to extend its own power and that of the Roman Catholic Church in education.

Political developments prior to the first democratic elections had created an environment by January 1990, which enabled the Parliament to pass the 1990 Education Act on religion which guaranteed religious rights in paragraph 17: "on the liberty of conscience and freedom of religion as well as on churches" (Szunyogh 1991:13). This act not only gave all denominations the right to establish and maintain schools, but made allowance for the tuition of religion in schools and set the scene for the first education crisis of national proportion. A debate was initiated by a speech of Education Minister, Bertalan Andrasfalvy, in September 1990 which caused great concern among parents (Gyarmati 11.1990:35). It created the impression that religion would be introduced as compulsory for all state school pupils. Following the Ministerial order whereby religious education was to be introduced to schools as part of the curriculum and as a standard subject (Horvath & Mihaly 1991:4), levels of tension

escalated dramatically. This order sparked off a countrywide outcry, with people protesting that after four decades of official communist atheism, the state was now again introducing an ideology at school level. Parents, teachers and the press, including believers and non-believers, participated in the debate which raged in Parliament, churches, schools and the media.

The first public opinion survey on educational expectations carried out since the 1990 elections by the National Institute of Public Education found the majority of people opposed to the government's initiative (Halasz 1991:6 - see Appendix 12). The survey found, in reply to the question : "Religious education should be compulsory for everybody", that 15,7% agreed while 78,8% did not. The remaining 5,5% were undecided. This trend was confirmed in a follow-up statement which read : "Religious education should not be compulsory, it must be an optional subject in schools", with 72,7% respondents being in support and only 18,4% against.

The Roman Catholic Church constitutes the largest denominational group, while the majority of people retain links with some religious denomination. Heinrich (198:xvii) estimates that 85% of the population is Roman Catholic, while Tomka (1991:66) contends that only 50-64% are religiously active. Non-Catholics were especially worried that their children would be discriminated against at school, as the state-sponsored religious education would be Catholic. The argument of Catholics, using historical justification, is that schools taught religion before the forty year atheist interruption. They claim that religion deserves an equal chance to re-establish its values among children of the third generation under an atheist government.

It is of interest to note the findings of the Hungarian Observer, a socio-economic journal published quarterly which, in a cover story, featured the start of religious introduction at school level (Gyarmati 11.1990:38). A Catholic priest of the 21st district, Jozsef Nemeth, relates how even under the anti - clerical Kadar regime, large numbers of youngsters would attend church masses. Nemeth argued: "The churches are charged with being impatient and aggressive for trying to make use of our new gained liberty...but now the children must have the right to learn about values other than Marxism-Leninism". It does appear, however, that the Church, in general, respects parental freedom to

choose religion for their children if they wish to.

Analysis of the 1990 election trends by Ildiko Vasary (1991:5), shows the majority of political parties adapting their campaigns to elicit the support of all denominations. A number of parties (e.g. Christian Democratic Workers' Party) added the label "Christian" to their party name. Major parties, such as the Hungarian Democratic Forum and Smallholders parties, incorporated traditional religious values in their election policy documents. The influence of the church on any future debate of national importance will therefore compel education interest groups to vie for the votes of the people associated with the church.

The decree by the Ministry of Education on the subject of religion at school has, since the Minister's original ideas, been changed to a large degree in order to accommodate the various interest groups. The decision, at the end of 1991, to rescind the original decree to introduce religious education is directly linked by Horvath and Mihaly (1991:4) to pressure from schools, parents and the liberal and socialist opposition (see Appendix 11, No:15). The Ministry's new policy further confirmed that religious education was not compulsory and would not appear on school report cards. Religious education, will in future function as extra-curricular activity and the church solely responsible therefore.

The agreement on religious education heralds the first post-1989 conflict of national proportion, to be solved by "collective wisdom", so termed by Melinda Potsubay (Gyarmati 11/1990:38). However, there should be no doubt that even though the introduction of a dominant religion in schools had been halted, the label "truce" would be more appropriate to explain what had actually happened. While Hungary is undoubtedly politically more "stable" then many other Central European countries, it is situated in a region that borders on the former Yugoslavia where religion is a deeply divisive issue. One cannot, therefore, rule out a renewed attempt by the Roman Catholic Church or another denomination to gain control over education.

It is within education that by seeking to introduce Catholic religious education, the MDF coalition government showed its desires to flex its muscle and thereby gain effective dominance in schools. Although this attempt by the MDF and Roman Catholic Church (dimension 1 - see page 110) has been successfully

opposed by interest groups from both dimension 1 and 4, the religious dominance of the Catholic Church and the MDF as champions of the Catholic faith, has remained unaffected.

The impression that I gained from interviewees in dimension 4, was that they remained under threat and wary of the dominant Catholic policy-makers in the 'arena of power' in a time of religious ethnic and nationalist 'restlessness' in the region.

4.5 Parents

Social circumstances in Hungary since 1945 have contributed to antagonistic relationships developing between parents, pupils, teachers and the schools (Bathory 1991:7). Within this environment of mutual blame for the state of education, school standards had deteriorated and with them the status of teachers, school ethos and school-community relations. The attainment of school level autonomy brought into sharp focus, the conflict of interests between the education establishment and the local community (see Appendix 24). Gyarmati (9.1991:2) commented : "The 1990-91 school year will go down in the annals of education as the year of student, teacher and parent demonstrations". The origin of conflict can be traced to parent participation in school advisory boards and the financing of schools.

The granting of school autonomy through the 1985 Act had by 1991 made the involvement of parents and other interest groups in devising school activities a reality. However, parents and interest groups as we discussed above, seemed reluctant to utilise their new freedom in participating in the management of schools (see Appendix 7, Question 20). The difficulty in getting parents to serve on advisory school bodies appeared to be that such bodies were seen by them as lacking sufficient decision-making power (Halasz 25-10-91). The Ministry has also been hesitant to devolve more authority to school advisory boards, as headmasters and staff viewed them with some suspicion. School management is also sensitive to parent involvement which, in a time of increased party political involvement in education, might result in parent political activism in schools. The challenge now facing schools is to get the local community and parents, who see the need for reforms (see Appendix 7, Question 2) to participate in school management while keeping out politics (Halasz 1991:10).

Schools where parental participation does occur, are typified by **individual** parents becoming involved, rather than collective parent participation (Halasz 25-10-91).

Schools have been hit hardest by the **financial** consequences of autonomy. The new 1990 Act on Communities spelled the end of state monopoly of education provision. Municipalities would, in future, take responsibility for the founding and maintenance of kindergarten and comprehensive schools. The Act also stipulated that villages were compelled to establish pre-primary (1-4 year old children) schools before villages would gain recognition. Communities and schools came under severe financial pressure in 1990-1991, as the new legislation burdened municipalities with half of schools budgets (Szebenyi 1992:25). Lack of funds and teacher shortage have resulted in a number of pupil strikes such as the well-publicised ones at the Balato-Nalmodi Hungarian English Secondary School in Budapest. Pressure from parents and local communities has also resulted in the foreign language state secondary schools increasing from seven in 1988 to forty in 1991 (Gyarmati 9.1991:11).

Funding remains the weak link in post-1989 education reforms as schools are hamstrung by the lack of municipal financial support. Parents struggle to make ends meet whilst trying to ensure an education for their children. In spite of this strain on parents and staff, progress is apparent in the rebuilding of relationships between these two groups. It is evident from the literature and interviews that the full participation of parents and pupils in the process of renewing state education, given West European experience, is dependent on the legitimisation of pedagogical reforms through incorporating the interests of the clients. This sentiment was underscored during the June 1991 International Workshop on East-European Education in Frankfurt, with Bathory (1991:7) stating the pivotal need: "to allow for the clear-cut interests of clients in the internal processes of school, e.g. values, contents, methods", to ensure grass roots support for school and Ministerial reform initiatives. Horvath (1990:216) expressed optimism about greater parental involvement, given the first steps taken by society to regain control of education through parent participation in school boards and the emergence of a **client-centered pedagogy** : "It seems that following its long domination of education matters the state will happily retreat to a referee role. It may blow the whistle if somebody is violating the rules, but the rules will be based upon a broad consensus. The teams (schools) may play

the ball game in whatever style they wish".

Parents are now found on the threshold of regaining a degree of control over their children's education, after four decades of being marginalised from the education process, by state ideological hegemony. Although school level autonomy had been attained through the 1985 Act, parents have only, since 1990, become empowered through participation on school advisory boards. While the absence of conclusive data prevents 'parents', as an interest group being positioned inside the 'arena of power', pressure from this group has mounted. Parents and pupils have used demonstrations and strikes as a 'channel of access' to influence the loci of power, namely the MDF-led government (dimension 1. see page 110). In spite of the economically vulnerable position of parents and schools to control 'persuasive' power tactics which centre on state funding to schools, parents have sent a clear signal to groups within dimension1 that unilateral policy decision-making will not be tolerated similar to the pre-1989 era.

4.6 Media and Public Opinion

The democratic elections and subsequent legislation guaranteed media freedom. But by the end of 1991 we find that numerous "critical gaps" (Zielonka 1991: 112) remained in the establishment of a vibrant civil society. The most worrisome phenomenon for the survival of democracy was voter apathy in follow-up elections (Breslow 1991:208). Another was the disintegration of public unity, as witnessed during the November 1989 protests, to the point that public opinion on social issues had all but been lost as a pressure mechanism to influence the government. A brief flicker of public cohesion was visible during the October taxi strike when striking taxi drivers blocked the streets of Budapest and forced the government to drop the announced doubling of petrol prices. The lack of forceful public opinion could be ascribed mainly to: public confusion in the face of over a hundred politicial parties mushrooming overnight and party politics that are depicted by what Zielonka (1991:112) refers to as the growing chasm between "high politics, them, the elites" and ordinary people or "us", who are concerned with bread and butter issues. The third contributing factor was the continued presence of nomenklatura (only 100 of the 700 replaced, one year after the elections: Tokes 1990:61) and elites who use the media as a tool in the political struggle (see Appendix 24). This section

will elaborate on the "media-war"that has kept education issues from gaining prominence and comment on prevailing public opinion on educational expectations.

In 1992, Mezes (1992:62) reported that the **mass-media** had since 1989 been embroiled in what he termed a "political media war". The ruling MDF felt obliged to create its own daily newspaper, "Uj Magyarorszag," to counter the majority of printed media which supported the opposition. The "war" escalated as the government voted in 1992 to freeze the budget allocation to television since it was not "sufficiently in service of the nation". The influence of this struggle on education issues cannot be underestimated as the mass media cannot influence the formation of public opinion on education matters if it is preoccupied with party political power struggles. In acknowledging the potential power of the media to pressure the education authorities the question can be posed "How will the socialist media and old guard influence the education debate?" given :

- that "the old party hands had metamorphasised into the managers of the new companies"(Meze 1992:62) , a reference to the majority of foreign owned newspapers managed by former Communist Party leaders.

- that the largest national daily newspaper, the "Socialist Nepszabadsag," dates from the Kadar era and boasts a daily circulation of 315 000 (Roskin 1991:88).

At the time of Mezes' article in August 1992, the "media war" was described as an undecided tie with the political parties awaiting legislation to settle the dispute. In mid-1990, the National Institute of Public Education (Halasz 1991:5) carried out the first **public opinion** surveys since the democratic elections, **on the educational expectations of the nation.**

The wave of public opinion and demonstrations which had been so successful in sweeping the communist government from power in 1989 had all but disappeared by the end of 1991. Effective public opposition to the dominant MDF-led government's policies had been adversely affected by low voter turnouts and public confusion faced with a confusingly large number of parties with few distinguishable features. The research shows that the media in its role

as 'watchdog' has been unable to get into motion due to the continued power and position of former communists in the media and local government (dimension 1 - see page 110). The only favourable indication to the formation of public opinion as an effective counter (in dimension 4) to government power in education, has been public pressure which had stopped the introduction of religious education and the results of the 1990 (Halasz 1991:5) opinion poll that indicated 38% of people supported equal parent representation on school-boards.

4.7 Higher Education and Research Institutes

Rudolf Tokes (1990:54) reported that well before the Gorbachev era, the Hungarian "native brand of glasnost" had through journal articles and in, "samizdat" (underground newspapers), catapulted the young intelligentsia into the political arena. These young intellectuals, mostly university students from provincial towns and villages had been politically marginalised under the communist government. With the political transition and restoration of academic freedom this "young set" of intelligentsia, together with progressive researchers and lecturers, found themselves in the midst of a"power battle" in which they were fighting for the modernisation of existing institutions. They were also concerned that the institutions should reflect the democratic gains made in the political sphere. This discussion will focus on the clash between the emerging group of young intellectuals, and "pockets" of academic nomenklatura and traditionalists who oppose reforms (see Appendix 24). The conditions which necessitate a new higher education law and the problem of research funding will be put forward as a background to the debate on a future policy for higher education.

Since the loosening of state control of higher education with the 1985 Education Law, the debate on the future **philosophy of education** has continued unabated. Educators have split into the progressive (pro-modernisation) and traditionalist camps. There is prevalent, according to Horvath (30-10-91), the phenomena of "collective amnesia" in certain education circles. The communist period has been "forgotten" by some pro-traditionalist educators who are campaigning for a revival of Hungarian education of the 1930's-1940's. It is precisely this "amnesia" which progressives fear. They argue that the present vacuum in the theory and practice will be filled by a return to systems of the 1930's-1940's.

Progressive educators point out that in the 1930's-1940's, Hungary had lagged behind West European education and that this lag was due to the traditional and conservative Prussian manner of education. The traditionalists, who are strongly represented in the government, lobby for the post-communist vacuum in education to be filled by a system of national Christian education. Their argument, summarised by Horvath (30-10-91), turns on the question of how to bring about "one single key attitude change in teachers". This is not an important issue for progressives. The instilling of pluralistic ideas as an answer to education problems is seen by them as a prerequisite for the emergence of a mature, but flexible, education system. Their approach calls for an acceptance of diversity; that alternative solutions exist for each educational situation (Horvath 1990:215).

The political transformation has led to a financial crisis in **educational research**. The re-organisation of institutes, especially those along political rather than professional lines, coupled with budgetary cuts has resulted in instability within research. Educational research, however, now faces the paradoxical situation that the new political order, in spite of its pro-reform stance, shows less interest than the former government, in supporting research in the social sciences (Halasz 25-10-91). Research faces an arduous task, in adverse conditions, to restructure the public education system without sufficient state research funding. Hungary will have to rely heavily upon international co-operation in planning reforms. Bathory (1991:7) argues that the main benefits of joint research are not merely improved methodology and results of system-level analyses, but also contact with the West as a result of the so-called "window effect", breaking through isolation. The Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is an appropriate example of an institute which has contributed to the development of the country's "gradualist" economic policy through international co-operation (Balasz 31-10-91).

Law XXII of 1990 brought education legislation in harmony with the democratic constitution and restored independence to institutes of **higher education**. However, proper functioning of the universities does not automatically follow the passing of laws. This reality is described by Bakos (1991:13), in a government publication, in which it is argued that "A radical transformation of higher education is necessary, along with its placing on new foundations".

In 1991, a new higher education law seeking to address both the effects of remnants of pre-1989 policy and other new challenges was proposed by the government. State motivation for new legislation led to the formation of academic interest groups, with lines of connection to other social groups who are attempting to influence the coalition government.

The most prominent arguments for a new higher education law can be traced to the need to address a number of issues. One is the need for adaptation of university norms to those held by their counterparts in Western Europe, in line with EC unification developments from 1992 (Kozma 1990:389). Out of this need has grown a project envisaged to have a lifespan of ten years. This project is outlined in a government document entitled "A Programme for National Renewal" (Bakos 1991:13). Another issue is financing and because of problems with the existing arrangements, a new system of financing and budgeting is also on the cards. It will replace the former state "hand out" policy with a competitive research fund allocation format. Universities faced with limited state budget allocations (0.7% of national budget) and cut-backs to "expensive" academic research, are now compelled to compete for state financing through academic lobbies (Szechy 29-10-91).

A further issue at stake is the "catch 22" position that the government finds itself in, given the autonomy granted to universities. Kozma (1990:389) contends that tertiary autonomy has given some universities the ability to protect themselves from modernisation. Bakos (1991:64,66) expresses the need for modernisation of universities, as these are: "fragmented organisationally and geographically, inflexible to larger student numbers, monopolistic and closed systems."

Lastly, democratic rights of students in university management need to be re-defined following large scale student demonstrations in September 1991 (Gyarmati 9.1991:2). In spite of financial constraints and opposition by certain institutions and individuals supporting the status quo, higher education has regained its pre-1945 autonomy from the state and has embarked upon a programme aimed at regaining its position in the European Community. In pursuing this goal, universities have joined numerous international exchange programs such as "Catching up with European Higher Education", Tempus (Trans European Mobility Program for University Students), Erasmus

(Eurupean Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students), and Petra (Young People in Technical Training). These programs and joint ventures serve as a key exposure to West-European educational training, innovations, standards and can act as a gateway to EC unity in higher education. The process of joining the European Community could therefore be a catalyst for reforms as Kozma (1990:389) is of the opinion that : "European integration is the essential challenge that may pull our higher education out of its comfortable particularism".

Hungarian research and institutes of higher education have a tradition of co-operation with their international counterparts which dates from the communist era. These contacts have enabled most Hungarian academics and educators to be one step ahead of their neighbours in Central Europe following the events of 1989. The power of this pro-reform lobby, found in dimension 4 (see p110) is well illustrated by their success even in the communist era, in pushing through the 1985 education decentralisation Act. At the forefront of these groups in dimension 4 are the "young set" of intelligentsia, who are strongly supported by the pro-EC economic lobby from dimension 2. The present political power of the ruling MDF elite and their 'persuasive powers' by means of state funding should not be underestimated. However, the research suggests that the balance of influence in the "arena of power" is slowly swinging towards the pro-reform lobby in dimension 4. This can be ascribed to the early indicators of a successful shift to a market economy which has strengthened the reformist groups' support from within dimension 2.

Participation of interest groups in reforms; circumstances influencing development of interest groups

A range of special circumstances define the basis on which interest groups have become involved in education. In this section, I briefly review these circumstances.

Since the first fledgeling signs of school level autonomy, following the 1985 Act, and given the Hungarian style of "communism with a human face" teachers in Hungary, in contrast to Poland and Czechoslovakia, have developed significantly as a professional group. However a clear distinction should be drawn between their participation and empowerment at school level and their

input into national reform policy. In the school context, teachers have scored their biggest achievements since the political transformation by the freedom afforded within the new curricula and equal representation on school councils. It is mainly the disposition of headmasters which continue to be the deciding factor in the implementation of innovative school programmes in which they have been involved. In this regard, international exchange programmes by research and higher education institutes have contributed to keeping headmasters informed and versed in the latest education practises. In spite of such initiatives, the Minister of Education, Andrasfalvy, in 1991 confirmed the continued presence of "bad institutions" in reference to schools still clinging to outdated policies (Szunyogh 1991:3). At a national level the absence of significant teacher participation in the political opposition prior to 1989 has resulted in the marginalisation of educators, as political leaders continue to wield power through their control of the process of education. The consolidation of teachers as a powerful interest body has been severely eroded by the precarious position in which the former Education Ministry's policies have placed them. Teachers have been pushed to the lowest level of economic existence with a minimal standard of living. Teachers thus face the arduous task of attempting to secure better wage conditions whilst the new government continues to regard education as of secondary importance in its "gradualist" shift to a market economy. The attention of teachers has effectively been shifted from the question of reforms to economic survival as headmasters struggle with deficit budgets and at times even meeting staff salaries (Halasz 1991:10). Teachers also find themselves besieged by contradictory parental expectations. On the one hand some parents pressure teachers to advance moral and religious education whilst others accuse them of collaboration and "mis-education" of past generations.

In the prevailing economic climate teachers look to their associations to lobby for a living wage and to safeguard their autonomy in the light of the mood of centralisation amongst the power elites. The two largest teacher associations are in agreement that the single biggest problem with which the profession has to deal is teacher salaries and the financing of education. The school financing issue dates from the communist era and has been exacerbated by the Ministry's shifting of its school funding responsibilities to local municipalities which do not have the required resources. The Pedagogues Democratic Trade Union (PDTU) who have campaigned on behalf of the pro-reform teachers is the most active organisation in this regard as witnessed by the first post-1945 demonstration, held

in December 1988 (see Appendix 21). The former communist Pedagogues Trade Union (PTU) continues to attract more members (170 000) than the more progressive Pedagogues Democratic Trade Union (established 1988). However, it would be the salary dispute that would bring the former opponents to work together to oppose the ministries unilateral scrapping of a 30 % increase in teacher salaries. The massive joint rallies before Parliament in 1991 served to demonstrate the united power and the common cause both associations responded to, a reality that underscored the role of post-1989 teacher associations.

The popularity of **independent schools** became evident in 1990, as thirty non-state schools were founded. The underlying reasons for the success of these schools were: the society's impatience with the states reform schedule; discontent with the persistence of traditional communist education in certain schools (Horvath & Mihaly 1990:48); negative comparison of schools with international standards and the need for market orientated manpower.

The proliferation of independent schools was seen by six interviewees, in the absence of radical education reforms (Halasz 31-10-91), as one of the major positive developments since April 1990. Alternative schools have also fulfilled to some degree the public expectation of reforms. The non-state school movement is slowed down to an extent by ongoing conflict over the subsidy criteria of the State Education Committee, with pro-independent school founders compaigning for subsidies to all school types as a civil rights issue. The independent school's movement is set to feature prominently as a powerful player in the future education system as there are predictions that its present (1991) five percent control of the national system is expected to reach twenty percent by 1994 (Mihaly, K 1991:3).

The antagonistic relationship between **parents**, pupils, teachers and schools that has developed since 1948 poses a threat to the efforts of educators to legitimise reforms through community participation in schools as part of the democratic transition of the education system. The achievement of school-level autonomy brought into sharp focus the conflict of interests between the education establishment and the local community. Parents were reluctant to participate in school management while headmasters and staff were opposed to the allocation of more decision-making powers which parents thought were lacking. The outcome was, in many instances, parent, pupil and teacher demonstrations during 1990-1991

(Gyarmati 9.1991:2). The challenge facing educators is to get the community and parents who are at present only involved as individuals, to participate in a collective manner in school management. This hinges, as Bathory (1991:7) argued, on "the adoption of the envisaged client-centered pedagogy which would allow for the clear-cut interests of clients in the internal processes of school, e.g. values, contents, methods".

The sheer volume of public response to education issues, and indeed the sensitivity of politicians to **public opinion**, in reaction to the first expert committees education draft (which was made public in February 1991) firmly established the wider public as an interest group not to be ignored. In mid-1990, a public opinion poll on education expectations confirmed the existence of two opposing camps in the general public (e.g. traditional vs modern) dividing along party political lines (Halasz 1991:5). However, since the conducting of the poll, public attention has been fixed upon "bread and butter" issues as witnessed in low voter turnout in subsequent elections. These issues of economic survival have had a negative effect on public opinion in regard to issues related to education. What is more, given the influence of the "old guard", doubt has been expressed on the mass media's ability or desire to raise education issues to further the process of education reforms. The end result has been the relegation of education issues in the minds of the public and with it public opinion as a means of pressuring the government to press on with reforms.

Higher education is in a transition phase similar to secondary education. The successful transformation at particular institutes depends upon the power of either the pro-traditionalist educators, those pro-reform minded or the group that favours continuance of the status quo. Participation in reforms have also, undoubtedly, been affected by the phenomenon of "collective amnesia" (Horvath 30-10-91) which is prevalent in certain education circles. The communist period has been "forgotten" and a return to traditional conservative Prussian education is advocated by some educators. The road to reforms, this return to the past notwithstanding, has been led, to name but a few, by the Eotvos Lorand University, the Foundation for School Development (Budapest), the Hungarian Institute of Education Research and the National Institute of Public Education.

My analysis suggests three issues from the pre-1989 period that remain the focus of critique on higher education and inhibit the development of this interest group. The grassroots implementation of Ministerial policy or research institutions' proposals are subject to the approval of local interest groups; counter-selection hinders the brightest school-leavers from entering higher education and some universities remain "monopolistic and closed" to modernisation in an effort to cling to their former powerful position (Bakos 1991:64;66). In spite of economic restraints and opposition by some institutions, higher education institutes are set to regain their position in the European Community, with international exchange programmes forming a crucial part of this goal.

The introduction of religious education as part of school curricula in 1991, sparked off a broad based public outcry against the government's unilateral powerplay in education. Public reaction sounded a warning to religious groups that political freedom had brought with it the right of parents and the community to oppose central decisions on the education system. The participation of the various special interest groups in the issue of religious education served to: identify a number of known and emerging interest parties that were ready to oppose central power; and facilitated a process of reconciliation between the state, educators and the church. Agreement on the question of religion in schools also heralded the first post-1989 conflict of national proportion, one that was solved by "collective wisdom" (Gyarmati 11.1990:38).

As parents, teachers, believers and non-believers participated in the debate on religious education which raged in the press, churches, schools and Parliament, it became clear that their greatest fear was that it would lead to discrimination and social division, reminiscent of the country's Nazi era. The non-Roman Catholic denominations were especially wary of the potential for discrimination at school level as instruction would be Catholic dominated. The Catholic Church uses historical justification in its claim to re-establish its values among children born in an atheist state. However, public opinion (Appendix 12) was opposed to the introduction of religion in schools which is seen by some as merely to strengthen their grasp on power through yet another ideology to replace the former state-sponsored atheist ideology. Religious interest groups seem set to increase their influence in education with: the appointment of

religious teachers to schools; the return of nationalised (1948) church property of which some presently house schools; and the majority of political parties adapting election policies to draw religious voters.

5. CONCLUSION : ARENA OF POWER

Classification of Interest Groups in the Education Policy-making Arena or "Arena of power"

"E" ECONOMIC AXIS (positive pole; external groups)

i.	Business sector schools e.g. Hungar Hotels School, Miller Food Chain schools.	i.	Directors of former state companies fearing loss of job/power due to privatisation e.g. government goal to increase privatisation from 8,3% to 50% (1991 - 1992)
ii.	Pro-EC unity economists and private sector requiring trained manpower		
iii.	Institutes which support international economic co-operation e.g. Institute of World Economics, Budapest.		
"I" AXIS (negative pole)	2	3	"I" IDEOLOGY (positive pole)
	4	1	
i.	Pro-democratic transformation teachers	i.	Pro-status quo educators
ii.	Pedagogues Democratic Trade Union	ii.	MDF Coalition Government
iii.	SZDSZ Political Party	iii.	Roman Catholic Church
iv.	Independent Schools	iv.	Christian National Movement
v.	Pro-Modernisation research institutes e.g. Foundation for School Development, Budapest.	v.	Reform Communists e.g. municipal authorities
vi.	Pro-reform "Young set" of intelligentsia at Institutes of Higher Education	vi.	Academic nomenklatura
vii.	Educators that favour European integration and globalisation of education.	vii.	Sector of media controlled by former communists, e.g. Nepszabadsag - largest national daily
viii.	Hungarian Socialist Party	viii.	Pro-Traditionalist educators
		ix.	Former Communists winning local elections as independent candidates
		x.	Pedagogues Trade Union
		xi.	Progressive independent candidates winning local elections

"E" AXIS (negative pole; internal groups)

The unique form of communism which evolved in Hungary and the education decentralisation process which started with the passing of the 1985 Act, have made clear how interest groups are located in the "arena of power". This relatively liberal environment made possible the alignment of groupings according to an emphasis on either the economic or ideological function of education. With the progress of the education policy debate on an appropriate future education philosophy has come a marked division between groups in quadrants 4 and 1 as opposing dimensions. The demise of Marxist ideological hegemony in education has opened, ironically, the way for occupation of dimension 1, to groups that support the idea of a single value system, for example, the MDF coalition government's program of traditional Prussian type education. This dimension continues to feature reform or former communists and nomenklatura clinging to the status quo. The position of the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP), the former dominant workers party in dimension 4 is of particular interest. In contrast to its firm entrenchment in dimension 1 prior to 1989, the HSP, now lobbies in its education manifesto, against central control and for greater school autonomy.

Dimension 3 continues to house the largest number of former communist directors of state enterprises that have either bought these companies with pre-1989 privileged capital or are placed favourably to do so as the slow process of privatisation of state companies continues. The present strength of groups in dimension 2 is set to grow given the tradition of a pre-1989 secondary economy, the inflow of foreign capital through joint ventures and the positive outlook for the Hungarian economy compared to Poland and Czechoslovakia. The favourable status of Hungary in regard to negotiation for full EC membership bodes well for the groups in dimension 2. The collection of pro-modernisation groups in dimension 4 could also benefit from the "ripple effect" from growth in dimension 2, as inflow of foreign capital and EC integration will reinforce the issues that they lobby for in education policy making. As newcomers to school boards, and as a result of the undecided outcome of the "media war", the parents and public opinion interest groups have not acquired a clear identity and thus I have not included them in the classification diagram. Similar to Poland, the research indicates that the "arena of power" in Hungary is dominated by interest groups from dimension 1, which favour a single value system.

The data suggests that in pinpointing the loci of influence in the Hungarian education "arena of power", that political supremacy equals dominance in

education policy-making. Although the pro-reform movement, found in dimension 4, has widespread support within education, especially at school level, the political hegemony commanded by the MDF coalition government, is undoubtedly the central factor in determining the form and pace of reforms. Hungary is the only Central European country where the same political party which toppled the communists in 1989 has comfortably managed to retain political power. The result has been that the MDF, with the blessing of the Roman Catholic Church, has had a relatively "free hand" to entrench its tradition value system on education in the absence of any serious threat to its political power.

Within education the broad reform movement, found in dimension 4, and led by the Pedagogues Democratic Trade Union and the pro-reform "young set" of intelligentsia have made substantial inroads into the Hungarian "arena of power". However, this research confirms that alliances between groups in dimension 1, particularly the MDF and Roman Catholic Church and Christian National Movement have effectively shut the door on the more far-reaching education reforms lobbied for by groups in dimension 4.

CHAPTER FOUR

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

INTRODUCTION

This historical overview has as its point of departure the Prague Spring of 1968 and tracks the development of the civic movement which culminated in the mass pro-democracy demonstrations of November 1989 (section 1).

This chapter, structured according to the Bereday framework, reflects upon the crisis in public education that prompted teachers to join the civic movement and the November 1989 protest marches. The revolutionary transfer of political power reversed almost "overnight" the roles of the dissident/pro-reform educators and the former communist education. The chapter also outlines the legislative reforms of the new government. This is followed by a discussion of the amended Act No 29 of 1989 which maps out the intended transition to a democratic education system and a review of the Ministerial reforms with respect to management and administration, curricula and teacher training. As the alignment of political groupings in Parliament after the free elections of 1990 shows, ethnicity and political fragmentation are at the heart of tensions in Czechoslovakia (CSFR) (e.g. Slovak National Party and Moravian Party - both parties for full autonomy). These developments provide, arguably, pro-reform minded educators in what is today the Czech (9,8 million) and Slovak (4,9 million) Republics with a stiffer challenge than that of their peers in Poland or Hungary, given the extreme centralist policies of the former Education Ministry in the CSFR and the fact that democratic transition could only be initiated after the 1989 revolution (Prucha 1991:1). Important as the issue of ethnicity is, this dissertation will, however, not consider this issue at length. It is the state of the country's economy which will command our attention.

This focus arises out of my fieldwork in Central Europe. While I was in the CSFR, it became clear that although political and ethnic headlines featured prominently in the media, economic issues constituted the focus of public and teachers' attention. For educators it certainly is a grave reality with which they have to contend each day. It is for this reason that I include in my

discussion the significance of economic policy (section 2). A brief overview of the Ministry's education policy follows (section 3).

The chapter concludes with an analysis of the seven emerging education interest groups. These interest groups are teachers, teacher associations, independent schools, parents, religious groups, the media and public opinion, higher education and research institutes (section 4).

Attention is given to both their participation in reforms and conditions that influence their development. The discussion of each interest group ends with a comment on its position within the sphere of education policy making, which I have called the "arena of power". This "arena of power" is illustrated in a diagram at the end of this chapter (section 5).

1. POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

The 1989 revolution in Czechoslovakia can be traced back to the political seeds of opposition planted during the uprising in 1968. Liberal and reform communist central committee members were disillusioned with the stagnant economy and monopoly of power by the conservative Novotny government (Cortona 1991:323). At the beginning of 1968, the communist central committee voted Antonin Novatny out in favour of the liberal communist Alexander Dubcek. Dubcek took over the presidency in March and within five months, all conservative communist central committee members were replaced by liberal communists. An enthusiastic population rallied to support Dubcek's attempt to create "socialism with a human face". This revolt has popularly come to be known as the "Prague Spring".

The scope of this popular movement was considerable. It led inter alia to a new economic model which included free-market principles. Equally significant, press freedom was re-instated, a product of which was the exposure of serious abuse of police power and poor economic management. The Prague Spring, however, was short-lived. Despite Dubcek's apparent volte face in proclaiming himself in support of the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, he had exposed his "vulnerability" to popular opinion. Neighbouring conservative communist leaders, fearing that the popular movement in the CSFR would spill

over into their own countries, convinced Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, to intervene. On 20 August 1968, tanks belonging to countries of the Warsaw Pact rolled into the CSFR, meeting with little resistance. Despite coming under a great deal of pressure from the Soviets, Dubcek, supported by two-thirds of the CSFR Communist Party, central committee and the majority of the nation, stolidly refused to renounce his government's reforms (Roskin 1991:118). He was, as a result, replaced in April 1969 by the conservative, Gustav Husak, who launched a policy of "normalisation", which in effect removed from the party all reform and liberal communists who had supported the Prague Spring.

Those who were politically harassed were to play an important role in the following decades. A large number linked up with dissidents to form the civil rights organisation, **Charter 77**, in 1977. Noteworthy is that 140 of the original 242 Charter 77 signatories were Reform Communists. Charter 77 formed the mainstay opposition in the period prior to 1989 and from its ranks would come the leadership of the Civic Forum. And yet despite the growth of this reform pressure, interestingly the communist government installed in Prague held out the longest as Eastern European governments elsewhere (Poland, Hungary, Rumania, East Germany) succumbed to mass demonstrations. Spurred on by Gorbachev's non-intervention policy, however, and the successes of the pro-democracy movement in hardline East Germany, 10 000 Czechs and Slovaks held their first major demonstrations on **29 October 1989**, in Prague, demanding the resignation of the communist leader, Milos Jakes (see Appendix 21).

A key event was a student march on **November 17** during which students threw flowers at police who retaliated by baton charging them. This show of state brutality united a disparate opposition consisting of students, workers, intellectuals and Charter 77 members to form two central organisations - the Civic Forum in the Czech Republic and Public Against Violence Party in the Slovak Republic and ignited countrywide demonstrations. What became known as the "Velvet Revolution" was in full swing (Di Cortona 1991:320). In the following days, demonstrations grew to a quarter million each day and saw the triumphant return of Alexander Dubcek to Prague.

Daily mass marches continued as the hardline Jakes clung to power. The discontent of protestors grew as the economy slumped with a +/- 200% increase in food prices amidst revelations that state mismanagement had created economic disaster areas in northwestern Czechoslovakia. A two-hour general country-wide strike on 27 November was the final blow, forcing Parliament to end the communist monopoly of power (Sullivan 1991:8). A non-communist cabinet was sworn in on December 10, upon which the communist president, Husak, resigned. The "Velvet Revolution" was complete by the end of December 1989 with Alexander Dubcek elected speaker of Parliament and the popular playwright and Charter 77 spokesperson, Vaclav Havel, elected president of Czechoslovakia.

In the June 1990 democratic elections for both Houses of the Federal Assembly, the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence parties attained a majority of one hundred and seventy seats in the 300 seat assembly. (See Appendix: 13). The largest remaining parties : Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Christian Democratic Union Party, won forty-seven and forty seats respectively (Di Cortona 1991:322).

The election outcome enabled the Civic Forum to form a non-coalition cabinet and Havel was elected President. In spite of the moderate support attracted by the Communist Party, it would be the tendency to regionalism and ethnicity that would pose the greatest threat to the Civic Forum and political stability. In the Czech Republic, the Catholic Moravian region endeavoured to attain local autonomy, while Slovak nationalism assured thirty percent of the Slovak vote going to the Slovak Nationalist and Christian Democrats parties who campaigned for Slovak national determination (Zielonka 1991:107; Royen 1991:82). As we know now, the Civic Forum was unable to hold together the variety of political views within the party, not least of which was those between Christians and secularists in Czechoslovakia. The CSFR broke up in December 1992 following a referendum in both republics in mid-1992 during which Slovak voters came out in favour of full automomy. Czech public opinion had throughout constitutional negotiation been in favour of maintaining the federation (Bohanes 7.1991:8).

2. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

The post-event euphoria of the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia lasted only until the June 1990 elections when the average citizen began to experience the effects of macro-social and macro-economic change (Sullivan 1991:8). In this change, essentially that of de-nationalising, light industries were initially targeted and later heavy engineering works were to follow. It was into 1990 that the dramatic effects of this shift to a market economy began to be felt and the pace of economic reforms began to be questioned in Parliament and the mass-media (see Appendix 5 & 21). The Prague government became unsure of itself with respect to the speed of marketisation and whether it should follow the Polish example of "shock therapy" or follow a more gradual transition. This indecision was fuelled by a growing awareness of the negative results of the Polish experiment, an inflation rate of 30% in the CSFR itself and food prices rocketing by plus minus 200%. The government found itself in a deadlock between the Finance Minister, Vaclav Klaus (pro-freemarket), a cautious President and a "go-slow" cabinet in 1990 (Roskin 1991:185; KLC 6-11-91). In spite of having the lowest foreign debt in Eastern Europe, (2.5 billion US dollars - 1988), national inflation was expected to continue at 20-30% for two to three years with salaries showing a mere 15% annual increase by 1991 (Roskin 1991:128).

The economic outlook survey released by the EC in December 1991 confirmed the bleakness in the Eastern European economic picture. This was especially so for Czechoslovakia. The report highlighted the increasing strain between the Czech and Slovak Republics; of particular issue was the 30% unemployment figure lying unevenly between the parts of the country. Slovakia was carrying twice the unemployment levels of the Czech Republic. Helena Hromadkova (13-11-91), a Charter 77 spokesman, contended that the economic deterioration of 1991 could be traced back to the period 1968-1989 when, "human capital was seriously damaged", with the exodus of expertise after the failed "Prague Spring".

How these challenges were to be and are confronted is by no means clear. In addition to experiencing a substantial decrease in the former-Soviet market, access to the EC trading block seems set to continue in the short term until the

CSFR gains EC membership. Although analysts expect the EC to deny membership in the short term to the CSFR, Poland and Hungary, "realpolitik" in order to avert mass migration is seen as a likely reason for the Eastern European countries to be accepted by the EC.

What is clear is that this failure of the CSFR's new economic policy has unleashed reaction from across the societal spectrum. In the Slovak Republic, the Slovak "separatist" movement, led by elements of the old guard, was bolstered as political support grew for a mixed economy (free market economy with certain socialist sectors) in contrast to the Czech Republic's policy of a full transition to a free market economy.

The re-emergence of this former political elite was accompanied by considerable opportunism. It exchanged its "political assets" for "economic assets" by using its capital and political connections from its previous life in government to buy newly privatised companies. Szelenyi & Treiman (Vecernik 1991:297) describe this phenomenon as the "reproduction and circulation of elites".

3. EDUCATION POLICY

Interest groups were effectively kept from participation in education after the CSFR underwent its paradigm shift to Marxist ideology in 1945. This discussion briefly outlines the main characteristics of education in this communist era leading up to the events of 1989, when teachers and the society, faced with a crisis in education, broke the oppressive mould in which they were encased and demanded that education reflected changes taking place in the political arena.

In 1948, the CSFR broke its traditional education links with Western Europe as the communist government led by Prime Minister Klerunt Gottwald came to power through the "Prague Coup". The new government passed the Act on Comprehensive Schools, which orientated the direction of educational policy towards Moscow (Roskin 1991:4). The advent of communist rule thus reversed the trend towards the comprehensive school which had been in motion since the 1930's (Burjan 1991:1). The new government's political and

ideological motivation for changing the education system was that education had to create new socialist workers who supported Marxist ideology (Cerna 1991:3). The revised education system sought in its fight against class "elitism" to remove all forms of differentiation, including the comprehensive school system, in favour of the "unified, uniform school", with all children from six to fifteen attending the same type of school (Burjan 1991:1). Reform-minded as this legislation might have been, it initiated the gradual decline of the once progressive comprehensive school model as new rigid curricula were introduced which were intolerant to alternative thinking and different interests (Walterova 1991:4).

The failure of the "Prague Spring" in 1968, moreover, entrenched this decline. It brought to the surface a political backlash which further weakened the capacity of the educational system to deal with diversity in thought. This led to the period of "normalisation" (purges) under Soviet occupation which witnessed renewed centralisation policies in education, more severe than in either Hungary or Poland (Kalous: advisor to the Czech Deputy Minister of Education 15-11-1991). By the 1970's, education had been wrung dry of vitality. Even the education reform launched in 1976, the Project of Further Development of the Czech and Slovak Education System (PFD), which would stay in place until 1989, could not stem the tide as education lost cultural status and social credibility (Walterova 1991:4) (see Appendix 20). Botlik (1991:1) goes as far as describing the last four decades of uniform curricula as effecting "the results of school activities more destructively than any other influences". Because of its attempts to homogenize individuals and to marginalise their personal interests and social needs (Havlinova 1991:7), the former uniform education system came to be seen as "inhuman" and education found itself out of step with the societies' political aspirations.

Concurrent with the rumblings in the general political sphere, discontent in education was persuasive. Teachers, mired for decades in demoralisation, shook off their oppression and amidst the most adverse conditions, formed, in the mid-1980's, the Teachers Forum (TF). Finding allies in the wider society, the TF, together with the Academic Forum and the Forum of Scientists came to work closely with the leading pro-democracy Civil Forum political party in Prague and the Public against Violence Party in Bratislava. Open reaction

to central state education policy grew as the teaching profession became more organised. By the late 1980's, further implementation of the 1976 PFD education project was met by mass dissatisfaction of teachers, the public and the media (Ondrejkowic 1990:13). Failure by education authorities to react to criticism, contributed to spontaneous civil demonstrations after 17 November 1989, during which teachers, students and the youth played a leading role. The effect of these demonstrations, as we saw earlier, was to bring into power new organisations. The problems in education were not, however, eradicated or diminished by these developments. The incumbent government was, therefore, to find itself confronted with a full-blown public education crisis by June 1990.

One of the new government's first responses to these problems was to initiate legislative reforms. For many in the new government, education was clearly a critical arena in which change was to play itself out. A new Education Ministry, had come into being, with the new government. Many dissidents and oppositionists to the former Ministry suddenly found themselves in the unique position of being given the task to create an education policy to fulfil the needs of a society experiencing substantial changes in all spheres (e.g. economy, culture). One month prior to the June elections the Proposals for the Innovation of the Law No. 29, 1984 of the System of Primary and Secondary Schools, was passed. In both the May legislation and in the agreement on the Rights of the Child, ratified in September 1990, the former education goals of "ideological political education, education for socialist and proletarian internationalism" were replaced with the "principles of patriotism, humanism and democracy" (Barret 2.1991:8, Szebenyi 1992:21). Four areas were specifically targeted for reform in these Acts : management and administration; curricula and teacher training. Significantly, these areas were to become the focus of attention for dissatisfied interest groups. To comprehend the significance of these reforms in the process of transition, it is necessary to spell out what they contained.

In the sphere of administration, the new government acted swiftly to rid the state management and education apparatus of its strict 3x3 model (municipal, regional, Parliament) of centralised Communist Party-state organs. The triad administration model (similar to those in Poland and Hungary) was replaced by a two-level structure of municipalities and Parliament embodied in the Slovak Act of State Administration on 26 November 1990, and The Act of the Czech

National Council on the State Administration of the Education and School Based Management, passed in December 1990 (Barret 1.1991:11, Prucha 1991:5).

The acts removed the power of Parliament to determine centrally the municipal boundaries of small settlements; these settlements were dissolved as 40% of now autonomous villages voted to form their own municipalities (Szebenyi 1992:28). The government retained seventy five administrative units provisionally, to prevent disorder with sudden elimination of local administrations. Municipal autonomy brought with it the burden of responsibility for provision of education. Secondary schools became autonomous legal entities by the end of 1990, but the majority lacked financial independence with economically strained communities in reality having to take care of schools. Communal resources were expected to come under renewed pressure in 1994 when government intended reverting maintenance responsibility of primary schools to communities themselves.

In the Czech Republic, the December 1990 Czech Education Act introduced the principles of school-based management through the establishment of district school boards and at community level, municipal school boards. This increase in independence of the individual school and local authority was further enhanced with the school boards and municipalities given control of the finances allocated to them by the central government. This Act also confirmed the rights of teachers and parents, as the elected local school boards were intended to consist of three groups, the municipal councils, teachers and parents (Christenko 5-11-91 main speaker at Bratislava workshop on Slovak education reforms).

In Slovakia, a weakened education administration and conflict in the various levels of management in the period 1989-1990, had created an urgent need for new legislation (Ondrejkovic 1990:95). The lack of integration of the various types of schools and the problem of transferring innovations and information from the Ministry to the school were cause for concern at Ministerial level. Years of top-down Ministerial decisions had fuelled resistance at school level which, given schools' new found freedom, resulted in teachers in particular deciding on how fast they would implement the reforms (Ondrejkovic 4-11-91 :

deputy director Institute of Information and Prognosis of Education, Bratislava). The Slovak Act in November 1990 sought to address the discontent within education management through (Barret 1.1991:11) : giving headmasters more powers; establishing school self- management (or school-based management boards) bodies; and setting up Local Education Authorities (LEA). The LEA's were to be the only link between the Slovak Ministry, schools and all other bodies. Their central concerns were the establishment of new schools in consultation with self-management boards and the allocation of central funds to headmasters. The LEA directors which were appointed by the Ministry, were also charged with informing the public, parents and all other education bodies of problems and the general situation of schools within its area.

The challenges of a transitional education system have compelled educators and researchers to take a renewed interest in curricula development, a research area all but marginalised prior to 1989, as a vehicle for a "human core curriculum" (Walterova 1991:16)

The 1990 Education Act gave the go-ahead for curricula freedom. The Education Ministry and pro-democracy teachers immediately followed the popular Central European progressive trend of establishing a "minimal core curriculum". The most important implication for schools was recognition of the principle of "tuition freedom". This principle left 30% of teaching time to the teacher's initiative and discretion. Examples of this "free time", given to the writer by the headmistress of the Vazovova Gymnasium Secondary State School in Bratislava, were: a special class with extra lessons for geography and history enthusiasts, compulsory Latin and a choice of seminar topics (Klaskova 6-11-91). According to Nenckova (6-11-91), head of the English department, Vazovova Gymnasium, Bratislava, this new "tuition freedom" enabled schools to specialise in certain subjects (e.g. foreign languages) in order to attract more pupils and build upon their reputations.

Structural changes have not been of a radical nature though. Primary school grades were increased from eight to nine years. Compulsory schooling at the secondary vocational level has decreased - from ten to nine years. The popular pre-1945 8-grade academic gymnasium secondary school has been

re-introduced on an experimental basis (in order to gauge parental support) alongside of the existing 4-grade gymnasium (Von Kopp 1991:101) (see Appendix 15).

The debate on education reform has brought into question the system of teacher training. In particular there are concerns over the standards of pedagogical skills and knowledge provided for teachers at various school levels (Cerna 1991:7). While Parliament had passed legislation to reform higher and secondary education, it remained up to the institutions whether actual changes would occur in training student teachers and in staff development programs. Initiatives at the twenty-five higher education institutes have taken place on two levels. At one level international exchange programs (e.g. Tempus) have focused on teacher training. In 1990/1991, for example, 500 teachers from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, were studying in the European Community country (Barret 7.1991). At another level, students, teachers and academics returning from Joint European Projects are required to plough back what they have learnt to ensure that education faculties at universities remain abreast of the innovations in teacher training.

The effect of these educational reforms on the emergence of interest groups and their access to the arena of policy making will be analysed in the following section.

4. EDUCATION INTEREST GROUPS

As we saw earlier in our discussion, interest groups who had largely been absent from the educational landscape, began to make their presence felt shortly before the events of 1989. After the revolution, teachers, teachers' associations, parents, independent schools, media and public opinion, religious groups and institutes of higher education became clearly distinguishable as emerging interest groups in Czechoslovakian education. Of these, undoubtedly, parents and religious groups have proved to be the most influential.

In the sections which follow, I will outline the context in which interest groups work and the development of each group in the "arena of power".

4.1 Teachers

The loss of community faith in teachers as a result of their participation in the communist education system, where as many as one in four were Communist Party members, led to a breakdown of teacher-parent relations (Cermakova 12-11-91). Ideological intolerance in education in the period leading up to 1989, had instilled in the educational environment mutual distrust and fear in teachers and parents. Teachers were never sure how parents would react to their work. In some instances, parents reported teachers for not towing party policy, while in others they blamed teachers for forcing Marxism-Leninism upon their children (Klaskova 6-11-91). This no-win situation in which teachers, particularly non-communist, found themselves was, however, by the late 1980's significantly reversed. In the groundswell period leading up to November 1989, teachers actively aligned themselves with the reform process, and managed to fashion a new image for themselves.

As the reform process gained momentum, so the profile of teachers changed. Central to this change was the perception that teachers were pivotal in the process of re-educating the Czechoslovakian people. Not altogether unexpectedly, however, the weight of almost forty years of communist rule was to assert itself constantly in the process of reform. Teachers were able to make several gains, but found a society with long memories and were thus always vulnerable to controversy. With wide public support and aid by the Public Against Violence Party and the Civic Forum, they were able, for example, to succeed with their demands that they themselves elect academic officials and headmasters. However, the system could not be transformed as swiftly as the government, and the level of conflict within secondary education rose sharply as the various interest groups jostled for power (see Appendix 24).

Epitomising this was the question, on the one hand, of the rehabilitation and re-instatement of the (estimated) 20 000 school teachers dismissed for political reasons under the old government and on the other, of the prosecution of functionaries of the old system (Von Kopp 1992:110). The aftermath of the democratic revolution was marked by often "wild" purges of teachers and headmasters, instigated not by the Ministry, but mostly by parents (Von Kopp 1992:111). Their memories of the past were close to the surface.

Teachers undoubtedly face a daunting task, called upon not only to endure the drawbacks of the profession, they have to withstand public criticism. The most common criticism expressed by parents and pupils is their anxiety about the former Communist Party teachers' ability to teach objective history (Cermakova 12-11-91. According to Botlik (12-11-91), consultant to the Czech Ministry of Education for School Reconstruction and Technology, while the majority of teachers are knowledgeable on new international education literature, analysts have criticised their ability to foster the innovations needed in the future.

But the reforms had undoubtedly opened a space for teachers. They were now able, supported by their associations, to become more active in pursuing their interests and in opposing unpopular Ministerial actions. They took to the streets in a major rally in Prague in January 1991, to protest against the lack of Ministerial "concepts" and guidance for future development in schools. This rally was the first sign of a revitalised teachers corps. The minister responded by acknowledging that no new curricula and text-books had been prepared. Sufficiently motivated and qualified teachers should, however, he pronounced, be able to manage without equipment and textbooks (Rude Pravo 1991:1). In February, teacher discontent again flared up, as demonstrations were staged outside the Ministry of Education, in a protest against the Minister's presumption in making a public apology to the children of the CSFR, on behalf of the teachers, for their role in teaching Marxism under the former government. The Education Ministry's unpopularity was further fuelled by the government's strict economic policy. While the policy had successfully curbed inflation, education was forced to bear the brunt of cuts to ward off a deficit in the national budget. In practice, this meant that the education budget and expenditure remained at the same level for 1990 and 1991 (Kalous 15-11-91). Teachers' salaries remained at 1990 figures in a society with a rapidly rising rate of inflation and living costs (Kalous 15-11-91). According to Jan Herber (15-11-91), director of the Bratislava Institute of Pedagogy, low teacher salaries and funding of schools remain the archilles heel of education in the CSFR (see Appendix 23). Low teacher motivation, inability to initiate prescribed reforms, lack of specialisation (for example, available technology such as computers), feminisation (in primary schools 82% of teachers are female and 50% in academic gymnasiums),

and inability to use travel freedom, are all ascribed to the lack of funds (Potucek 8-11-91 and Cermakova (12-11-91). Ondrejkovic (4-11-91) gives the example of wage comparisons between steel industry workers earning 3800-4000 crowns per month whilst average teachers earn a maximum of 3300 crowns. Teachers, these conditions notwithstanding, have emerged very much more empowered.

Within this process of reforms, headmasters were the group most profoundly affected within education. Sutcliffe (1992:22) put the number of headmasters who had to re-apply for their post as 6300 at primary schools, 484 at secondary vocational and 357 at gymnasium schools. Only one tenth re-secured their former position. The majority of newly elected headmasters support the new Ministerial management and reform policy, though they continue to struggle to keep pace with implementation schedules through shortage of funds, the unstable personnel situation and lack of management experience (Vary 5-11-91, Christenko 5-11-91). The degree of compliance with Ministerial reforms at school-level continues to depend upon the attitudes of individual headmasters. This situation is best exemplified by Nenickova's (6-11-91) comment :

> "Finally, the principal is democratic and responsible. It depends on the principal and on his/her morality, whether he/she wants to discuss the matter with the staff or vice-principal. The personal view of our principal is that it is better when teachers decide, themselves decide, what to do, as then they do it better. They have the feeling it is their responsibility and they are more active".

And yet, regardless of the sweeping changes in education, the daily reality of pro-reform teachers, especially in those conservative rural areas, according to Szomolanylova (6-11-91), is that teachers are vulnerable and at the mercy of the local community and politically recalcitrant headmasters.

In evaluating the position of teachers, one needs to comprehend the complex mixture of activist and passivist elements within their midst and in their collective makeup. While pro-reform teachers (dimension 4 - see p 147) have rid themselves of the hegemonic yoke of the communist era and their position

of 'subjugation' in the 'arena of power' with their participation in the "Velvet Revolution", the research shows, however, that their new found freedom and access to power at school level through schoolboards' participation, is under threat from conservative headmasters and reform communists from within education and at various levels in the government (dimension 4). Their achievements have been noteworthy all the same. Although the 1989 revolution and ensuing economic policy had brought economic hardship to teachers, their greatest victory lay in the establishment of 'channels of access' to the power elite, not only in the form of schoolboard representation but the right to pressure government policy-makers by means of demonstrations (e.g. the January and February 1991 protests). This access to the 'arena of power' was most evident in teachers successful lobbying for the re-election of all headmasters.

4.2 Teacher Associations

Early participation by teachers in the pro-democracy movement, which evolved into the Czech Civic Forum and Slovak Public Against Violence political parties, guaranteed a determining role for teacher associations in the process of negotiations.

The Teachers Forum was established in both republics as the teaching profession strove to represent their interests and separate their professional goals from party political issues (see Appendix 21). The Teachers' Forum, drawing on large support from teachers, accounting for 8,3% of the total workforce in Slovakia alone, has been influential in the rapid solution of long-standing educational management problems. It won support especially in its campaign to re-instate teachers who had been dismissed on political grounds and in its efforts to keep public scrutiny focused on problematic education issues (Ondrejkowic 1990:14). For example, a number of professional groups of experts, attached to the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, rallied to support the Teachers Forum. These groups of voluntary educators co-operated closely in the restructuring of existing education structures and in preparing new legislation.

The major associations in Czechoslovakia are the former communist Teachers Trade Union, the Pedagogical Union and the Teachers Forum of Slovakia (see Appendix 24). The Communist Teachers' Trade Union (CTTU) was the only legal organisation prior to 1989. Following the revolution, this union broke into about sixty splinter groups. The largest group, numbering approximately 300 000, formed the **Teachers' Trade Union** (TTU). The TTU is the most powerful of the teachers' organisations because of its retention of CTTU capital and buildings, and the active, well-organised participation of its members and strong and pragmatic leadership. In these times of economic hardship, the TTU is especially attractive to teachers, as it is able to pay for study travel abroad, etc. The TTU's dependance, however, on the leadership of one or two personalities is described by many, for example, Jaroslav Kalous (15-11-91) as a potential weaknesses.

The second organisation, the **Pedagogical Union** (PU) grew from the School Committee in an effort to cut ties with the Civic Forum and Teachers Forum, and to embark upon a professional programme. The PU consists of about thirty co-ordinating groups from all types of schools. The efforts of this pro-reform and innovation-minded group, according to Kalous (15-11-91), are hindered by inexperience and lack of finances. Unity in the PU, it would appear, is a further problem.

In Slovakia, the **Teachers Forum of Slovakia** remains the largest association, with 3240 members (Herber 16-4-1992). This organisation evolved from the broad civic movement of 1989 and supports the democratic transformation of the education system.

Teacher associations have made tremendous strides in the first two years of a "levelled political playing field" in safeguarding their professional interests. Of particular significance have been a number of "spontaneous actions" such as non-formalised, non-institutionalised demonstrations. An example of this was the Prague 9 (suburb of city) teachers' demonstrations in February 1991. Nonetheless, Szebenyi (1992:30), Szomolonylova (6-11-91 : leading figure in Public Against Violence Party; lecturer University of Comecuis, Bratislava) and Hromadkowa (13-11-91) warn against complacency as prevailing socio-economic and local political conditions place a growing number of

progressive teacher/activists from 1989, "at the mercy of incompetent municipalities" and "reform communists". Alena Hromodkova commenting on the post-1989 role of the civil rights organisation, Charter 77, said: "....all the ex-communists (reform communists) are in government and now I am corresponding and in communication with suppressed, depressed and desperate Charter 77 people who have the same troubles they used to have as before: [They may now be] without communist harassment, but [their] daily existence [is no different because of the continued role of] ex-communists and [the] economic conditions".

The organised teaching profession in the CSFR that supports democratic transformation and modernisation in education, like their colleagues in Poland and Hungary, finds itself up against powerful opponents amongst reform communists in positions of influence from Ministerial to municipal levels. Both the Teachers Forum of Slovakia and the Pedagogical Union (dimension 4 - see p 147) which relied on support from the ruling elite, found their influence in the 'arena of power' diminishing in direct relation to the loss of political power of the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence Parties (dimension 1). As the influence of the pro-reform political parties in dimension, declined, power in the policy making arena shifted within the same dimension to the reform communists and nationalist groups. Although teachers' associations have made use of demonstrations to access the 'arena of power', their future position seems vulnerable if the transition to democracy is not consolidated. An anti-reform government can again easily 'subjugate' educators, given the present economic climate, through the use of state funding as a form of 'persuasion'.

4.3 Independent Schools

The "Velvet Revolution" had scarcely run its course, at the beginning of the 1990 - 1991 school year, when the **first independent** schools were established (see Appendix 24). The elimination of state monopoly, by government decree, gave impetus to the alternative education movement. Where in early 1990 there were nine independent schools (Von Kopp 1992:107), by the end of 1991 there were 130 (Sutcliffe 1992:22). In December 1990, the earlier government proposals were **legislated** through the amendment of Law No. 29, 1984 on the System of Primary and Secondary Education. The Act was

favourably received by the education establishment who saw it as the first attempt by the Ministry to initiate administrative decentralisation and pluralism in education since 1948. It is interesting to note the remark by Kalous (15-11-91) that the legislation on independent schools was the outcome of a "funny coalition between central bureaucrats and school teachers". The schools were given independence but central power (Education Ministry) was given even more power as the old communist school committees and parent bodies were removed and in their place was brought "a straight line now from the Ministry to the schools....the paradox of revolution is that there is now more centralisation". In spite of this reserve towards the Ministry's centralisation tendencies, the space afforded to independent schools is viewed by many parents and progressive educators as the most visible and essential component in the transformation to a democratic system (Steffl 14-11-91 : principal and founder of Realne Gymnasium, Prague).

A further benefit of the new approach is the financial support provided by the government. The only pre-requisite for this support is that they maintain curricula and standards at public school level. The most attractive features to parents and pupils are the small classes (+/- 25 pupils to 30-35 state schools) and the supplementation of the curriculum with English lessons (Christenko 15-11-91).

The significance of independent schools in the future education system, warrants a brief discussion of the "**Prvni Obnovene Realne Gymnasium**" (PORG or Real Gymnasium), the first independent high school in the CSFR. The founding group of the PORG consisted of teachers and academics, led by Dr. Ondrej Steffl, who had declined an invitation from the Ministry of Education to oversee the reform process (Weiss 1991:37). The non-sectarian, apolitical PORG project was launched in January 1990 and classes began in September 1990. During my visit to the PORG in November 1991, the reasons for starting the school became apparent. The founders said that they had been unwilling to wait the decade or more that it would have taken to reform state education (Burgr 1991:3). Prominent objections to state education included dissatisfaction with inadequate state text-books and curricula for modern education and the continued presence of former loyal communist teachers. The school also grew from the need to break from the monopolistic hold of the state and in response to parental demand (Stefl 14-11-91). The overriding motivation seemed to be the establishment of the PORG as a possible model for other educators and communities to follow.

Noteworthy aspects of the school are : a concerted effort to keep tuition fees at an affordable level to ensure access to all families, and not to become an elitist institution (tuition fees for 1992 will represent about two-and-a-half months of the average Prague family income); as a reaction to years of communist school propaganda, a determination not to teach "civics" (political science) classes or allow a "student government" (reminiscent of the communist youth organisations) at the school (Mitter & Weiss 1991:39); participation in international exchanges and visits, with the U.S.A., Netherlands, Germany, France and England.

The active **support of the Ministry** for independent schools can be attributed to: an attempt to reach a "golden mean" between state education and the "privatisation" of education (Szebenyi 1992:24); using such schools as a testing ground for alternative models; and as a political response to lobbying from the increasingly influential Association of Private Schools (APS) which was founded in April 1991, with seventy member schools.

Independent schools, are in many cases the "showcase" of the pro-reform movement in Czechoslovakian education and the one interest group, represented by the APS (dimension 4 - see p 147) which seems relatively "immune" to the political power struggle. The APS does not have direct influence in the 'arena of power'. However the standards attained, comparable to West European education, have seen such schools used as testing grounds and models by the Education Ministry. The outcome of the power struggle following the breakup of the CSFR and the rise in nationalist sentiment in Slovakia will, however, be a factor in the direction taken by independent schools. In so far as independent schools are dependent on subsidies they will have to retain good relations with the political authorities. The best possible scenario for the future of independent schools, is the strengthening of groups in dimension 2 and EC integration which will neccesitate maintenance of standards to ensure adequately educated manpower for a market economy.

4.4 Religious Groups

The **Christian tradition** in the CSFR has in the communist era, played a crucial defensive underground role ever since the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and

the suppression of religious activities after 1948 (Potucek 1991:4). Opinions vary on the estimated number of practising Roman Catholics in the population. Santema (10-9-91: former theology lecturer, University of Amsterdam) put the figure at 49% of the roughly fifteen million population (CSFR), while Potucek (1991:4) puts it at 58%. However, Chermakova (12-11-91) reckoned that the period of state sponsored atheism had taken its toll on the church : "In the Czech Republic, plus/minus 70% of the population is Christian, but not rigid Roman Catholic, and only 10% are actively in Church." Whatever the size of the Catholic community it is a fact that this group is firmly entrenched as an interest group (Christenko 15.12.1991) (see Appendix 22).

The December 1990 Act specifies that schools should guarantee religious education. This provision in the Act led to heated debates as the Minister of Education strove to change the socialist education system to a Christian system. As the Minister, who was described in personal communication to be a "big Christian activist", attempted to fill the normative vacuum created by the collapse of communism, opposition formed rapidly from teachers, teachers' associations, parents and pupils. Cermakova (12-11-91) described parental feeling in the following terms : "The majority of people do not want the children influenced by another ideology, like obligatory religious instruction". In the debate between the Minister and opponents of religious instruction, it became apparent in September 1990 that the government had backed off. The government conceded that religion would not be included in the curricula and would be presented after school hours (see Appendix 24). Szomolanylova (6-11-91) remarked, however, that in spite of the government "backing down" on its introduction of religious education, that: "...the dogmatic approach of the Roman Catholic Church has led sections of the population to send pupils to less rigid Protestant gymnasium schools, which are run by the church, and which provide good, open, professional schooling".

Following the 1990 elections, religious values, suppressed by Communism resurfaced, not without opposition though. Traditional differences between Catholics, Protestants, secularists and other ethnic groups quickly became apparent as the communist threat abated. Historic religious tensions between the Czech and Slovak republic, for example, became problematic. These can be traced to their very distinct religious and cultural backgrounds. The Czech

Republic has a historical tendency to a secular humanistic worldview and an orientation to Western European democracy and its liberal culture. In the Slovak Republic on the other hand, religion has early links to Eastern spiritual traditions with a strong present-day Catholic following, interwoven with Slovak nationalist sentiment. These differences have been visible in the post-1990 scene where religious undercurrents have emerged in the Civic Forum, with President Havel representing the secular Catholic faction, and the Foreign Minister, Dienstbier, the traditional Catholic party element (Roskin 1991:173). This has had profound implications for education, particularly over religious education in Slovakia, given the strong Catholic and nationalist tone of the leading political parties. The possible power of these parties to influence the debate on religious education was evident in the success of a nationalist demonstration in 1990 at the Bratislava Parliament, which forced the government to legislate Slovak as the only official language, ignoring the vernacular of Slovaki's 600 000 Hungarians.

The Roman Catholic Church, (dimension 1 - see p 147) as the dominant religious interest group, was the first to make its presence felt in the 'arena of power' as the church 'persuaded' the government to introduce religious education. This attempt by the Catholic Church and ruling power elite, witnessed the one occasion in education that opposing groups from dimensions 4 and 1 temporarily "joined forces" to oppose this 'traditionalist' grasp at power and implementation of a single value system. In spite of the success of opposition to religious education in 1990, the research indicates the combination of Catholic and nationalist sentiment as prevalent amongst a large segment of the population, which raises the probability of a renewed "onslaught" by these groups on the 'arena of power'.

3.5 Parents

Under the socialist government, parents had no rights in education and were caught in "a crisis of the absolute horizon" as man "disintegrated into the anonymous roles of consumer, patient, pupil and parent" (Vaclav Havel in Walterova 1991:3). The present Ministry of Education has launched a completely new strategy to "take into account the existence of groups of different interests" (Obdrzalek 1991:1). This democratisation project has not

only seen the legal sanctioning of parental participation in schools, but the active "courting" of the Ministry and schools to elicit the active support of parents to legitimise the process of transformation.

Herber (5-11-1991) (see Appendix 23) confirmed that since the December 1990 Act, parents, in terms of their participation in Municipal School Boards (Czech) and Secondary School Councils (Slovak), have changed from a mere "novice group" to a highly influential interest group (council/board composition: equal representation from municipal council, parents and teachers). Cermakova (Barret 1-91:11) describes the role of the councils as being of immense importance, given the parameters of their powers, e.g. assessment of schools, local community and local state bodies. School councils also serve as a platform to promote parent and teacher interests and as a public control mechanism over local school decision-makers (see Appendix 24).

The development of parents as a strong interest group in all schools is still in its early stages, mostly due to their inexperience and the short lapse of time since they were given rights for participation. At the end of 1991, Cermakova (12-11-91) remarked, "parents are not organised and speak only as individuals, they cannot oppose school decisions, while state school parents may propose something and staff may or may not accept". The position of parents has further been weakened by the dissolution of pre-1989 parent-teacher associations. Szomolanylova (6-11-91) also voiced her concern, following the re-election of a number of former communist headmasters in Slovakia after 1989 : "People (teachers and parents) were not ready for freedom and to use it properly .... parents are not ready to take initiative in their hands, change is already visible but it will take some time. The education system is the most damaged resource of the country".

Consultations at the Czech Ministry of Education, during November 1991, confirmed, consistent with Poland and Hungary, that financing of education was the biggest "headache" for the new Ministry. Oldrich Botlik (12-11-91) remarked upon the goals of the Ministry : "Our aim is to have a lot of diverse schools. The major obstacle to this development is the system of financing, allocation of state subsidies to schools". He continued to describe a possible change of the financing system that was being researched at the time. The

proposed voucher system would : "....establish rules to allocate funds, as a result of the money which will follow the pupils as the parents (having been given education vouchers) chose the school". Although this voucher system was still in the research phase, early indications were favourable for its passage through Parliament, given the strength of the ruling Civic Forum. The implications of the voucher system would appear to be far-reaching for parents as an interest group. Parents would enrol their children at the school which they chose. Botlik (12-11-91) emphasised the enormous potential influence and power it would give parents : "Control could be shifted from the Ministry to the parents and pupils as consumers".

Parents have been assured a 'channel of access' to the 'arena of power' at school level, with equal representation on school boards and school councils in both republics of the CSFR. The ability of parents to have a meaningful influence on the education process is also set to have a broader impact if the proposed voucher system of school financing is passed by Parliament. The effect of parents on the 'arena of power' becomes evident when considering their ability through the voucher system to support schools of their choice, thereby deciding in reality the "survival" of only the best schools. Furthermore, a 1991 parent opinion poll, (Appendix 14) describes 50% of parents as being pro-reform minded (dimension 4 - see p 147) thereby suggesting that a large segment of pro-reform schools will be supported by parents at the expense of schools who are intransigent in implementing reforms.

4.6 The Media and Public Opinion

Powerful images of the power of public opinion, expressed in the March 1988 Candlelight Demonstration (Bratislava) and November 1989 student demonstrations in Prague, were etched in the minds of the international community, as the Czechoslovakian nation demanded democracy. Ironically, it was to be the Central European country where public opinion (manifested through the mass media, demonstrations, petitions and opinions of the "silent majority" category), had been most severely suppressed, which would demonstrate the immediate effectiveness of mass discontent. The success of the bloodless "Velvet Revolution" epitomised this most potently. The swiftness of

the revolution, unfortunately, carried its own price. Inherent in it were negative impulses as the turbulence spilled over into the new democracy.

The removal of totalitarianism could not construct a fully functioning and mature democracy, as numerous political parties, numerous special interest associations and pressure groups only began surfacing after the revolution. In coming to light, what is more, these groups were adversely affected by a lack of experience and rapidly changing social conditions which continuously strained their relationships with their support bases. Educators intent on winning public support for education issues had to contend with a complex array of socio-economic and political interest groups (see Appendix 24).

By late 1991, political disarray seemed the order of the day as the broad civic movement (pro-democracy movement with support from, for example, Charter 77, teachers, politicians and people from across the societal spectrum) which won the June 1990 elections split to form several minority parties (eight parties in the Czech Republic and seven parties in the Slovak Republic (Illner 8-11-1991: Director Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of Sociology). Leading figures in the Velvet Revolution and the democratic movement lost popularity after the June 1990 election. In Slovakia, the Public against Violence Party's support dropped from 29.4% to 2.4% (Potucek 8-11-91) while the Czech Civic Movement (Remnant of the Civic Forum) slid to a 6% voter support percentage (Bohanes 7.1991:2). Personal communication with interviewees attributed this decline to "tentacles of invisible mafias"; President Havel, in August 1991, put the situation down to "the burden of the totalitarian heritage" (Bohanes 7.1991:8). Havel pointed the finger at the former communists who retained key positions at all levels of the administration and in state enterprises. While reform communists, through their support for Charter 77 (human rights organisation) and the civic movement, have gained office, their support for real democratic reforms has been questioned in light of their "nominally anti-communist" stance (Hromadkova 13-11-91).

As in Poland and Hungary, the trend to voter and public apathy to national issues is apparent in Czechoslovakia where it became clear that subsequent elections were decided on "bread and butter" issues. Public pressure groups

such as the ecological movement and the environmentalists, to which the public rallied prior to the revolution, had lost support (3.4% to under 2% Potucek 1991:12). This confirmed the trend of voter apathy, with about 30-50% of the population appearing to be politically undecided in November 1991 (Illner 8-11-91).

The shift in societal priorities is most striking when evaluating the ten most important problems given by respondents in answer to a 1991 opinion poll question : "What social problems are necessary to be solved first" (Potucek 1991:6). The poll conducted one and a half years after the revolution, concluded that concerns about the standard of living (for example, unemployment and economy) had replaced initial public concerns about a "moral crisis" and "social deviations" in reference to the ecology, education and family values. Where, for example, there had been public pressure on the new government in both republics to introduce re-election of headmasters and deputies through secret ballot in the December 1989 to January 1990 period, public enthusiasm soon waned with the deteriorating of the economy and attention shifted to political and "bread and butter" issues (KLC: 6-11-091: journalist at Narodna Obroda, Bratislava daily newspaper). Kalous (15-11-91) ascribes the lack of public interest in education to the Parliamentary and societal debates, which at the end of 1991, were dominated by the dispute over the continuance of the federation as Slovak nationalists called for an independent state. Although only 16% of the population supported an independent Slovakia in July 1991, the July 1992 election outcome resulted in a breakup of the CSFR federation on 31 December 1991 (Bohanes 7.1991:1).

The mass media is internationally acknowledged by government, Parliament and the majority of people to be the key public control mechanism of education policy. The mass media and the numerous political newspapers which appeared after 1989 have taken up the plight of the average and below average income citizens and have demanded that education, along with clothing and housing, should be seen as basic human rights in the new democracy (Bohanes 7.91:9). The transition to press freedom has not been without incident. Potucek (1991:10) documented the appearance and suspected work of "professional demagogues", former secret police and journalists selected during the communist era, who manipulated the mass media to incite socio-economic

uncertainty. The post-1989 society has been characterised by the meteoric appearance of the so-called 'money-hunters' (for example, pornography magazines and small poor-quality daily newspapers) which use press freedom to enrich themselves, whilst not contributing to the debate on social issues (Eggenhuizen 16-9-91: Utrecht School of Journalism). This means that public opinion has been open to numerous influences. There is the example, possibly adverse, of a monopolised paper such as "Rude Pravo" (the official former Communist Party mouthpiece), being taken over by organisations with certain vested interests (Hromadkova 13-11-91). Another problem has been the withering of the vibrant "Samizdat" (underground pre-1989 newspapers) tradition, such as student newspapers (for example, "Studentske Listy", Prague), which played an invaluable role in directing public attention to critical issues. Critically in 1991 active student support for "Studentske Listy" declined steadily (Zacek 14-11-91: editor of "Studentske Listy"), reflecting the trend of public apathy for political issues.

These difficulties notwithstanding, public opinion in the new democracy has been established in its watchdog role, through its sensitivity to changing social conditions. In spite of the re-emergence of communists and communist/ conservative sentiment, analysts are optimistic that sufficient "islands of positive deviation" (or IPD, agents who carry through the critical amount of systematic changes in totalitarian systems) exist with reform-minded people in key societal positions (Potucek 1991:28). The IPD had formed the pre-1989 opposition to the communists and included environmentalists, independent Catholics, students, artists, scientists and Charter 77 signatories. It was the participation of these groups in the civic movement that eventually culminated in the "Velvet Revolution". Within the new politically-free environment, the future of democracy (and reforms in education) rests upon the hope that the "islands of positive deviation" could transform themselves into "islands of positive innovators" (Potucek 1991:28).

The society which had demonstrated the power of public opinion through the Velvet Revolution, however, had by the end of 1991 retrogressed to a state of the "silent majority". Economic hardship and political apathy ensued, following the fragmentation of the ruling political parties and the impending breakup of the CSFR. The force of public opinion that brought about the

popular demand for re-election of headmasters had been spent by late 1991. Those newspapers (dimension 1 and 4 see p 147) who are for and against reforms and basic rights such as education continue to publish their views but the research shows that education is no longer a societal priority. Public opinion as a method of influencing policy, will depend on the success of the so-called "islands of positive deviation" (dimension 4) being established in society in order to counter the "comeback" phenomenon of reform communists in Central Europe.

4.7 Higher Education and Research Institutes

The restoration of academic freedom and the institutionalisation of democratic principles, brought with them wide ranging changes to higher education and research institutions. These institutions were free to jettison the Marxist ideology and structures of the former communist government. Although academic nomenklature resisted dismissals, 1991 saw universities and research institutes in a state of flux. Data forthcoming from my research will show that there was a feeling of job uncertainty in academic circles which was compounded by financial restrictions. The government decreased subsidies, research grants were allocated on academic (and not political) merit alone and implementation of reforms became problematic.

The leading role which students played in the revolution, more so than in Poland and Hungary, mandates a brief discussion of their influence. Actions of the student body had the direct consequence that higher education was the first to experience the popular demand for democratisation. On 4 May 1990, the new 172/1990 Higher Education Act restored academic freedom through the establishment of new self-governing and autonomous bodies at higher education and research institutions (Slovak Republic Statute book 1990:3). The influence of students was evident in their success in gaining 50% representation in the academic senate at a number of universities, including the prestigious Charles University in Prague. The inroads made by students in the ruling bodies of higher education institutes are acknowledged to have been the first product of the revolution (Kalous 15-11-91). In line with the post-revolution sentiment of public participation, the higher education draft bill had also undergone scrutiny in public debate, underlining the future public accountability of academic

governing bodies (Barret 1.1991:12). The 4th May 1990 Act paved the way for the decentralisation of higher education, and the democratisation of its administration and study programmes.

The Higher Education Act included changes in the financing of higher education, but the short time lapse between the passage of the Act and the drawing up of the 1991 budget, mandated the use of the traditional model. Only 10% of the budget allocation was derived from evaluation of conditions at specific institutions (Botlik 12-11-91). The Ministry of Education, in co-operation with foreign experts, especially from the Netherlands, had prepared a new system of financing for 1992, but the 1991 budget continued to operate in line with the restrictive economic policy.

Those higher education governing bodies and faculties who launched reforms had to do so by giving attention to the negative characteristics that had developed since the 1960's (Rupnik 1992:148). Central amongst these negative characteristics were restrictive admission policies; the influence of ideology in the "normalisation" period following the 1968 Soviet invasion; centralised administration; "the serious brain-drain" to the private sector; and the promotion of academics through party political affiliation. Although Rupnik (1992:148) confirmed the initial difficulties of altering tuition programmes (for example, humanities) due to the lack of qualified lecturers and the staff's lack of familiarity with new subject content, the author witnessed the success of : foreign language bridging classes for secondary school leavers; the appointment of lecturers after a professional competition and the success of student and staff mobility programmes. Trans-European mobility in higher education is funded by the EC (European Community) through the Tempus, Comett (Community Action Programme for Education and Training for Technology), Erasmus and Lingua projects. In 1991/1992 alone, 700 students from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia undertook studies in one EC member country (Barret 7.1991:11). Rupnik (1992:150) made a strong plea against unnecessary "intellectual tourism" and argued for the educating of university educators and the expansion of university entrant numbers through programmes such as Tempus and the support of the new Central European Universities in Prague and Budapest.

At the time of my research in the CSFR, research institutes were locked in a process of **organisational transition**. The Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (CSAS) is the umbrella body for eighty institutions and by the end of 1991, 20-30% of its 12 500 strong staff would have been dismissed and 85% of its directors replaced in an open competition (Valachovic 1991:3). The primary reason for the dismissals was that many former appointments had been politically motivated. However, after 1989 economic pressures and inefficient staff also contributed to the ongoing process of rationalisation.

The education system was, and still is, adversely affected by the transition in research institutes. To some extent, however, this dislocation in the research institutes was compensated for by the use of expatriate expertise. This arrangement also expedited the working relationship between the research institutes and the Ministry as a number of Western educators, including former exiled dissidents, and internally-banned researchers were appointed as advisors to the Education Minister (Botlik 12-11-91; Kalous 15-11-91). At certain universities the continued presence of former communist supporters and lecturers, who are opposed to pro-democracy changes in society and education in particular, has resulted in the governing bodies opting for a strategy of restaffing whole faculties (Von Kopp 1991:111) or establishing additional institutes at the universities (Potucek 8-11-91; Szomolanylova 6-11-91). At the Charles University in Prague, the new Institute of Educational and Psychological Research has been attached to the Faculty of Education, whilst in Bratislava, an as yet unnamed research group, in addition to the existing Department of Sociology, has been founded at the Comenius University. New structures such as these will have the all-important task of transmitting international education research and innovations into Czechoslovakia.

The re-establishment of academic freedom in May 1990 brought into sharp focus the divide between opposing interest groups in research and higher education institutes. A number of institutes (dimension 4 - see p 147) embarked upon democratic reforms, modernisation and sought to support government reform efforts in education policy making. In stark contrast to these institutes, academic nomenklatura (dimension 1) and conservative traditionalist academics attempted to entrench their positions of power secured under the communist government. Early indications in the research are that the large number of

trans-European higher education exchange programs, inflow of international funds to pro-reform institutes and possible EC integration will swing the balance of influence in the 'arena of power' to the institutes in dimension 4.

Participation of interest groups in reforms; circumstances influencing development of interest groups

Interest groups have played a central role in the reform process. The discussion on interest groups is opened with the argument that teachers have borne the brunt of the pressure in the educational arena in the transition period due to the contradictory expectations they faced. Teachers have the pivotal role of not only implementing reforms, but attempting to reverse the breakdown of teacher-parent relations as a result of loss of community faith in teachers during the pre-1989 years. At the same time they carry the stigma of having collaborated with the old system and remain suspect in the eyes of the public, particularly parents. Although teachers have generally welcomed their new freedom within the curricula, the profession remains dogged by low motivation and working conditions, and primarily by poor salaries. These conditions continue to adversely affect teachers' attitudes to the enactment of change at school level.

In 1990 nine tenths of headmasters, now democratically elected, were new to the position. These leaders were confronted by the full and complex range of factors constituting the heritage of communist education. While the majority supported Ministerial reforms, they were unable to implement these because of a lack of funds. It was, as a result, apparent from interviewees that the principle of democratic decision-making within schools conferred by the Act, was observed only in part, depending heavily on the attitudes of individual headmasters. Nenickova (6-11-91) commented that: "Finally, the principal (in reference to their school) is democratic and responsible. It depends on the principal and on his/her morality, whether he/she wants to discuss the matter with the staff or vice-principal". The vulnerability of pro-reform teachers again resurfaces as it emerges from the literature and interviews that, especially in conservative rural areas, teachers in reality remain at the mercy of the local community and headmasters, who have retained their power at local level.

Teachers have, these conditions notwithstanding, played a heroic role in the process of change in Czechoslovakia. The Teachers Forum was the driving force in the pro-democracy movement, which strove to broker a determining role for teacher aspirations in the process of political power negotiations (see Appendix 21). Backed by the victorious political parties in both republics, the Teachers Forum won support for having solved a number of pre-1989 management problems in the education system and securing the re-instatement of teachers, who had been dismissed for their political beliefs. Teachers, backed by the public, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence Party were in the forefront of demanding the dismissal of headmasters and a process of democratic election. The power of the teachers' lobby became apparent as only a tenth of former headmasters were re-elected (Sutcliffe 1992:22). Teachers' response to unpopular Ministry policies was demonstrated in protest marches in Prague during January and February 1991. The organisational context in which these developments have taken shape is crucial to understand. Prior to the 1989 uprising, the most important organisation was the Teachers Trade Union (TTU). Similar to Poland and Hungary, the former communist Teachers' Trade Union remains the most powerful teachers' association, having retained its pre-1989 capital and attracting teachers through its economic means, thereby ensuring its influence in the transition process. In the Czech Republic the smaller pro-reform Pedagogical Union has made impressive contributions to innovative school programs but has been hindered by a shortage of funds and a lack of experienced members. In Slovakia, the biggest association remains the Teachers Forum of Slovakia (TFS). However, it is too early to report how the splintering of the organisation's parent political party, the Public Against Violence Party, will affect support for the TFS. From the Teachers Forum, which had the support of many pro-reform appointees to the new Ministry of Education, evolved the Pedagogical Union as teachers sought to sever their ties with political parties and form a teacher's association with a professional program. The sentiment can be echoed that the organised profession faces a similar "threat" to their interests as do individual teachers. This comes at a time when socio-economic and local political conditions place a growing number of progressive teacher/activists from 1989 subject to the decisions of "incompetent municipalities" and "reform communists" (Szebenyi 1992:30; Szomolanylova 6-11-91; Hromadkowa 13-11-91).

Teachers have also taken the lead in the private school movement. The removal of the state's monopoly on education provision was followed by an unprecedented growth in independent schools, from nine (1990) to one hundred and thirty within a year. Independent schools such as the Real Gymnasium in Prague, established by progressive educators, many coming from state schools, would take the lead in providing models for the education system. The reason put forward by founders of independent schools and parents for enrolling their children there, is that the state is unwilling or unable to change education in the short-term. They are also opposed to the presence of former loyal communist teachers in state schools. Some of the "teething problems" that the non-state school movement has had to contend with are: labels of elitism, lack of initial funds, difficulty in obtaining premises and equipment and the possibility of disruption as nationalised buildings are returned to the churches. Success in overcoming the day-to-day obstacles in "privatising" education has seen non-state schools progress to form the increasingly influential Association of Private Schools.

The church is a major actor in the process of change and has provided an arena within which interest groups have operated. It has by itself, though, been instrumental in shifting the discussion along. The crucial underground defensive role which the Roman Catholic Church played in communist Czechoslovakia enabled church leaders to convince the incumbent government, many of whom were church members, to push for religious education in schools. The very factors, however, which prevented the success of such a policy (of having religious education) will in future also, it appears, inhibit its capacity to resurface. Forty years of state atheism and secular teacher training have reduced active support of the Catholic Church to possibly as low as ten percent (Chermakova 12-11-91). Following the "Velvet Revolution", parents and the public were quick to oppose new ideological monism in the form of religious education. But two years later, preoccupation with the economic crisis and poor support for fragmented political parties and election turn-outs, raises the question whether a renewed attempt to religious education and extension of the church's power would be met by the same public opposition.

Consistent with trends in the rest of post-communist Central Europe, religion has become a criterion to distinguish opposing groups in education. The

controversy on the merits of introducing religious education in schools not only rekindled traditional differences between Roman Catholics, Protestants and secularists, dormant during forty years of communist education, but re-drew the dividing line between the Czech and Slovak republics and split the ruling Civic Forum cabinet. Although the government gave into public pressure and religious classes were changed to a voluntary after-school activity, a renewed effort by the church cannot be ruled out given its support of an estimated forty-nine to fifty-eight percent of the population and the strong traditional nationalist Slovak separatist party in Slovakia.

Parents have gained limited power at school-level and access to the decision-making process through serving on school councils, but this step alone is not enough. Cermakova (2-11-91) elaborates that at state schools: "Parents are not organised and speak only as individuals, they cannot oppose school decisions, while parents may propose something, staff may or may not accept." The uppermost concern of educators on the subject of parents has been to elicit the participation in school structures (after four decades of absence) and support for the reform process. This has not been easy. Parents, however, have emerged as an important pressure group. The presence of parents within the education debate was first encountered as they joined teachers to pressurise the new government in calling for democratic re-election of headmasters. By contrast, however, at school level parents have remained inexperienced, and uninvolved, largely due to having been kept out of school decision-making and empowerment at school level for four decades. Interestingly, nonetheless in some instances, parents, undoubtedly a "novice group" (Herber 5-11-1991) have, within a short space of time in gaining equal representation on school councils, moved to realise their potential as a vested interest group. The pre-1989 teacher-pupil relationship had reduced pupils to "the position of a passive object" (Ondrejkovic 4-11-91), a situation that both parents and teachers need to counter through the creation of a classroom ethos of pupil creativity that could make reforms meaningful at classroom level.

Within the sphere of public opinion what counts at present are issues pertaining to the communist era. These have captured public emotions and the headlines of the media, thereby distracting public attention and influence from matters that plague the democratic transformation in education. The 1991 public opinion survey clearly shows a shift from education to political issues with the society apparently

preoccupied with the debate on the future of the nomenklatura and unity of the CSFR. The media also reflects a mood of societal uncertainty, preoccupied as it is with the country's past. Evident in this preoccupation is the heavy and often manipulative presence of individuals and organisations linked to the former system.

It is in the domain of **higher education** and education research where not only most changes have occurred, but paradoxically, also the stiffest resistance from scientific nomenklatura been encountered. The sweeping dismissals of 85 % of research institutes' directors were counterbalanced by certain university faculties with anti-reform proclivities using their new autonomy to ward off changes, clinging to their powerful positions and in so doing forcing university authorities to create duplicate structures to accommodate returning or internal dissident academics. It was evident to me during the study tour that education research institutes and higher education institutes were undergoing far-reaching changes simultaneous to the education system which it is supposed to serve. Therefore the contribution of research and the preparation of the "new" generation of teachers were initially subordinate to staff and policy changes.

5. CONCLUSION : ARENA OF POWER

Classification of Interest Groups in the Education Policy-making arena

"E" ECONOMIC AXIS (positive pole; external groups)

i. Economic sector supporting E C Membership			i. Former political elite exchanging political for economic assets. ii. Directors of state enterprises awaiting privatisation.
"I" AXIS (negative pole)	2	3	"I" IDEOLOGY (positive pole)
	4	1	
i. Independent Schools & Association of Independent Schools ii. Pro-democracy teachers iii. Former dissidents in government iv. Pedagogical Union (Czech Republic) v. Teachers' Forum of Slovakia vi. Parents - Czech Republic vii. Media e.g. Studentske Listy- Prague student newspaper, former samizdat underground newspapers & "islands of positive deviation" viii. Pro-Reform Institutes of Research and Higher Education e.g. Charles University Education Faculty; CSAS Institute of Sociology.			i. Civic Forum & Public Against Violence parties ii. Roman Catholic Church iii. Slovak National Party iv. Former communist teachers v. Teachers' Trade Union vi. Media, e.g. journalists selected in communist era; former communist mouthpiece - Rude Pravo vii. Reform Communists in government viii. Academic Nomenclature ix. Reform communists in local municipal management

"E" AXIS (negative pole; internal groups)

In Czechoslovakia, similar to Hungary, the orientation of interest groups to a particular philosophy of education, decides the position of these groups on the Ideology "I" axis. Although the ruling Civic Forum and Public Against Violence parties (in dimension 1) hold a number of pluralistic views in common with educators in dimension 4, their attempt to introduce religious education (Catholicism) in schools, keep them in this dimension of groups, lobbying for a monolithic value system in education. Groups within dimension 1, such as the Slovak National Party and reform or former communists from government to local municipality level, not only threaten transition in education, but given voter apathy, pose a real danger to the future unity of the CSFR. In spite of the Teacher's Trade Union (TTU), severing ties with its communist past and advances made by the organisation to change to a non-political professional body, the dominance of former communists in its ranks, mandate its position in dimension 1. However, the TTU seems likely to join dimension 4 under its present leadership. The broad pro-democracy civic movement dating from the Velvet Revolution, form the bulk of dimension 4. This group (4) opposes attempts by groups in dimension 1 to impose any brand of education monism and generates pressure on the government to provide differentiated education. Parents who favour education reforms appear in dimension 4 (absent in the classification diagram of both Poland and Hungary), regardless of the present trend of public apathy to both political and education issues, following the only public opinion poll found directly gauging this interest group (Appendix 14). The main antagonists in dimension 2 and 3 are respectively the emerging business sector, closely following the "gradualist" shift to a free market economy, and managers of state companies awaiting and resisting the government program of privatisation. A group in dimension 3 whose power and influence should not be underestimated, is the former political elite which, according to the theory of circulation of elites (Szelenyi in Vecernik 1991:297) have merely changed their political assets for economic assets and will continue to play an influential role in any future education system in which reforms are dependent on economic factors.

In the 1989-1991 period, the Civic Forum (CF) and Public Against Violence parties (PAV) were at the forefront of education policy-making in the Czechoslovak "arena of power". However, the fluctuating fortunes of the CF and PAV, increasing success of the separatist parties, such as the Slovak

National Party and the break up of the CSFR in December 1992, has left the post 1992 "arena of power" in a state of flux. In the Czech republic, the Czech Civic Movement (remnant of the Civic Forum), led by president Vaclav Havel, continues to be a force in government, but it is too early to say how the influential group of reform Communists in government will influence the "arena of power". The Slovak "arena of power" also remains in a state of flux as the impact of the Slovak National Party on education policy-making remained unclear at the end of 1993. This research has confirmed the influence of Roman Catholic Church on education, but it is less of a force than in Hungary and especially in comparison to Poland. Although a number of issues and future role-players in the Czech Republic and Slovak Republics "arena of power" remain open-ended, the research gives a strong indication that policy-making power will remain with interest groups in dimension I. The probable future alliances will consist of on the one hand, the Czech Civic Movement (Czech Republic) and Slovak National Party (Slovak Republic), supported by the Roman Catholic Church and on the other hand, the revitalised reform communist parties with its power-base in education, the Teachers Trade Union.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This research had as its focus, the role of secondary education interest groups in Central Europe, in the period 1989-1991. I examined the research questions pertaining to the circumstances influencing the development of interest groups, how they had emerged, and evaluated their participation in reforms. A classification of interest groups in the education policy-making arena, labelled the "arena of power", and a discussion thereof in regard to the balance of power concluded the chapters on Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In this final chapter I will start by briefly resketching the political landscape of the region. This will be followed by a summary of the features common to the seven interest groups identified for this study. I will then offer a classification of interest groups based on the view that education functions as a transmitter of ideology or in service of the economy. This chapter will conclude with a brief review of the channels of access, tactics and future of education interest groups in Central European power politics.

The picture that emerges from this research on the political changes in education in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia is that transformation is an extremely complex and often unsatisfactory process. The attempt by these countries to re-establish ideological pluralism and multi-party political systems, is undermined, as the research shows, by a multiplicity of factors. The most important of these are ideological naivete, impoverished economies and undoubtedly central, the question of political power. We have seen that the replacement of communist orthodoxy does not, and has not meant that the terrain upon which policy is formed has been levelled. Far from it, it remains marked by potent political forces seeking to stamp new or revived orthodoxies on the education scene.

Strategies built around ideas of pluralism and democracy have sought to bring into being policies aimed at enlisting the participation of the "client-community" and giving increased autonomy to local municipal and school level authorities as part of a process of decentralisation of decision-making. However, the relative ease with which new democracies

appeared to replace the former socialist education system - particularly with the passing of new legislation espousing the principles of democracy, humanism and liberty - belied real difficulties which showed how tenacious 'old realities' (some even from a distant past as we see with the church's revivalist stance) were. Reforms proved difficult to implement as the post-1989 euphoria was forced to make way for the stark socio-economic and political realities of everyday life. The real threat that education in Central Europe faces in the attempt to establish democratic education systems, is undoubtedly going to be found in the awareness that the outcome of party political struggles ultimately determine the future of education. Already by December 1990, President Vaclav Havel of the CSFR, in his speech to the Federal Parliament, warned against the dangers to the new democracy and cautioned that the day would come when the 1989 events would be referred to as the "gambled away revolution" (Von Kopp 1992:101). Embedded in this warning was Havel's awareness of the fragility of transformation experiences. Every gain for democracy was hedged by a multiplicity of conditions which threatened to reshape the character of the reform process.

Harden and Battiata (Zielonka 1991:107) sounded a similar warning in 1990: "The fervour of freedom that spilled into the streets last year and fuelled the 20th century's most remarkable round of democratic change has run low. In its place, there is a dark awareness of freedom's costs, destitution and demagoguery." It is crucial to this research that the political backcloth is clearly sketched in order to comprehend the delicate condition in which educational change finds itself.

In summary, I found the data emanating from this project and specifically from the research questions, to indicate the replication of certain conditions in all three countries under discussion.

i. **Teachers** face contradictory expectations as they attempt to insert themselves into the transformation process as legitimate players with voices of their own. In all three countries, teachers had been cowed into silence by several years of centralised authority. Not only were they disempowered but they were marked by the signs of "Judas". Levels of suspicion against them were high. As a result, they struggled to repair the breakdown of teacher-parent relations which

had occurred under the former system. The central criticism related to their former role as transmitters of state Marxist ideology. This problem is compounded by evidence which shows that conservative local interest groups, many who had gained power under the former government continued to have the power to dictate the pace of events. The active involvement of teachers in the reform process and actual implementation has been negatively affected by erosion of their status, poor salaries, shortage of funds to implement changes and the perception that as before 1989, they still lack the ability to influence Ministerial education policy.

Of the three countries, Hungary is possibly the best situated for allowing the role of teachers to change. This can directly be ascribed to the relative stability of democratic government and national reform initiatives, the power of independent pro-reform municipalities and school-level autonomy that can be traced back to the 1985 Education Act in Hungary.

ii. The role played by Solidarity in Poland and the Czech and Slovak Teacher's Forums in the initial stages of the political transformation ensured the representation of teachers' interests at Ministerial level. However, the data indicates mounting frustration in the organised profession as reform initiatives have been thwarted or slowed down by former communists or reform-communists from Ministerial level to Parliament, municipality and school level. It is also significant to note that the **teachers' associations** that evolved from the former communist associations, namely the Polish Teachers Association, Pedagogues Trade Union (Hungary) and Teachers' Trade Union (Czech Republic) remain the largest organisations and continue to wield influence as they attract underpaid teachers through economic incentives.

iii. **Independent schools** and independent school associations are leading the reform movement in all three countries not only at local level but the data shows that these schools are used by the Education ministries as "social laboratories" and "testing ground" for innovative programmes and reform policies.

iv. **Religion** had throughout socialist Central Europe, with the exception of Poland, been suppressed for forty years. In this period, a generation of adults, parents and teachers had been socialised in a society of "state-sponsored atheism". This socialisation, not unexpectedly, produced people who had developed different attitudes to religion. Amongst them were those who felt strongly about schools propagating particular religious beliefs. The new governments' attempts to re-introduce religion in schools during 1990, therefore, not only sparked off the first education crisis of national proportions in Poland and Hungary (to a lesser extent in the CSFR), but redrew a sharp dividing line, in the first instance, between the traditional opposing religious groups and secularists, but in the second awakened nationalist sentiment in regions such as Moravia and Slovakia in Czechoslovakia. The split on the question of religion could also be witnessed in certain political parties, adding to their fragmentation. The transition in education has further been complicated by the ongoing debate on the restitution of church buildings nationalised after 1948, which have been turned into schools since then and which now face possible disruption.

v. The literature and interviews confirm two obstacles pre-dating 1989 which hinder prospects for a democratic transtition in education. The first is that teachers, in seeking to restore sound teacher-parent relations as a pre-requisite to legitimising the reform process, face a challenge in overcoming the non-participation of **parents** in schools.

vi. **Public opinion** as a pressure mechanism to fix attention on education issues was largely absent in socialist Central Europe. In the early months of 1990, prior to the first free elections, the mass media enjoyed new-found press freedom and featured education much more prominently than had been the case before. Public opinion polls reflected this rise in the prominence of education as a public priority. However, by the end of 1991, public opinion on education had become overshadowed by : concerns in Poland over the effects of the "shock therapy" economic policy; the fragmentation of political parties and economic matters. In Hungary, moreover, the media is engaged in a battle for control by the political parties. Questions on the

influence of former Hungarian "old-guard" members in this "media war" have been raised while public focus in the CSFR centre upon the heated debate on the future of the remaining nomenclature, pace of marketisation and unity of the federal state.

vii. **Higher Education and Research Institutes** form an integral part of the transition process in education, providing, most visibly, teachers who are arguably now better equipped for the task (given the inflow of local and international innovative educators and practises) and also research which sheds light on the reform processes. The information provided by this research points to sweeping staff changes brought about in higher education and research institutes following in the wake of the new governments. In spite of these changes, the data confirms that higher education continues to be inhabited by vestiges of scientific nomenklatura and anti-reform minded academics, using newly-gained institutional autonomy as a means to hold off reforms.

Following the work of Halasz (1986:123) on pre-1986 Hungarian education interest groups, I propose a classification that reflects the societal changes in socio-economic and political life that Central Europe has experienced since the events of 1989.

Classification of Interest Groups in the Education Policy-making Arena or "Arena of Power"

"E" ECONOMIC AXIS (positive pole; external groups)

i. Sector of economy supporting E C Membership and integration ii. Foreign joint business ventures	2	i. Directors of former state enterprises awaiting privatisation ii. Former political elite changing political assets for present economic assets and influence iii. Reform communists and central economic planners returning to government
"I" AXIS (negative pole)		"I" IDEOLOGY (positive pole)
i. Independent schools ii. Pro-reform teachers iii. Pro-democracy & freemarket opposition minority parties iv. Pro-reform teachers' associations v. Public opinion (Czech Rep.) vi. Pro-modernisation institutes for research and higher education vii. Former dissidents from government to local and school level who propogate pluralist policies	4	1 i. Ruling political parties, e.g. MDF Solidarity, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence ii. Roman Catholic Church iii. Former communist teachers' associations iv. Ethnic nationalist parties v. Reform communists in government vi. Academic nomenklatura vii. Media - nationalistic and former communist-owned viii. Former communist teachers pro-status quo ix. Local municipalities dominated by former communists

"E" AXIS (negative pole; internal groups)

The classification of post-1989 interest groups that I propose differs from the Halasz classification which represented a policy-making arena with the state as the only "gatekeeper" in the communist era. The Halasz classification was comprised of economic planners (external groups) and educators (internal groups) whose actions were confined to the boundaries imposed by Marxist hegemony upon education. Mass demonstrations and the first democratic elections in Central Europe swept aside Marxist ideology and in its place came the opportunity for the incoming governments to establish an education system based upon the principle of democracy and pluralism. The events of 1989 not only mandated a change to the Ideology "I" axis of the original Halasz classification but also to the Economic "E" axis, as these countries embarked upon the hazardous road to a free-market capitalist economy. The dominant ideology for four decades had been discarded and replaced by a debate between the various interest groups on an appropriate future philosophy of education. The label of the Ideology "I" axis was retained in the light of the serious attempt by the new ruling power elite to either unilaterally introduce a "traditional type Catholic education" or, in the case of the other ethnic, nationalist groups, to seek the installation of a single value system, rather reminiscent of earlier communist monism in education. The classification that I put forward also caters for the proliferation of education, economic, religious, public, ethnic and nationalist pressure groups that have emerged who seek to influence the government's policy making, given the new era of open access to education.

In my classification the opposing camps of interest groups are found among the Ideology "I" axis, with the positive pole representing the monistic groups that "resist" the democratic transition in education. The groups at the negative pole of the "I" axis lobby for a pluralistic and differential education system with a strong following for modernisation and cooperating with Western Europe. I have included public opinion in dimension 4 at the positive pole of axis "I", underplaying for the moment present voter apathy, given the overwhelming pro-democracy support that swept Central Europe and in spite of data substantiating this observation only available from the Czech Republic.

The dominant role of economic matters in shaping the structure of post-1989 education and the success of reforms dependent on economic recovery,

form the motivation for keeping Halasz's Economic "E" axis. Contrary to Halasz's dimension 2 and 3 which were dominated by central planners and economists tied to the state, my post-communist classification, reflecting the move from a centrally planned economy to a market orientated capitalist economy, exhibits a range of new economic interest groups at the positive pole of the "E" axis. Dimension 2 has shown particularly rapid growth as foreign investment poured in and the question of EC membership gained support from local businessmen. However, groups in dimension 3 have shown a certain persistence in seeking to make their presence felt. This is manifested in former communists or reform communists, either continuing to manage former state companies or using their pre-1989 political assets and privileges to gain economic assets "cheaply", especially in the period of state privatisation. The return of former communists, eg. in Poland, to positions of power will, in future, strengthen groups in both dimensions 3 and 1. The growth of groups in dimension 2 will depend largely upon the rate of economic recovery as Central Europe moves to a free market economy. Positive signs in the Hungarian economy and the progression of the transition process in education have already become evident in the strengthening of dimensions 2 and 4 in Hungary. In contrast both Poland and Czechoslovakia seem to have stalled in the transition to democracy and pluralist education, as groups in dimension 3 and 1 appear to have bolstered themselves. This can be ascribed to increasing voter apathy and confusion with a multitude of new parties, the pre-occupation with "bread and butter" issues and the resurgence of former communist groups.

In briefly looking at the types and sub-types of political power which are 'coercion', 'inducements', 'persuasion' and 'authority', one can identify several examples within the Central European context which will be dealt with in detail later in this research. Within the sphere of education, 'inducements' are employed by Education ministries, linking financial support to compliance to central "reform" initiatives, from school to university level. 'Persuasion' and its sub-type, 'indoctrinational' were the accusations by opponents levelled at the effort by Central European governments to introduce Roman Catholic religion to schools. Numerous examples of 'authoritive' political power and specifically the sub-types 'charismatic' and 'traditional' are evident in Central Europe. The 'traditional' power of the Roman Catholic church continues to be a dominant influence in Poland while pro-Catholic sentiment is also found in the Civic Forum (Czech Republic) and the ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum. The 'charismatic leadership' of Lech Walesa and to a lesser extent, Vaclav Havel

would catapult Solidarity and the Civic Forum to the ruling power elite, the first over a period of nine years, the latter a period of three months.

The channels of access used and tactics employed by education interest groups in interacting with the power elite have taken the form of public and teachers demonstrations; lobbying by school boards (with parent representation) at municipal level; informal contacts with decision-makers; submissions to education commissions and public propaganda campaigns, for example, through the media. The impact of these interest groups upon political power has largely depended upon how the power elite perceived the group's level of representativeness and support base and so on. It is this reality, given the relative late-comer status of most education interest groups that has kept the balance of power in Central European education firmly in the grasp of the ruling political powers. The success of education interest groups, however, is not solely dependent on the power play within the sphere of education. The parallel and simultaneous transformation experiences in both education, the economy and the macro-political process have placed the future of education interest groups in Central Europe under a much greater threat. The outcome of the struggle for the consolidation of the fledgling democracies - by the experiences of the last three years - casts a shadow over emerging education interest groups and necessitate elaboration. I would like to make some concluding remarks regarding the future position of interest groups in Central European secondary education.

The totalitarian 'communist' ideology was rejected by the majority of people in this region in favour of democratic capitalism. In the transition period we find the re-establishment of civil society in this societal vacuum of public non-participation, dating from the pre-1989 period (Skilling & Griffiths 1971:22). Civil society consists of the various non-state institutions such as associations, interest groups, youth movements, civil rights organisations and is the realm in society which is not regulated by the state. In totalitarian systems, the state absorbs and controls all these organisations (Sorenson 1993:157). Sociologically interest groups are of social significance as their establishment and disappearance reflect the changing values of a society. In this case the emergence of interest groups marks the re-establishment of civil society in Central Europe and the empowerment of new groups in education. The power of social groups, as in education, therefore serves to facilitate or hold back transformation.

In Central Europe the new governments in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia came from the ranks of the broad civic movement and had engineered the downfall of the communists through mass anti-government

demonstrations. The civic movements successfully showed through popular dissent that the communist governments no longer had the legitimate power and authority to govern the countries. The democratic elections in Central Europe during 1990 firmly entrenched a political process that envisaged a society with pluralistic views. Within this space between the state and society emerged various interest groups, including those in education, who sought to represent a multitude of views and in doing so, to influence the government in order to satisfy the goals of their particular constituency.

The ousting of the communist governments in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia has been followed by radical attempts by the new post-1989 governments to break with their past and initiate processes, during a period of transition, to attain democracy and market-orientated economies. This transition phase has been characterised by the re-construction of civil society with the establishment of various organisations, political parties, associations (social, cultural, professional) and education interest groups (Bernhard 1992:309). My experience "on the ground", conducting interviews in these countries, the data emanating as summarised in this chapter and opinions in education literature all point to the position of education interest groups as subject to the new governments successfully negotiating the present "intermediate stage between revolutionary turmoil and democratic stability" (Breslow 1991:209).

Although all three countries have embodied the principles of democracy, humanism and liberty in legislation on education, the full implementation envisaged for the reforms of respective education systems remain "hostage" to economic improvement. Therefore the transition in education and full participation of all interest groups are interconnected with the problems of economic and political transformation, each influencing the success of the other. This brings me to the paradox of the anti-communist revolution which the new Central European governments face. In contrast to the pre-1989 era, in the new era "everything may happen, yet little can be done" (Bauman 1992:130). As political, economic and educational freedoms have been won, economic realities have placed a severe restraint on these activities. With the fall of communism came the collapse of the centrally planned economy, state subsidised industries, farms and mass unemployment ensued.

In many instances the former dissidents in the new government could not, similar to their predecessors, satisfy the majority of the peoples interests. The end result has been loss of voter support and the fragmentation of the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence (Czechoslovakia) and Solidarity (Poland), victors in the 1989 elections. It is essential to understand that the

future development of education interest groups and the hard-won reforms in education can be threatened if a particular country is unable to complete the transition to democratic capitalism. Przeworski (1991:93) reminds us that "religion and nationalism, not democracy, were the driving forces against communism, democracy is not necessarily the outcome sought by those challenging the communist regime". Rose (1993:156) sounds a similar warning: "dictatorship has lost and freedom has won ... but that does not mean that democracy has won".

During the completion of this research, Czechoslovakia was the first country to succumb to nationalist aspirations as the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic split into two autonomous countries in December 1992. In the national referendum the majority was gained by pro-separatist Slovak nationalists. In Poland, on 19 September 1993, the ousted former Communist Party, campaigning as the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), gained a 20.6 percent vote and more than one third of the 460 seat lower house (Cape Times 1993:7). This enabled the SLD to form a coalition government after pushing The Democratic Union (formerly Solidarity) to a third place with 10.7 percent. The return to power of the former communists, four years after being swept from office has confirmed the continued influence of communists as was also expressed by a number of interviewees in Poland. It is only in Hungary that the 1990 parliamentary political parties have remained unchanged and no new challengers to the ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum have appeared (Korosenyi 1993:104). The political stability in Hungary is an indication of the probable consolidation of democracy and with it the most likely full transition of education reforms envisaged by the government.

In conclusion, I feel that moderate optimism can be expressed on the successful establishment of well-functioning democratic education systems in Central Europe, given the broad-based participation of emerging interest groups. It is appropriate to end with a quote from Kozakiewicsz (1992:100), to illustrate the challenge that education interest groups face:

"To sum up these inevitably sketchy remarks on recent changes in Polish education, I wish to stress that this is a report from a battlefield. The battle is fought on various fronts, not only in education. It is a battle for the future of Poland, for her independent and democratic shape. Within our struggle many ideas will appear. It is too early to say which or how many will prevail."

This research within the South African context

Although the scope of this study does not allow for analysis of education interest groups within the South African context, I wish to comment briefly on some striking parallels to the data emanating from Central Europe. I am well aware of the inherent dangers of comparing conditions between geo-politically diverse countries. Indeed, this is a widely debated issue in the comparative research field. However, lengthly interviews with a broad spectrum of educators in Central Europe have confirmed a number of common issues which reformers in Central Europe and South Africa face during the period of political transformation.

The most prominent are :

- that the character of the political transformation - from a hegemonic to a multi-party political order - in both contexts is marked by a heritage which did not cater for diverse education interest groups. The establishment of democratic or pro-democratic structures in society are, for the first time, giving interest groups channels of access to the education policy-making arena or "arena of power";

- that in both Central Europe and South Africa, the former political elite, with historic roots, positions of power, (nomenklatura in the former), remains a force to be reckoned with, where many merely exchanged political for economic power, in the latter, political negotiations have left those with political influence, particularly in positions of authority;

- while South Africa for the present is confronted with the added challenge of economic transformation, like Central Europe, it is vulnerable in the sense that opposing religious, ethnic and separatist forces are constantly asserting, through land, language and other claims, their rights in ways which are placing strain on the reform process.

In conclusion I would like to remark that the data emanating from this study and my "grassroots" research has served to underline that putting in place a democratic political system does not guarantee democratic reforms in education, as the implementation thereof remains subordinate to political and economic conditions. Central Europe has shown that the inability of the political parties, victorious in the 1990 elections, to consolidate their power-base, has with the exception of Hungary, threatened the democratic process in education.

APPENDIX : 1 (p.45)

Teachers' roles and responsibilities	Relation between job satisfaction and the assessment of the realization of responsibilities Tau-B	Relation between the appearance of stress and the assessment of the realization of responsibilities Tau-B	Valorization index
Work with colleagues on the well-being students	.164	-.019	.183
Work with colleagues on the evaluation of students' progress	.151	-.032	.183
Reading professional periodicals	.132	-.042	.174
Counselling individual students	.119	-.054	.174
Study for professional development	.146	-.008	.154
Share in the guidance system	.130	.000	.130
Work with colleagues on curriculum development	.167	.040	.127
Contacts with parents	.109	-.014	.123
Induction of new teachers	.116	.004	.112
Share in school management	.108	.012	.096
Work on school/community relationships	.067	.040	.027

Professional responsibilities perceived by secondary school teachers in Poland listed with the decreasing valorization index (N=936).

NASALSKA (1991:31. POLAND)

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE POLISH PARLIAMENT

NOVEMBER 1991



* There are 19 other parties represented in the Sejm, including the German Minority with 7 seats, Christian Democracy (5), Christian Democrats' Party (4), Labor Solidarity (4), Party X (3), Union for Realpolitik (3).

KLOSOWSKI (10.1992:3. POLAND)



STRUCTURE OF THE POLISH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
MIEZALSKI (1992:21. POLAND)

APPENDIX : 4 (p.61)

What are your main life aims and aspirations for the next 5-10 years?
(the surveyed population was between 15 and 44 years old)

Aims and aspirations	1977 % of answers	1977 rank	1983 % of answers	1983 rank	1986[b] % of answers	1986[b] rank	% of difference between 1977 and 1986
Connected with education	78	1	49	4	42	4	- 36
Family and personal	53	2	51	3	60	1	+ 7
Accommodation[a]	42	3	58	1	56	2-3	+14
Other material	35	4	55	2	56	2-3	+21
Connected with work	33	5	31	5	27	5	- 6
Status - prestige	8	6	6	6	9	6	+ 1
Self-improvement	3	7	1	8	3	7	0
Sociocentric	1	8	2	7	1	8	0

[a] We have distiguished between the goals connected with accommodation and other material goals, because of their common character and importance among other social aspirations.
[b] The data base is currently being established and errors ca. + 1 per cent may occur.

Wisniewski (1988:126. Poland)

APPENDIX : 5 (p.31,117)

%	1989	1990	1991
POLAND			
Gross domestic product	- 0.2	- 12	- 3.7
Industrial production	- 2.5	- 28.8	- 5.7
Inflation	251	684	80
Unemployment % of workforce	0.3	6.1	7.3
CZECHOSLOVAKIA			
Gross domestic product	1.4	- 3.1	- 9.8
Industrial production	1.0	- 3.7	- 4.5
Inflation	1.4	15	40
Unemployment % of workforce	0	1.0	2.8
HUNGARY			
Gross domestic product	- 0.2	3.5	- 6
Industrial production	- 1	- 10	- 12
Inflation	17.5	28.2	36
Unemployment % of workforce	0.5	1.6	2.9

Boyes (1991:23. Central Europe)



STRUCTURE OF THE HUNGARIAN EDUCATION SYSTEM

SZUNYOGH (1991:5. HUNGARY)

APPENDIX : 7 (p. 84, 89, 102)

PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ON EDUCATION EXPECTATIONS : 1990

The distribution of answers to the following question : "Now I will read out twenty-two pairs of statements. The statements in each pair contradict one another. Please indicate the statement with which you agree. Perhaps it will be difficult to give a definite response to some of the pairs, but try to show stands closest to your opinion." (N=992, sample representing Hungarian adult population)

QUESTION : 1

1.	Nowadays a person can only get on in life if he has been educated at school.	(35.4%)
2.	A talented person can get on in life regardless of the fact that they have been educated at school or not.	(61.3%)
3.	No answer.	(3.3%)

QUESTION : 2

1.	After so many experiments and reforms, schools are very much in need of calm.	(35.3%)
2.	In the future major changes will be needed in schools.	(53.2%)
3.	No answer	(11.5%)

QUESTION : 3

1.	Children should be sent to a school which is appropriate for their abilities and knowledge as early as possible.	(67.5%)
2.	Independently of their particular knowledge and abilities, children should stay at the same school for as long as possible.	(25.8%)
3.	No answer	(6.7%)

QUESTION : 4

1.	The schools of today overload the children and the demands they face are too big.	(69.1%)
2.	The schools of today do not place enough serious demands in front of children.	(24.1%)
3.	No answer	(7.0%)

QUESTION : 5

1.	These days one cannot expect the family to teach children good manners and proper behaviour; this is primarily the task of the school.	(26.2%)
2.	Good manners and proper behaviour should be taught within the family; one cannot expect the school to carry out this task.	(69.0%)
3.	No answer	(4.8%)

Halasz (1991:15. Hungary)

(Appendix 7/Continued)

QUESTION : 6

1.	Special skills and knowledge are not needed in order to educate children and any sensible adult is capable of doing this.	(48.4%)
2.	The education of children requires serious professional knowledge and thus only a well-trained, well-prepared teacher is capable of carrying out this task.	(47.7%)
3.	No answer	(4.0%)

QUESTION : 7

1.	Parents should have the right to send their children to the school which they consider to be the best.	(67.1%)
2.	All parents should send their children to the school which serves the local area in which they live otherwise the privileged children will go to the best schools.	(29.0%)
3.	No answer	(3.7%)

QUESTION : 8

1.	It would be best if each school chose its own textbooks and its own teaching methods.	(46.9%)
2.	It would be best if all schools used centrally prescribed textbooks and similar teaching methods.	(44.1%)
3.	No answer	(9.0%)

QUESTION : 9

1.	Parents have little time and opportunity for dealing with their children, so schools should have a greater responsibility for a child's personal development.	(35.2%)
2.	Families ought to give more attention to their children, and the schools should not take on this responsibility.	(59.3%)
3.	No answer	(5.5%)

QUESTION : 10

1.	The primary task of the schools is to prepare pupils for good, secure employment, and it is not satisfactory to simply provide them with a general education.	(47.1%)
2.	The primary task of schools is to give the children a thorough general education and not to prepare them for a job or profession.	(45.9%)
3.	No answer	(7.0%)

QUESTION : 11

1.	There is no place for religion in state schools.	(20.8%)
2.	The chance to receive religious education should be guaranteed in state schools.	(75.2%)
3.	No answer	(4.0%)

(Appendix 7/Continued)

QUESTION : 12

1.	Men and women have different tasks in life and therefore they should be given a different education.	(31.7%)
2.	In a modern society the education of men and women should not be different.	(61.6%)
3.	No answer	(6.7%)

QUESTION : 13

1.	Minorities and nationalities have a right to have their own schools.	(63.4%)
2.	Children belonging to the same minority groups and nationalities should attend the same schools as Hungarians.	(32.9%)
3.	No answer	(3.7%)

QUESTION : 14

1.	Special schools should be established for talented children, because only in this way can they fully realize they natural abilities.	(49.2%)
2.	Special schools should not be established for talented children because this offends social justice.	(42.8%)
3.	No answer	(8.0%)

QUESTION : 15

1.	Schooling should be free for everybody.	(63.6%)
2.	Families which can afford it should contribute to the cost of schooling.	(33.8%)
3.	No answer	(2.6%)

QUESTION : 16

1.	Schools should demand serious learning from children at an early age.	(49.2%)
2.	Schools should not expect serious learning from very young children.	(44.1%)
3.	No answer	(6.7%)

QUESTION : 17

1.	Most of the current problems in education can be solved at the local level within the schools themselves.	(48.4%)
2.	Today's educational problem can only be solved by central measures.	(38.2%)
3.	No answer	(13.4%)

(Appendix 7/Continued)

QUESTION : 18

1.	Besides teaching, schools should guarantee the provision of meals and other daily requirements.	(67.1%)
2.	Schools should occupy themselves with teaching matters; the provision of other services is not their concern.	(28.8%)
3.	No answer	(4.1%)

QUESTION : 19

1.	Schools should be more strict and ought to demand greater discipline.	(50.7%)
2.	Instead of being more strict and demanding greater discipline, teachers should pay more attention to pupils and be more tactful.	(45.8%)
3.	No answer	(3.5%)

QUESTION : 20

1.	The teachers are the professionals and it is their job to decide how and what to teach; parents should not interfere with this process.	(65.1%)
2.	Parents should also have the opportunity to say something about what is taught in schools and how it is taught.	(30.5%)
3.	No answer	(4.4%)

QUESTION : 21

1.	At present teachers' pay is lower than it really ought to be.	(57.2%)
2.	Teachers' pay is appropriate for the work which they do.	(32.5%)
3.	No answer	(10.3%)

QUESTION : 22

1.	Education in state schools should be neutral with regard to any kind of world outlook.	(53.3%)
2.	Education in state schools cannot be neutral, because successful education can only take place on the basis of a particular world outlook.	(33.4%)
3.	No answer	(13.3%)

APPENDIX : 8 (p. 15)

HALASZ'S SPHERES OF INTEREST (OR INTEREST GROUPS)

(1) *Ideologically committed educational groups :* relatively homogeneous, with an idea of the educational system based on a theory of unified polytechnical training, which would develop an almost unified educational provision obligatory for every body up to the age of 18.

(2) *Ideologically less committed groups of economic planners :* concerned with the long-range planning of the national economy, and linked with the institutional networks of economic planning. Since the education service had to provide a labour force for a relatively backward economy, these groups urged the development of a system which would turn out most young people at 16 for simple manual work.

(3) *Ideologically committed vocational groups :* concerned with the development of vocational education and its integration into a traditional school system so that education would take precedence over merely vocational training

(4) *Ideologically less committed education groups* : growing stronger since the mid-1970s, trying to work out the rational theory of society and taking account of the fact of socio-economic development. These groups think in terms of a differentiated school structure and wish to preserve the secondary school in its existing form but do not exclude some possible extensions.

Howell (1988:125. Hungary)



The percentage of children of manual workers among first-year students attending regular courses at institutions of higher education (%).

Lukacs (1989:226. Hungary)

APPENDIX : 10 (p. 105)

RANK ORDER OF EXPECTATIONS TOWARD THE SCHOOL IN FUNCTION OF EDUCATION LEVEL (1 = HIGH RANK, 20 = LOW RANK)

		Without second. educ. (N=482)	With second. educ. (N=415)	Together
1.	The developm. of individual abilities	9.2	4.9	7.2
2.	Development of intellectual capacities	9.8	4.5	7.4
3.	Moral education, education for honesty	6.9	8.5	7.7
4.	The teaching of mother tongue	3.7	7.6	8.8
5.	Education for a good profession	7.2	9.8	8.4
6.	Education for discipline and order	7.4	9.9	8.5
7.	Preparation for further studies	9.3	9.2	9.3
8.	The teaching of foreign languages	11.3	7.3	9.5
9.	Care with affection	9.9	10.8	10.3
10.	The teaching of scientific knowledge	11.7	8.6	10.3
11.	The teaching of national traditions	11.1	10.8	11.0
12.	Education for patriotism	10.5	12.6	11.5
13.	Sports, physical education	11.8	11.7	11.8
14.	Education for cooperation with others	12.3	11.3	11.8
15.	Meals, day-care	12.3	14.6	13.4
16.	Religious education	12.0	15.1	13.4
17.	Development of collective values	14.0	12.9	13.5
18.	Leisure, playing	15.2	14.8	15.0
19.	Sexual education	16.7	15.5	16.1
20.	Political and civic education	17.7	17.9	17.8

Halasz (1991:5. Hungary)

APPENDIX : 11 (p.101)

RANK ORDER OF EXPECTATIONS TOWARDS THE SCHOOL IN FUNCTION OF POLITICAL ATTACHMENT (1 = HIGH RANK, 20 = LOW RANK)

		Those in favour of		
		Governm. (N=310)	Opposition (N=296)	Neither (N=386)
1.	Education for a good profession	8.9	9.0	7.5
2.	The development of individual abilities	8.0	5.9	7.7
3.	Moral education, education for honesty	6.9	8.4	7.8
4.	Development of intellectual capacities	7.7	6.5	7.9
5.	Education for discipline and order	7.9	9.8	8.0
6.	The teaching of mother tongue	8.5	7.8	8.2
7.	Preparation for further studies	9.7	8.6	9.4
8.	The teaching of foreign languages	9.9	8.5	9.9
9.	The teaching of scientific knowledge	11.1	9.9	10.1
10.	Care with affection	10.5	10.1	10.3
11.	The teaching of national traditions	11.1	11.1	10.7
12.	Education for patriotism	10.8	12.4	11.3
13.	Education for cooperation with others	12.0	11.5	11.9
14.	Sports, physical education	11.5	11.5	12.3
15.	Religious education	12.6	14.8	13.0
16.	Meals, day-care	13.0	13.8	13.4
17.	Development of collective values	13.3	13.5	13.8
18.	Leisure, playing	15.0	14.9	15.0
19.	Sexual education	16.2	15.5	16.6
20.	Political and civic education	17.5	17.7	18.1

Halasz (1991:6. Hungary)

APPENDIX : 12 (p. 92, 100)

THE ACCEPTANCE OF DIFFERENT OPTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION (n=979)

	Agree	Do not agree	Do not know
Religious education should be compulsory for everybody	15.7	78.8	5.5
Religious education should not be compulsory, it must be an optional subject in schools	72.7	18.4	8.9
The introduction of religious education would be discriminative for non-religious children	20.8	62.8	15.4

Halasz (1991:6. Hungary)

APPENDIX : 13 (p. 73,116)

THE COMPOSITION OF EASTERN EUROPE'S NEW PARLIAMENTS

HUNGARY

Date of Election : March 25 and April 8, 1990
Type of Legislature : 386-member single chamber (including 8 deputies coopted after voting to represent national minorities).
Electoral Mode : A complicated system of district, regional and national party lists as well as majority voting in single-member constituencies.

	Percentage of votes	Number of seats
Democratic Forum	24.7	165
Free Democrats	21.4	92
Smallholders	11.8	43
Socialists (ex-Communists)	10.9	33
Young Democrats (Fidesz)	8.9	21
Christian Democrats	6.5	21
Others	15.8	11

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Date of Election : June 8-9, 1990
Type of Legislature : The Federal Assembly contains 300 seats divided into two chambers : the House of People (with 150 members, 101 from the Czech Lands and 49 from Slovakia) and the House of Nations (with 150 members, 75 from each republic). Also elected were the republican parliaments, that is, the Czech National Council (200 members) and the Slovak National Council (150 members).
Election Mode : All seats were elected from party lists on the basis of proportional representation. A minimum 59% of the poll was required to win representation in the Federal Assembly and Czech National Council; and a 3% minimum was required for the Slovak National Council.

House of the People

	National percentage	Czech	Slovak	Seats
Civic Forum and Public against Violence	46.6	53.2	32.5	87
Communists	13.6	13.5	13.8	24
Christian Democrats	12.0	8.7	19.0	20
Moravian and Silesian autonomists	5.4	5.4		9
Slovak Nationalists	3.5		11.0	6
Coalition of minorities	2.8		8.6	4
Other	16.1	16.7	15.1	

Evling (7.1990:2. Czechoslovakia, Hungary)

APPENDIX 14 (p.140)

TYPOLOGY OF PARENTS ACCORDING TO ATTITUDES TOWARDS CHANGES IN EDUCATION
(representative sample of Czech parents, N = 1,216)

Type of parents	% of parental population	Attitudes to changes in education	Willingness to pay school fee
liberal	34	positive : 75% of this group wish private schools	yes (75% willing to pay)
radical	16	asking radical changes, decentralization, private schools	yes (83% willing to pay)
socialistic	12	negative : against private schools	no (100% requesting non-paid education)
centralistic	15	supporting centralized school system, accepting only "cosmetic" changes	no
non-interested	23	not appreciating education as a primary value	partially yes

Prucha (1991:16. Czech Republic)



STRUCTURE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK EDUCATION SYSTEM: 1 SEPTEMBER 1990

ONDREJKOWIC (1990:28. CZECHOSLOVAKIA)

APPENDIX 16 (p. 14,22,40)

SEMINARS

Cultural Week - Hosted by Dutch Department of Foreign Affairs & Stigtings Studiefonds Voor Zuid-Afrikaanse Studenten. Amsterdam. 14 - 18 October 1991.

Lecturers:

Prof. J. Berting, Department Sociology, University of Rottendam.
Prof. G. Schutte, Department History, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.
Dr. C.E. Choenni, Bureau Racismebestryding, University Utrecht.
Prof. S. Couwenberg, Law Department, University Rotterdam.
Prof. P. Nijkamp, Department Economy, Vrije University Amsterdam.

Dutch Department of Foreign Affairs. Briefing by Under-secretary of African Affairs in regard to Dutch policy in Southern Africa. The Hague. 16 October 1991.

International Seminar: "Law and Practice". Legal acts concerning higher education and research in Central and East-European countries. Warsaw. November 18 - 20 1991.

National Quarterly Meeting. NES NSZZ Presidium. Members were interviewed prior to meeting. Warsaw. 22 November 1991. (Translator: I. Okraska)

Slovakia Workshop. Primary and Secondary School Reforms. Institute of Information and Prognoses of Education. Youth and Sports. Chairman: Dr. S. Christenko. European Forum of Freedom in Education, Slovak Branch. Fromer USSR education researcher. Bratislava. 5 November 1991. (Translator: I. Ivanovova).

ORIGINAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Gabor Halasz (1986) distinguishes the four major "spheres of interest" affecting Hungarian secondary education policy as follows :

1. Ideologically committed education groups : relatively homogeneous, with an idea of the educational system based on a theory of unified polytechnical training, which would develop an almost unified education provision obligatory for everybody up to the age of 18.

2. Ideologically less committed groups of economic planners : concerned with the long-range planning of the national economy, and linked with the institutional networks of economic planning. Since the education service had to provide a labour force for a relatively backward economy, these groups urged the development of a system which would turn out most young people at 16 for simple manual work.

3. Ideologically committed vocational education groups : concerned with the development of vocational education and its integration into a traditional school system so that education would take precedence over merely vocational training. These groups urged the preservation of the existing education system as a pre-condition for the expansion of vocational education.

4. Ideologically less committed education groups : growing stonger since the mid-1970's, trying to work out a rational theory of society and taking account of the fact of socio-economic development. These groups think in terms of a differentiated school structure and wish to preserve the secondary school in its existing form but do not exclude some possible extensions.

D.A. Howell (1988)

In the questions that follow, the Halasz classification will be used as a model for examining the dynamics of the "spheres of interest" in education, within the societies under focus. (It is important to note that the Halasz classification is only one way of understanding who the interested parties in the process of education are and that there are a number of others).

QUESTION 1 : Is the Halasz classification a useful one for describing what is happening in your country?

QUESTION 2 : In your opinion, what "spheres of interest" (educational interest groups) exist in your society? On what basis would you define these groups?

QUESTION 3 : With regard to the 1989 - 1990 political transformations, were those groups present before 1989? If so, in what form?

QUESTION 4 : Comment on the relationship between the spheres of interest with regard to their (a) dominance, (b) decline and (c) realignment or (d) alliances formed and (e) possible future importance in the light of the 1989 - 1990 events.

QUESTION 5 : Howell (1988) refers to the continuing relative decline of the ideological spheres of interest, and its effect on Hungarian educational policy making, which continued from 1978 into the 1980's. Is this trend reflected in your country? If so, can you suggest the possible cause of this trend?

QUESTION 6 : Indicate (a) the immediate (and possible future) impact of the government's economic reform policy, to which the education system has to adapt and (b) the effect thereof on the spheres of interest groupings? Have these issues led to the emergence of post-1989 interest groups?

QUESTION 7 : To what extent do nationalist, ethnic and minority issues (a) play a prominent role in educational policy making and (b) feature on the agenda of the spheres of interest groupings? Have these issues led to the emergence of post-1989 interest groups?

QUESTION 8 : Lukacs (1989) points to the emergence of a regional interest group and anti-market group in Hungary. In Poland, Kozakiewicz (1990) distinguishes between opposing interest groups of Minimalists (satisfied with the traditional system and in favour of slight modernisation) and Maximalists (who call both the values and objectives of the existing system into question, and are in favour of radical changes).

Comment on the possible appearance of spheres of educational interest groupings in your country, which fall within these descriptions or which can be added as post-1989 phenomena.

QUESTION 9 : Elaborate with regard to the emergence, dominance or decline of present or new spheres of educational interest groups, against the background of the most likely socio-economic and political scenario of your country, in the foreseeable future.

QUESTION 10 : With reference to your answers in question 1 and 2, describe briefly a model or classification which would be (a) an addition or extension to the Halasz classification or (b) a more suitable way of understanding the educational "spheres of interest" in your particular country.

APPENDIX 18 *(p. 35)*

POLAND : EDUCATION ACTS

Name of Act	Date	Administration and management (A & M)	Curricula	Teacher training	Other remarks
System of Public Education Act	6.6.1990	2 x 2 A & M model	Common Core	Foreign languages introduced	Philosophical and Religious Freedom
Municipal Act	1990	49 Autonomous Regions	Basic Curricula Guidelines		School Autonomy through school councils
Academic Education Act	9.1990	Institutional Autonomy			Academic Freedom restored

APPENDIX 19 *(p.76)*

HUNGARY: EDUCATION ACTS

Name of Act	Date	Administration and management (A & M)	Curricula	Teacher training	Other remarks
Education Reform Law	1961	Three track Secondary Education system			First post-1945 attempt to modernise education
Education Act	1985	Decentralisation of A & M			School level Autonomy
Law XXII	1990	Institutional Autonomy			Academic Freedom
Education Act	5.11.1991	2 x 2 A & M model	Core Curricula	Foreign languages introduced	Philosophical and Religious Freedom

APPENDIX 20 *(p. 119)*

CZECHOSLOVAKIA : EDUCATION ACTS

Name of Act	Date	Administration and management (A & M)	Curricula	Teacher training	Other Remarks
Project of Further Development of the Czech and Slovak Education System	1976	Centralised A & M	Uniform Curricula		
Law no. 29	1984	Comprehensive - School Policy	Uniform Curricula		
System of Primary & Secondary Schools	5.1990		Minimal core Curricula	International Exchange & Staff Development Projects	Philosophical & Religious Freedom
Slovak Act of State Administration	26.11. 1990	2 x 2 A & M model			
Act of the Czech National Council on State Administration	12.1990	2 x 2 A & M model			
Higher Education Act No : 172	4.5.1990	Institutional Autonomy			Academic Freedom

APPENDIX 21 *(p. 28, 31, 43, 65, 72, 74, 92, 107, 117, 127, 143)*

TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS & POLITICAL EVENTS

TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS

PRE-1989	POLAND :	Polish Teachers Association (ZNP - communist)
		Teachers Solidarity (TS - underground)
	HUNGARY :	Union of Pedagoges (UP - communist)
		Pedagogical Democratic Trade Union (PDTU)
	CZECHOSLOVAKIA :	Communist Teachers Trade Union (CTTU)
		Pedagoges Democratic Trade Union (PDTU)
		Teachers Forum (TF)
1990	POLAND :	ZNP (former communist, now non-aligned)
		Solidarity National Education Section (NSZZ - umbrella body to the TS)
	HUNGARY:	Pedagoges Trade Union (PTU - former UP)
	CZECHOSLOVAKIA :	Pedagogical Union (PU - former TF - Czech Rep.)
		Teachers Forum of Slovakia (TFS)
1991	POLAND :	ZNP
		NSZZ
	HUNGARY :	PTU
		PDTU
	CZECH REPUBLIC :	CTTU
		PU
	SLOVAK REPUBLIC :	CTTU
		TFS

POLITICAL EVENTS

Poland : martial law	8.1980
Polish round table talks	1988
Gorbachev's "glasnost & perestroika"	1989
Hungary : pro-democracy rallies	3-6.1989
Hungarian open border policy	5.1989
Fall of the Berlin Wall	9.1989
Poland : partially free elections	6.1989
"Velvet Revolution" pro-democracy demonstrations. CSFR :	10.11.1989
Poland : introduction "shock therapy"	1.1990
Hungary & CSFR : "gradualist" economic policy	1990
Hungary 1st democratic elections	4.1990
Antall : Hungarian Prime Minister	3.1990
CSFR : 1st democratic election	6.1990
Havel : CSFR president	6.1990
Walesa : Polish president	11.1991
CSFR break up into two republics	12.1992

APPENDIX 22 (p. 132)

Dr.Sergej Christenko, Pieninská-6, 05201, Spišská Nová Ves, Czechoslovakia.

Spišská Nová Ves,
15.12.1991

Mr. Henning Oosthuizen
University of Cape Town

Dear Mr.Oosthuizen :

I hope you already in your country after temporary stay in Europe. Because you gave me materials about your research I must answer to you any way.

At this moment I can't to do more than send to you some materials of **European Forum of Freedom in Education.** Maybe later, after two - tree months I would like send to you my own opinion about your answers. For this moment you can have some opinions of other persons in documents, which was with this letter.

Maybe after your stay in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary you already anderstood that **classification of groups of interest** by Halas is very old and no useful in this time.

For example in Czechoslovakia we have the following (I think) groups of interest :

- **catolical church** (and political groups on this base),
- **two - tree groups of liberal thinking teachers, politicians,**
- "new" communist party (diferent groups of this one).

That's all (by my opinion naturally).

Parents and other parts of Public are too indiferent (except newspapers of course).

I decided to find some workplace as a teacher of **Russian** in any from american schools and stay there 1 - 1.5 years. It will be very good for my still very bad English and for my effort know more about the education in demokratic country. I hope I will be successful after some problems (evaluation, certification proces).

I have more information about the program **America 2000.** I translate those documents now, but I can send to you a copy of them if you want.

Maybe after sometime I'll be have some problems as Rusiian here but I hope no.

I wish to you success in your research direction.

Sincerely,

Dr. Sergej Christenko

APPENDIX 23 (p. 125, 134)

VUP INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
Kutlikova 17, 852 55 BRATISLAVA
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

Phone: +427-828 304
Fax: +427-821 584

Bratislava 16 April 1992

Mr Henning Oosthuizen
14 Garrison Road
Claremont
7700
CAPE TOWN SOUTH AFRICA

Dear Mr Oosthuizen,

thank you very much for your letter of 22 March 1992. I answered most of the questions and items in your question - sheet and it was posted in January 1992, sorry so late.
The answers to your questions:

a) The largest teacher association in Slovakia is "Teacher Forum of Slovakia". It is member of WCOTP. It has 3240 members. Adress: Moyzesova 44, 040 01 Košice, CSFR, tel and fax no.: 0042-95-426955

b) In the last year 1991 the school boards were established. Parents play leading role in the board. In addition there are quaterly the classroom parents meetings where the parents can express their opinion and wishes to the school managment. Generally we can say the situation has improved in that field.

c) I believe the most of headmasters prefer reforms and new managment policy. But they suffer from lack of funds and nonstabil personal situation.

d) As a biggest change at school level since 1989 we can consider removing ideology from the schools, decentralization of school managment, struggle for introducing democracy and humanism to the schools. The biggest problems are heavy and to much content for student to learn, lack of interest and enjoy of student and pupils for school, lack of funds for facilitating of schools and teacher salary as well..

I wish the best in your study and to your wife.

Yours sincerely

dr. Jan HERBER
Director

APPENDIX 24 *(p.18, 39, 43, 51, 54, 56, 59, 89, 91, 94, 95, 98, 100, 106, 124, 128, 129, 134, 136)*

COUNTRY	INTEREST GROUP	CONTEXT FOR PARTICIPATION IN REFORMS				
		CO-OPERATION (versus protest)	OBSTACLES		ELIMINATION	OTHER
			TOLERANCE	DOMINATION		
POLAND	Teachers	through school councils	of parents and ministerial reforms	Ministry by network of old principals "house-cleaning" in 1989		
	Teacher Associations	by NSZZ on Education Commission	by Education Ministry of associations	of ZNP in organised profession		
	Independent Schools	with Education Ministry as "change agents"				
	Religious Groups	with Ministry and Catholic Schools	by Ministry of non-Catholic Schools	attempt by Catholic Church through religious education introduction		
	Parents	through school councils				innovative programs at schools
	Media & Public Opinion		by the government	Party political newspapers attempt to influence the public		
	Higher Education & Research Institutes	pro-reform academics support Ministry reforms	by Ministry of "academic middle class"	academic nomenklatura		
HUNGARY	Teachers	though school advisory boards		by headmasters; Ministry through "witchhunts" & headmaster appts		demonstrations and strikes
	Teacher Associations	PDTU pressure Ministry for reforms	by Ministry of Associations	of PTU in organised professions		
	Independent Schools	with Ministry	by Ministry and local government			Language schools meet public demand
	Religious Groups	between Ministry and Catholic schools	by Ministry of non-Catholic schools	attempt by Catholic Church through religious education introduction		
	Parents	participation in school advisory boards				
	Media & Public Opinion		government tolerate free press	attempt by political parties in "media war"		media reflect pressure from parents and public
	Higher Education & Research Institutes	between pro-reform academics and government	by Ministry of "young set" intelligentsia	academic nomenklatura resist change		
CSFR	Teachers	through school boards/ councils	of critical parents	by Ministry through "wild purges"		Demonstrations and strikes
	Teacher Associations	PU and TFS co-operate with state reforms	by Ministry of associations	of TTU in organised profession		
	Independent Schools	"testing ground" for Ministry reforms				Fulfill need of pro-reform/parents
	Religious Groups	between Ministry and Catholic Schools	by Ministry of non-Catholic schools	Ministry attempt through introduction of religious education		
	Parents	on Czech School boards and Slovak school councils				
	Media & Public Opinion		government tolerate press critisism	political parties attempt power by own newspapers		media are forum for parent & public pressure
	Higher Education & Research Institutes	by pro-reform institutes & CSAS		Academic nomenklatura attempt to retain power		

NOTE : REMARKS ON NEXT PAGE

REMARKS (p.189)

This diagram is read by starting with a particular interest group and following the "context within which it participates in reforms" through studying the horizontal flow of sub-headings.

If the teachers' interest group in Poland is taken as an example, then under the subheading "co-operation (versus protest)", the data indicates that this group participates in reforms "through school councils".

Firstly, under the subheading "obstacles", the category "tolerance" indicates (i) the groups which teachers have to be tolerant of, for example, Polish teachers tolerate empowered "parents and ministerial reforms", and (ii) also which groups are now obliged to tolerate emerging interest groups, for example, Polish teacher associations are tolerated by the "Education Ministry". The second subheading "domination" refers to interest groups which attempt to dominate a particular interest group, for example, Polish teachers continue to be dominated by remnants of the "network of pre-1987 headmasters".

The subheading "elimination" is empty as the practice of eliminating opposing interest groups, as witnessed under the pre-1989 governments, has stopped since the democratic revolutions.

The last heading "other", makes allowance for activities of interest groups which fall outside the three main forms of group participation in reforms.

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INTERVIEWS

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Howell, D.A. (24-9-91). Institute of Education, University of London.

Hromadkowa, H. (13-11-91). 1991 Chairperson for Charter 77, Human Rights Organisation, which under Pres. Vaclec Haval, played a leading role in the 1989 revolution, Prague.

Kalous, J. (15-11-91). Adviser to the Czech Minister of Education. Prague.

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KLC, J. (6-11-91). Editor, Narodna Obroda, Newspaper. Bratislava.

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Kruithop, B. (10-9-91). Stichting Interuniversitair Instituut voor Sociaal - Wetenschappelik Onderzoek, Amsterdam.

Musil, J. (Director) & Illner, M. (8-11-91). (Deputy) - Institute of Sociology, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Guest of Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences whilst in Prague.

Muskens, G. & Kinnear, R. (23-10-91). European Co-ordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Science Council, Vienna.

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Okraska. (22-11-91). NSZZ Solidarity. International Department. Warsaw.

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Pavlasek, P. (19-11-91). Representative of Slovak Union of Education and Science Workers. Warsaw.

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Sullivan, B. (15-11-91). Editor-"Prognosis". Czechoslovak-English newspaper.

Szajkowski, B. (1-10-91). Department of Political Science. Central European Section. University of Exeter. Editor: Marxist Regime Book Series.

Szechy, E. (Prof.). (29-10-91). Head of Hungarian Information Centre for Unesco-Cepes. Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest.

Szomolanylova, S. (6-11-91). Department of Sociology. Comenius University. Leading figure in Public Against Violence Party of Coalition Government. Bratislava.

Van Gent, B. (Prof.). (6-12-91). Education Department. Adult Education Section. University of Leiden.

Varga, L. (Prof.). (29-10-91). Institute for Teacher Training and Psychology. Technical University of Budapest.

Voderatski, J. (1990). Bratislava. Institute for Oriental and African Studies. Interviewed at Stellenbosch University.

Witkowska, H. (19-11-91). Engineering Faculty. Technical University of Krakow. Warsaw.

Zacek, P.P. (14-11-91) Editor-"Studentske Listy". Student newspaper at forefront of 1989 revolutions. Prague.

Zielinski, A. (22-11-91). Vice President, NES. NSZZ, Bydgoszcz region representative. Warsaw.

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